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REAL PROPERTY
William R. Van Wagner*
Lou Hedrick Jones**
Mark M. Sloan ***
HIS Article surveys developments in traditional areas of real prop-
erty law and related topics, from October 1, 1992 to September 30,
1993.1 During the Survey period, the courts made a few significant
pronouncements and the state legislature found time to promulgate amend-
ments to several Texas statutes which affect real estate practitioners. 2 Even
though cases decided during recent years have unequivocally established the
awesome force of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine3 and certain other federal
defenses available to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),4 a
stream of cases involving D'Oench, Duhme and other federal defenses con-
tinued to flow. While some of these cases were easily resolved by applying
the basic D'Oench, Duhme defense, others presented the courts with ques-
tions of the scope of the defense 5 or more technical issues surrounding the
availability of the defense, such as statutes of limitations6 and the standard
of review applicable to the FDIC's review of a failed bank's records.7 In
addition, several courts utilized the broad rationale behind D'Oench, Duhme
and its statutory companion, section 1823(e) of the United States Code (Sec-
* Shareholder, Thompson & Knight, P.C.; B.B.A., Western Michigan University, 1970;
J.D., cum laude, Southern Methodist University, 1980.
** Shareholder, Thompson & Knight, P.C.; B.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1972;
B.G.S., University of Nebraska, 1975; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1984.
*** Associate, Thompson & Knight, P.C.; B.B.A., University of Iowa, 1985; J.D., cum
laude, Southern Methodist University, 1990.
1. Although a few cases discussed in this article were decided prior to October 1, 1992,
we have included those discussions because the opinions were published after the final draft of
last year's article. As we did last year, we have attempted to address only those cases that are
most applicable to the "average" real estate practitioner. Cases which we believe deal with
unremarkable fact situations or which neither create new law nor provide worthy or new inter-
pretation of existing law have been purposely omitted or have received only minimal attention.
We caution all readers to be aware that some cases actually decided during the Survey period
are not published in time for inclusion in this article.
2. See Appendix I.
3. The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine was enunciated by the Supreme Court in D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942), and has been interpreted
and expanded by its progeny.
4. These defenses include, among others, the federal holder in due course doctrine, the
federal doctrine which prohibits usury and other punitive damages from being assessed against
the FDIC, and the prudential mootness doctrine.
5. See infra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
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tion 1823(e)),8 to accord the FDIC (as well as its predecessors and assignees)
favorable interpretations of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).9 These decisions continued the
buildup of the arsenal of weapons available to the FDIC to defeat the en-
forceability of certain contractual agreements between a failed lending insti-
tution and its borrowers through the use of the D'Oench Duhme doctrine.
I. MORTGAGES
A. MORTGAGES GENERALLY
Though inappropriate for substantial discussion, a number of cases de-
cided during the Survey period deal with general mortgage issues. These
cases include a decision holding that the retroactive application of a provi-
sion of the Texas Property Code,' 0 which requires a holder of a note secured
by residential real property to provide the debtor with notice and an oppor-
tunity to cure before accelerating the debt, does not violate the Texas Consti-
tution."I Other cases reaffirmed the following precedents:12 a party whose
property is sold through wrongful foreclosure may recover either the prop-
erty or damages, but not both; 13 a purchaser at a valid foreclosure sale, re-
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), which provides:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the [FDIC] in
any asset acquired by it under this section .... either as security for a loan or by
purchase ... , shall be valid against the [FDIC] unless such agreement-
(1) is in writing,
(2) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming an ad-
verse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the ac-
quisition of the asset by the depository institution,
(3) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution or its
loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board
or committee, and
(4) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of
the depository institution.
9. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). See infra notes 185-87 and 198-230 and
accompanying text.
10. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
11. Rey v. Acosta, 860 S.W.2d 654, 657-58 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, n.w.h.).
12. One case decided during the Survey period, In re Farb Inv. Interest Ltd., 155 B.R. 442
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993), wrongly suggests that it is settled law in Texas that a holder of a lien
may unilaterally subordinate his lien to a leasehold interest prior to the sale. Id. at 445. While
we are aware of no Texas cases which support the court's position, two cases impliedly suggest
otherwise. See United General Ins. Agency v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 740 S.W.2d 885, 886
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ) (citing W. MIKE BAGETTr, TEXAS FORECLOSURE, LAW
AND PRACTICE § 2.87 (1984)); Peterson v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, 838 S.W.2d 263, 266 n.2
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
13. Durkay v. Madco Oil Co., 862 S.W.2d 14, 21 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ
requested) (relying on Diversified Inc. v. Gibralter Say. Ass'n, 762 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied)). The plaintiff in Madco claimed that a lender
wrongfully foreclosed upon the plaintiff's property and sought the return of the foreclosed
property and the voiding of the trustee's deed which conveyed the foreclosed property. In
defending this claim, the lender argued that the four year limitations period applicable to suits
on contracts, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1994),
barred the plaintiff's claim. The appellate court concluded, however, that TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 16.033(a)(7) (Vernon 1986 & Vernon Supp. 1994), and not § 16.051, gov-
erned the case before the court. Madco, 862 S.W.2d at 18. At the time considered by the
court, § 16.033 provided that a suit to set aside a deed on the basis of a claimed defect specified
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gardless of knowledge of claims subordinate to the lien of the foreclosing
lender, takes good title to the property free of all such subordinate claims; 14
a mortgagor who suffers damage, loss or injury caused by irregularities in
the foreclosure sale process is entitled to sue for damages or sue to invalidate
the sale; 15 the twenty-one day notice period under the Texas foreclosure stat-
ute' 6 does not require the exclusion of both the day of posting and the date
of sale; 17 a debtor may waive his right to receive a notice of intent to acceler-
ate a note provided that the waiver is in writing and is clear and unequivo-
cal; 18 and notwithstanding a foreclosure of a lien superior to a leasehold
interest, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and the tenant may agree to
continue the lease in full force and effect or such an agreement may be im-
plied by the actions of the parties such as payment and acceptance of rent.19
The case law over the last several years should lead mortgagees to expect
that their documents generally will be enforced as written. However, where
the mortgagee's written documents are less than absolutely clear, the mort-
gagee may suffer consequences not initially intended. Two Survey period
within § 16.03 3, including a claim that a trustee executed a deed without record of the trustee's
authority to do so, must be brought within ten years after the date the deed is recorded with
the county clerk. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.033(a)(7) (Vernon 1986 &
Vernon Supp. 1994). Although the court's conclusion is correct, the precedential value of the
court's conclusion is questionable since the court granted a motion for (and issued a new opin-
ion following) a rehearing in which the plaintiff dropped its claim for return of the property
and instead sought damages resulting from wrongful foreclosure. Note is made that by an
amendment effective September 1, 1993, the Texas legislature amended § 16.033 to reduce the
ten year limitations period to four years with respect to suits filed on or after that date. TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.033(a)(7) (Vernon 1986 & Vernon Supp. 1994).
14. Grant v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans' Affairs, 827 F. Supp. 418, 422 (S.D. Tex. 1993);
Gainesville Oil & Gas Co. v. Farm Credit Bank, 847 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. App-Texarkana
1993, n.w.h.).
15. Gainesville Oil & Gas Co., 847 S.W.2d at 659; First State Bank v. Keilman, 851
S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
16. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1994).
17. Parker v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 852 S.W.2d 741, 743-44 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ
granted); Onwuteaka v. Cohen, 846 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1993,
writ denied). In 1993, the Texas state legislature amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002
to require that the entire day on which the twenty-one day notice of foreclosure is given be
included in the calculation of the twenty-one day notice period and that the entire day of the
foreclosure sale be excluded from the calculation of the twenty-one day notice period. TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(g) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
18. Parker, 852 S.W.2d at 744. In Parker, the debtor argued that although the waiver
contained in the note clearly and unequivocally waived the debtor's right to a notice of intent
to accelerate, the notice was rendered ambiguous because the other loan documents did not
contain such a waiver. The court concluded that any requirement that all loan documents
contain the waiver of notice of intent to accelerate would be "unnecessarily duplicative." Id.
The debtor also argued that the foreclosure was wrongful because the noteholder failed to
allow the debtor a 20-day period to cure his default under § 51.002(d) of the Texas Property
Code, which generally sets forth the noteholder's and debtor's respective obligations and rights
regarding notice and cure when the property which is the subject of the foreclosure sale is the
debtor's residence. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994). The Parker
court concluded that the debtor's argument was flawed in one significant respect-the property
foreclosed upon was not the debtor's residence. 852 S.W.2d at 744-45. Effective September 1,
1993, the Texas legislature amended § 51.002 by expressly providing that § 51.002 (d) applies
only to foreclosures involving a debtor's residence. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1994).
19. Parker, 852 S.W.2d at 745.
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cases are good examples of this maxim. In the first case, Law Offices of C
Kendall Harrell, P.C. v. Commerce Savings Association,20 a lender financed
an unrelated party's acquisition of an office complex from an affiliate of the
lender. The acquired property included a leasehold interest created in a
parking agreement entitling the lessee to lease a specified number of parking
spaces in a garage located on land adjacent to the acquired property. The
lessee under the parking agreement also had the right to sublease parking
spaces in the garage to individual third parties. The parking agreement was
clearly intended to enable the owner of the office complex to provide parking
in close proximity to the office complex for tenants of the complex.
Notwithstanding the parking agreement's importance to the purchaser of the
office complex, the documents evidencing the acquisition loan neither allo-
cated any portion of the loan proceeds to the acquisition of the leasehold
interest nor expressly included the leasehold interest as part of the collateral
securing the acquisition loan. Moreover, the deed conveying the office com-
plex to the borrower did not include a description of or a reference to the
leasehold interest. The borrower later defaulted on the acquisition loan.
Following the default, the lender and the borrower each sent letters to ten-
ants of the office building representing themselves as the proper party to
receive the office rentals and parking rentals for the spaces subleased pursu-
ant to the parking agreement. Concerned over who had the legal right to the
office and parking rents, certain tenants of the office complex filed inter-
pleader actions against the lender and borrower, requesting the court to de-
termine which party was entitled to those rents. 21 The lender and borrower
made various cross-claims against each other, the most basic of which were
competing claims to the office and parking rents. In addition, the borrower
went on the offensive, seeking a determination that the borrower was entitled
to equitable reimbursement for the operating expenses incurred between the
date of default and the date of foreclosure and that it was the owner of the
leasehold interest in the parking agreement.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the lender on the issue of
ownership of the office rentals, concluding that the assignment of rents was
absolute in nature and that the lender became entitled to all rents collected
by the borrower from and after the date of default until the date of foreclo-
sure.22 Attempting to expand its recovery, the lender argued that it was
20. 824 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
21. After the filing of the interpleader action, the RTC became the conservator of the
lender and removed the actions from state court to federal court.
22. Law Offices of C. Kendall Harrell, P.C., 824 F. Supp. at 1167, 1172. The form of
assignment is set forth on page 1177 of the court's opinion and is nearly identical to the assign-
ment which the Fifth Circuit held to be absolute in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. International
Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (5th Cir. 1992). Based on the loan docu-
ments, the court determined that the default in payment occurred only after the contractual
notice and cure periods expired and that the lender became entitled to the building rents re-
ceived from and after the date of default. Law Offices of C. Kendall Harrell, P. C., 824 F. Supp.
at 1172-75. Notwithstanding these determinations, the court concluded that the borrower was
the proper owner of the building rents collected during the month of default because the lender
(1) failed to introduce any evidence that the rentals collected during the month of default were
collected after the date of default and (2) failed to establish what portion of the rentals col-
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entitled to recovery of punitive damages on the theory that the borrower
improperly converted the rents. Although the court recognized that the
lender had an arguable claim of conversion as to rents received by the bor-
rower after the date of its default, the court declined to so hold because the
court had already awarded the lender the rents on the theory of absolute
assignment. Moreover, punitive damages were inappropriate since, in the
court's judgment, the borrower had not acted wantonly or maliciously. 23
Attempting to acquire the rents through a back door, the borrower argued
that it was entitled to equitable reimbursement for operating expenses in-
curred after the date of the borrower's default. 24 The court slammed the
door shut, however, concluding that the borrower's contract, and not equity,
controlled the issue of reimbursement for operating expenses. 25 As one
would expect, the court located provisions in the deed of trust obligating the
borrower to pay promptly all expenses incurred in connection with the mort-
gaged property and to reimburse the lender for any expenses incurred in
connection with the use, custody, or operation of the mortgaged property.26
These provisions clearly established the borrower's responsibility for the op-
erating costs of the office complex prior to foreclosure, thereby eliminating
any possible claim for equitable reimbursement. 27
Wanting more than the rents and perhaps to obtain what it thought to be
an absolute need for operating and leasing its newly acquired office complex,
the lender sought ownership of the leasehold interest in the parking garage,
arguing that the definition of the collateral under the loan documents ex-
pressly included the leasehold interest. In the alternative, the lender argued
that the leasehold interest was an appurtenance to the mortgaged property
and therefore a part of the collateral secured by the deed of trust. Not sur-
prisingly, the court appeared somewhat befuddled by the lender's express
inclusion argument as there was no specific reference to the leasehold inter-
est in the description of the collateral in the loan documents. Placating the
lender, the court acknowledged the collateral description was arguably am-
biguous. 28 The court concluded, however, that an ambiguous collateral de-
scription was not a sufficient reason to declare the leasehold interest a part of
the mortgaged property. 29 The court then rejected the lender's appurte-
lected during the month of default was attributable to office rents as opposed to the parking
rents. Id. at 1175.
23. Id. at 1178 (citing George Thomas Homes, Inc. v. Southwest Tension Sys., Inc., 763
S.W.2d 797, 797 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ)).
24. The lender argued that the borrower was not entitled to reimbursement because of the
unclean hands theory and because the borrower failed to exhaust the administrative claims
process pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3). The court rejected these arguments, but fortu-
nately for the lender, the court (on its own initiative) concluded that the borrower was not
entitled to reimbursement under the provisions of the loan documents. Id. at 1180. See infra
notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 1180.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1182. Based on the limited language of the deed of trust and conveyance docu-





nance argument, reasoning that the parking available under the parking
agreement was not indispensable to the use and enjoyment of the office com-
plex as required by Texas law. 30 Disbelieving the court's position, the lender
countered, arguing that the parking spaces were important inducements to
prospective tenants. Perhaps so, acknowledged the court, but no evidence
appeared in the record indicating that the parking spaces were absolutely
necessary in order to obtain new tenants. Moreover, the defaulting and dis-
enfranchised owner had presented evidence showing that it had obtained
some tenants without the necessity of providing parking spaces in the
garage.31
Apparently believing a vendor's lien to be broader in scope than the deed
of trust lien, the lender argued that the express vendor's lien retained in the
warranty deed that conveyed the improvements to the borrower and/or the
implied vendor's lien to which the lender was entitled under common law
created a lien against the leasehold interest under the parking agreement.
The court acknowledged that both the express vendor's lien and the implied
vendor's lien created a lien against the land, the office building, and the ap-
purtenances. 32 The court held, however, that neither the express vendor's
lien nor the implied vendor's lien covered the leasehold interest in the park-
ing garage, reasoning that the leasehold interest was not an appurtenance,
was not expressly conveyed by the deed, and was not acquired with the
purchase money. 33
Having lost each argument under the loan and conveyance documents, the
lender sought reformation of the deed of trust and warranty deed, arguing
that the leasehold interest was not covered by either the loan documents or
the warranty deed because of a mistake. The court recognized that under
certain circumstances the doctrine of mutual mistake entitles a party to ref-
ormation of a contract and that Texas law permits a contract to be set aside
if the acts of another party induce a unilateral mistake.34 Under the facts
before it, however, the court concluded that no mutual mistake existed be-
cause the lender claimed that the leasehold estate was to be covered by the
deed of trust lien and the vendor's lien, while the borrower claimed that
neither the deed of trust lien nor the vendor's lien was intended to cover the
leasehold estate.35 The court further noted that counsel for each party testi-
fied that no mistake, "unilateral or otherwise," had occurred with respect to
30. Id. at 1183 (citing Pine v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass'n, 519 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which concluded that an appurtenance
means "all rights and interests in other property [that are] necessary for the full enjoyment of
the property conveyed and which [are] used as necessary incidents thereto" and Ogden v.
Jones, 37 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1931, writ dism'd)).
31. Law Offices ofC. Kendall Harrell, P.C., 824 F. Supp. at 1183. Noticeably absent from
the court's discussion was whether parking was available in the general area of the office com-
plex and whether the parking was needed to satisfy any applicable zoning ordinance.
32. Id. at 1184.
33. Id. The first two reasons supported the court's holding as to the express vendor's lien
and the last reason supported the court's holding as to the implied vendor's lien. Id.
34. Id. at 1185.
35. Id. at 1185-86.
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the drafting of the documents.3 6 Based on these facts and the sophistication
of the parties, the court reached the inescapable conclusion that neither
party had been induced by the other to make a unilateral mistake. 37
Realizing that it had lost the war over the ownership of the leasehold
estate, the lender argued that it was entitled to offset all parking rentals paid
in respect of the subleased parking spaces against the deficiency under the
note. The court had little difficulty declaring the lender victorious in this
skirmish, as the deed of trust granted the noteholder an extremely broad
right of offset.38
In the second case, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Bodin Concrete
Co. ,39 a borrower executed a deed of trust containing a dragnet clause which
provided that the mortgage secured a specific promissory note, 40 together
with all other debts "which may hereafter ... be owing by [the borrower] to
the [lender]." '4' Following execution of the mortgage, the bank and the bor-
rower entered into a settlement agreement regarding several notes executed
by the borrower prior to the execution of the deed of trust. Several months
after the execution of the settlement agreement, two contractors filed
mechanic's liens against the property mortgaged to the bank, claiming that
the borrower had not paid for materials used at the mortgaged property. A
few months after the filing of the mechanic's liens, the borrower defaulted
under the settlement agreement and, relying on that default, the bank fore-
closed its lien against the mortgaged property. The holders of the
mechanic's liens promptly filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking deter-
minations that the bank's foreclosure was void, the bank's deed of trust did
not secure the borrower's obligations under the settlement agreement, and
that the settlement agreement resulted in an accord and satisfaction of the
deed of trust.4 2 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
36, Id. at 1186.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1187.
39. 869 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
40. According to testimony given in the trial court, the borrower executed the promissory
note in connection with the bank's issuance of a letter of credit for the benefit of the borrower.
Although not a party to the lawsuit filed by the holder of the mechanic's lien, the borrower
testified that the bank orally agreed to fund the note only to the extent that draws were funded
under the letter of credit and that the bank funded no draws under the letter of credit. The
FDIC, which arrived on the scene after the bank failed, argued that D'Oench, Duhme and
Section 1823(e) barred the borrower's alleged agreement with the bank regarding funding of
the note. For a more thorough discussion regarding the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and Section
1823(e) issues in this case, see infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
41. Bodin Concrete, 869 S.W.2d at 374.
42. On an initial appeal of this case, the appellate court concluded that the mechanic's
liens were invalid because the holders failed to provide notices required by the statute. On this
second appeal, however, the court concluded that each of the suppliers was an original con-
tractor entitled to a constitutional mechanic's lien, and that the constitutional mechanic's liens
would be superior to the bank's prior recorded deed of trust as to the materials supplied if the
materials supplied could be removed without material injury to the mortgaged property. Id. at
381-82 (relying on Justice Mortgage Investors v. C.B. Thompson Constr. Co., 533 S.W.2d 939,
944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ refd n.r.e.)). Because the trial court did not reach a
determination as to material injury to the mortgaged property and there was no evidence in the
record concerning material injury, the court concluded that the priority issue should be deter-
mined by the trial court on remand. Id.
19941 1555
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bank and the appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial
court found in favor of the holders of the mechanic's liens. The bank then
appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that (1) the dragnet
clause in the deed of trust applied only to funds advanced to the borrower
after the execution of the deed of trust and (2) the bank wrongfully
foreclosed.
In construing the dragnet clause, the court concluded that no substantive
difference existed between the words "which may hereafter be owing," used
in the dragnet clause at issue, and the words "which may hereafter become
owing," used in a dragnet clause in a prior case decided by the Texas
Supreme Court and which, according to the Bodin Concrete court, the Texas
Supreme Court construed to encompass only funds advanced in the future. 43
Since the borrower executed the notes addressed in the settlement prior to
the deed of trust, the Bodin Concrete court held that the deed of trust did not
secure those notes."4 Therefore, the bank had no right to foreclose the lien
of the deed of trust on account of a default under those notes or the settle-
ment agreement. Accordingly, the court held that the lender wrongfully
foreclosed and voided the foreclosure sale.45 Although the court's holding
logically follows from the court's construction of the dragnet clause, the
court arguably erred in concluding that no difference existed between the
phrases "which may hereafter be owing" and "hereafter becomes owing."
According to Webster's Dictionary, "become" refers to that which comes to
be (i.e., an amount which comes to be owing) while "be" refers to that which
exists at any give time.46 Therefore, that which "hereafter becomes owing"
is logically a future advance, while that which "hereafter may be owing" is
that which is owing on any given date, regardless of when advanced. 47
The Commerce Savings and Bodin Concrete cases demonstrate that a
43. Id. at 377 (citing and quoting Estes v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 462 S.W.2d 273, 276
(Tex. 1970)). Actually, the Texas Supreme Court did not attribute any particular meaning to
the quoted phrase. Rather the Estes court held that the phrase "owing or which may hereafter
become owing" by the borrower to the bank unambiguously referred to all indebtedness at any
time owed by the borrower to the Bank. Estes, 462 S.W.2d at 276.
44. Bodin Concrete, 869 S.W.2d at 377.
45. Id.
46. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 136, 139 (1986). Stated more
simply, $50 that you owe to me today may also be owing to me in the future, and if you borrow
more money from me in the future, you will become further indebted to me.
47. Two other interpretive issues were presented to the court. The settlement agreement
contained a mutual release releasing the parties from "any cause of action" and a provision
recognizing that the settlement agreement superseded all prior agreements concerning the sub-
ject matter of the settlement agreement. The holders of the mechanic's liens asserted that the
bank's right to foreclose its lien upon a default constituted a cause of action. Therefore, the
holders of the mechanic's liens argued that the bank released its right to foreclose its lien
pursuant to the mutual release contained in the release agreement. The court, with no diffi-
culty, rejected the holders' argument, holding that a private power of sale contained in a deed
of trust does not constitute a cause of action under Texas law. Bodin Concrete, 869 S.W.2d at
378. The holder of the mechanic's liens also argued that the bank waived its right to foreclose
on the basis that the settlement agreement constituted the entire agreement of the parties. The
court agreed that the settlement agreement constituted the entire agreement of the parties, but
only as to the subject matter of the settlement agreement. Id. at 378-79. The court held that
because the deed of trust did not secure the debt covered by the settlement agreement, the
subject matter of the settlement agreement did not include the deed of trust. Id. Accordingly,
1556 [Vol. 47
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mortgagee must be concerned that its documents clearly express the mortga-
gee's intent. However, Texas courts do not have a license to require that
particular provisions in a mortgage document expressly address every con-
tingency in order to be logically read, as demonstrated by Edwards v. Holle-
man .48 In Holleman, a noteholder accelerated the note and the trustee
instituted foreclosure proceedings. Prior to the foreclosure sale, the debtor
located a purchaser for the property and requested a payoff figure from the
noteholder. The payoff figure included attorney's fees and trustee's fees, to
which the debtor objected. Nevertheless, the debtor went forward with the
sale and paid the attorney's fees and trustee's fees under protest at the clos-
ing. The debtor then brought suit against the noteholder to recover the fees.
Perhaps to the shock of the noteholder, the district court entered judgment
in favor of the debtor and the noteholder appealed to the Houston Court of
Appeals.
The court of appeals examined the language of the loan documents to
determine the noteholder's right to demand reimbursement for attorney's
fees and/or trustee's fees. The deed of trust provided for the noteholder's
right to reimbursement of costs and expenses, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, incurred by the noteholder in connection with the exercise of its
rights and remedies. Inexplicably, however, the Houston Court of Appeals
concluded that the trustee's fees were not costs and expenses covered by this
deed of trust provision.49 The court looked instead to another provision of
the deed of trust that provided that the noteholder had the right to apply the
proceeds received from a foreclosure sale to the payment of trustee's fees and
attorney's fees. 50 This provision, according to the court, entitled the note-
holder to payment for trustee's fees only if a foreclosure sale actually oc-
curred.51 Disagreeing with the court's conclusion, the noteholder appealed
to the Texas Supreme Court, which, in a per curiam opinion, concluded that
the trustee's fees logically constituted a cost and expense incurred in enforc-
ing the noteholder's rights and remedies; therefore, the trustee's fees were
recoverable under the deed of trust.5 2
B. DEFICIENCY
Section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code, which applies to deficiency
actions arising out of foreclosures occurring on or after April 1, 1991, allows
any person pursued for a deficiency to request the court to determine the fair
market value of the property at the time of foreclosure.53 If the court deter-
the "settlement agreement did not extinguish the [b]ank's foreclosure right under the [deed of
trust]." Id. at 379.
48. 862 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1993).
49. Edwards v. Holleman, 842 S.W.2d 704, 706-07 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992), rev'd, 862 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1993).
50. Id. at 706.
51. Id.
52. 862 S.W.2d at 581. In somewhat of a backhanded slap, the Texas Supreme Court
stated that the court of appeals' holding did not logically follow from the deed of trust provi-
sion relied on by that court. Id.
53. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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mines that the property purchased at foreclosure sold for less than its fair
market value, the statute requires the reduction of the deficiency by the
amount by which the fair market value, less the secured indebtedness not
extinguished by the foreclosure, exceeds the sale price. 54 Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. v. Schwarzer,55 the first case that applied section 51.003 to a
deficiency action, involved a borrower who defaulted on a $230,000 note
secured by a deed of trust. Prior to commencing the foreclosure sale, the
noteholder received a financial statement from the borrower establishing the
value of the property at $50,000. To support this value, the borrower sub-
mitted the research of a local realtor and statements from local realtors that
the property would not sell for more than $35,800. The noteholder also
received two appraisals, one dated approximately sixteen months prior to the
foreclosure sale established the value of the property at $140,000 and the
other dated approximately three months prior to the foreclosure sale estab-
lished the value of the property at $77,500. The $77,500 appraisal assumed
the property would be sold in two to three months after the date the prop-
erty was placed on the market.
After receiving this information, the noteholder commenced foreclosure
proceedings and, as the highest bidder, acquired the property at the foreclo-
sure sale for a price of $69,500. The noteholder then brought suit against
the borrower to collect the deficiency resulting from the foreclosure sale.
After the noteholder brought the deficiency action, the borrower obtained a
new appraisal establishing the value at $153,000, if the property were used
for a commercial or apartment development and sold in twelve to eighteen
months. Shortly after obtaining this appraisal, the borrower, pursuant to
section 51.003, requested the court to determine the fair market value of the
foreclosed property.
Although the court did not provide a definition of fair market value, the
court's review of the evidence relating to the value of the property provides
some guidance as to the evidence a court might accept in determining fair
market value. The court gave little weight, if any, to the appraisal dated
approximately sixteen months before the foreclosure sale. The $153,000 ap-
praisal obtained by the borrower after the foreclosure sale fared little better.
The court concluded that the $153,000 value, which assumed that the prop-
erty would be used for commercial or apartment development, was not real-
istic for several reasons. First, the property was located approximately
twenty to thirty minutes outside of the city off of a major highway; second,
some evidence existed indicating that the property served as a habitat for
two endangered species; and third, the general real estate market continued
to experience a general softening.56 Moreover, the court did not lose sight of
the fact that the borrower unsuccessfully attempted to sell the property dur-
54. Id. § 51.003(c).
55. 812 F. Supp. 700 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
56. Id. at 702. The court suggested that until further investigation established that the
property did not serve as a habitat for endangered species, the mere allegation that the prop-
erty might serve as a habitat for endangered species would significantly affect the value of the
property. Id. at n.4.
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ing the preceding three years.5 7
According to the court, the appraisal setting the value of the property at
$77,500 accurately established the fair market value of the property, espe-
cially in light of the fact that this value most closely agreed with the bor-
rower's financial statements and the letter supplied by the borrower, both of
which relied on consultations with local real estate agents.5 8 The borrower
argued that the $77,500 appraisal did not accurately establish the property's
fair market value because the appraisal established value as of a date several
months earlier than the foreclosure sale and the appraisal utilized a disposi-
tion period of two to three months, as opposed to the period generally used
in commercial appraisals (nine to eighteen months). However, the testimony
of the preparer of the $77,500 appraisal and the fact that the borrower had
been offering the property for sale for well over eighteen months convinced
the court that the appraiser's opinion of fair market value would not differ if
the appraiser had determined fair market value as of the foreclosure sale date
or if the appraiser had used a disposition period of nine to eighteen
months. 59
C. SUBROGATION
Three cases decided during the Survey period dealing with the principle of
equitable subrogation deserve discussion. In one of the cases, Dietrich In-
dustries, Inc. v. United States,60 a buyer and seller agreed to use the pro-
ceeds from the sale of property to obtain a release of the first lien against the
property being sold. Even though the sale generated proceeds less than the
debt secured by the first lien, the holder of the first lien agreed to release its
lien in exchange for receipt of the full sales price. Apparently, either the
buyer's title company committed a significant error or the buyer failed to
have a title search performed, because a properly recorded tax lien affecting
the property existed at the time of closing. The tax lien, however, was
subordinate to the first lien which had been released in exchange for the sales
proceeds. After becoming aware of the existence of the federal tax lien, the
buyer filed a declaratory action against the government seeking a determina-
tion that the doctrine of equitable subrogation entitled the buyer to be equi-
tably subrogated to the first lien released in exchange for the sales proceeds.
The district court rejected the buyer's equitable subrogation argument and
the buyer appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
On appeal, the government argued that an appeals court case, McDowell v.
M. Jones Lumber Co.,61 controlled the case before the court. In McDow-
ell, the court held that a purchaser was not entitled to be subrogated to a lien
released in connection with the purchase, even though (1) the purchase price
57. Id. at 702. The importance of the court's observation that the property had not sold
for three years is somewhat negligible without knowing at what price the property had been
offered for sale.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 702-03.
60. 988 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1993).
61. 93 S.W. 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, no writ).
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was used to obtain the release of the lien and (2) the purchaser was not
aware of a junior lien affecting the property. 62 The Fifth Circuit agreed that
if McDowell controlled, the plaintiff's equitable subrogation argument would
fail. 63 The court, however, concluded that McDowell contradicted two
Texas Supreme Court decisions, Fears v. Albea 64 and First National Bank v.
Ackerman,65 each of which allowed a purchaser of land to be equitably sub-
rogated to a lien where the seller and purchaser agreed that the sales pro-
ceeds would be used to satisfy the debt secured by that lien. 66 In the court's
judgment, the Fears and Ackerman holdings required the Fifth Circuit to
hold that the doctrine of equitable subrogation entitled the buyer to be equi-
tably subrogated to the lien released in exchange for the sale proceeds. 67 In
reaching this holding, the court made clear that the equities favored the
buyer, noting that if the buyer had been aware of the government's liens, the
buyer would have had the opportunity to structure the transaction in a way
that would have protected the buyer's interest in the property.68 Moreover,
the property records established the inferiority of the government's lien
before the release of the lien and the purchase of the property. To elevate
the government's position above the party who paid for the release in order
to protect its interest in the property would, in the court's opinion, allow the
government to receive an unearned windfall. 69
The government countered with two arguments, neither of which received
more than a polite nod from the court. The government first argued that the
buyer's constructive knowledge of the federal tax lien barred the buyer from
claiming equitable subrogation. 70 Recognizing that some jurisdictions hold
that constructive knowledge bars an equitable subrogation claim, the court
concluded that Texas law supports a contrary conclusion. 71 Grasping at the
62. Id. at 476-77.
63. Dietrich Indus., 988 F.2d at 571.
64. 69 Tex. 437, 6 S.W. 286 (1887).
65. 70 Tex. 315, 8 S.W. 45 (1888) (holding that purchaser was equitably subrogated to
lien where seller promised to use sale proceeds to satisfy lien but failed to do so).
66. Dietrich Indus., 988 F.2d at 571-72.
67. Id. at 572.
68. Id. at 573.
69. Id.
70. As authority for its position in Dietrich Indus., the government relied on Providence
Inst. for Sav. v. Sims, 441 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1969), in which the Texas Supreme Court noted
that "[n]egligence on the part of one seeking subrogation is of some importance when the right
is wholly dependent upon equitable principles." Id. at 519. However, the Sims court further
noted that it located no Texas cases holding that constructive knowledge barred a party's right
to claim equitable subrogation, but that one appellate court had held that a purchaser's con-
structive knowledge of a junior claim did not defeat the purchaser's right to claim equitable
subrogation. Id. (citing Sanger Bros. v. Ely & Waler Dry Goods Co., 207 S.W. 348 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1918, writ refd)).
71. Dietrich Indus., 988 F.2d at 572 (relying on Fears v. Albea, 69 Tex. 437, 6 S.W. 286,
292 (1887)). In Fears, the purchaser and seller agreed to use the sales proceeds to satisfy the
first lien against the property. At the time of purchase, a properly recorded second lien also
existed against the property. However, the purchaser did not perform a search of the applica-
ble real estate records and did not otherwise have actual knowledge of the junior lien. The
junior lienholder subsequently foreclosed its lien and was the successful bidder, and the pur-
chaser/owner sued seeking relief. Although the purchaser's constructive notice of the junior
lien did not impair the purchaser's right to claim equitable subrogation, the court held that the
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last straw, the government reminded the court that a party is not entitled to
be equitably subrogated to a lien until the debt secured by the lien is paid in
full. 72 This rule, argued the government, barred the buyer's right to equita-
ble subrogation because the buyer obtained the release by paying less than
the entire secured debt. The court recognized the rule cited by the govern-
ment, but also recognized that the rule existed to protect senior creditors
who continue to hold lien rights following partial payment by a party other
than the debtor.73 On the facts before the court, although only partial pay-
ment had been made, the lienholder had agreed to discharge its lien in ex-
change for the partial payment. Since no senior lienholder existed and
because the rule did not exist to benefit a junior lienholder such as the gov-
ernment, the court concluded that the rule did not bar the buyer's entitle-
ment to equitable subrogation.7 4
In the second equitable subrogation case, O'Dell v. First National Bank,7
the Texas Supreme Court reached the right result but made an unnecessary
holding that could have significant impact on future equitable subrogation
cases. In O'Dell, the plaintiff purchased approximately 190 acres of land.
The plaintiff financed the purchase by assuming a recourse note secured by a
first lien against the land and delivering to the seller the plaintiff's recourse
promissory note secured by a second lien against the land. The note secured
by the first lien contained provisions entitling the obligor to fifteen days no-
tice prior to acceleration of maturity. The plaintiff later sold the land, to-
gether with some additional land acquired by the plaintiff, to a third party
who financed the purchase with a non-recourse promissory note payable to
the plaintiff and secured by a third lien against the property. Thereafter,
that purchaser obtained a loan from a bank to satisfy, among other things,
the first and second liens. The bank secured its loan with a fourth lien deed
of trust which characterized (1) the liens securing payment of the bank's
note as subordinate to the third lien, except to the extent of the amount of
the first and second lien indebtedness satisfied with the proceeds from the
bank's financing76 and (2) the first and second liens as valid and subsisting
liens assigned to the bank for the purpose of securing the payment of the
foreclosure of the junior lien was valid because the purchaser/owner had constructive knowl-
edge of the junior lien at the time of the purchase, and that the holder of the junior lien, as the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale, became the owner of the property. Fears, 6 S.W. at 292. The
court further held, however, that the property should be sold, with the proceeds being used to
first satisfy the principal and interest due on the first lien note and the remainder of the pro-
ceeds being paid to the second lien holder, Id. Although the first lien note had previously
been paid, the court apparently concluded that the amount required to satisfy the principal
and interest on the first lien note was equal to that amount of principal and interest which
would have been outstanding if the note had not been paid with the proceeds of sale.
72. Dietrich Indus., 988 F.2d at 572..
73. Id.
74. Id. at 572-73.
75. 856 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. 1993).
76. Pursuant'to the bank's deed of trust, the bank subordinated its liens up to a stated
amount as to the portion of the land covered by the first, second and third liens and fully
subordinated its liens to the third lien as to the remainder of the land, a 50 acre tract which
apparently had been separately acquired by the third lienholder and constituted a part of the
land purchased by the bank's borrower from the third lienholder.
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bank's loan. The bank's deed of trust did not, however, provide for any of
the notice provisions contained in the first lien note. The bank's note also
waived all notices which had been reserved under the first lien note. The
bank's borrower subsequently defaulted under the bank's note and the bank,
without notifying the holder of the third lien, foreclosed its fourth lien at
private sale. On the day following the bank's foreclosure of its fourth lien,
the bank notified the holder of the third lien that the bank's foreclosure had
extinguished the third lien. Shortly thereafter, the holder of the third lien
privately foreclosed the third lien, and filed a declaratory judgment action
seeking determinations that the bank had foreclosed a fourth lien, that the
fourth lien was subordinate to the third lien and that the foreclosure of the
plaintiff's third lien extinguished the bank's fourth lien. On summary judg-
ment, the trial court found that based on the equitable subrogation doctrine
the bank had foreclosed the first and second liens, and the holder of the third
lien appealed to the San Antonio Court of Appeals.
In a confusing and somewhat cryptic decision that never mentions the
words equitable subrogation let alone discusses the concept, the appellate
court reversed the trial court. 77 Relying on the principle that "a mortgage
can have no legal effect apart from the debt or obligation which it is designed
to secure,"78 the court held that the first and second liens ceased to exist at
the moment the bank paid the debt secured by those liens. 79 With its equita-
ble subrogation argument receiving no attention whatsoever, the bank ap-
pealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
The Texas Supreme Court recognized that a party is entitled to be subro-
gated to the liens securing a debt that is satisfied by that party at the request
of the debtor and under circumstances that make it appear that the party
making the payment is entitled to the benefits of the security for the satisfied
debt.8 0 Under this principle, the bank would not be entitled to equitable
subrogation unless it established that its borrower was a debtor with respect
to the first and second liens. To establish this as fact, the bank argued, some-
what weakly, that although its borrower had purchased the property "sub-
ject to" the first and second liens, the bank's borrower could and did assume
liability under the first and second lien notes by signing the bank's note,
which included the amounts that had previously been outstanding on the
first and second lien notes. The court responded that the prior debt must be
for the benefit of the debtor who, according to the court, is the party liable
for payment of the debt at the time of the "subrogation transaction."8t Fur-
77. O'Dell v. First Nat'l Bank, 855 S.W.2d I (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991), rev'd, 856
S.W.2d 410 (Tex. 1993).
78. Id. at 4 (citing Teas v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 460 S.W.2d 233, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1970, writ refd n.r.e); Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Custom Leasing, Inc., 402 S.W.2d
926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, no writ); Spencer-Sauer Lumber Co. v. Ballard, 98
S.W.2d 1054 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1936, no writ)).
79. Id.
80. O'Dell, 856 S.W.2d at 415.
81. Id. This is clearly the case in subrogation cases which do not involve a purchase and
sale financed through third party financing. The application of these principles are part of the
difficulty with the court's broader holding that "the party must at least be an obligor before the
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thering this concept, the court held that "a party must at least be an obligor
before the renewal transaction for the [equitable subrogation] doctrine to ap-
ply. 18 2 From this holding, the O'Dell court logically concluded that the
bank was not entitled to rely on the equitable subrogation doctrine because
the bank's borrower was not personally liable for the first and second lien
notes before the renewal transaction occurred.83 Although the court's con-
clusion is correct, the court's holding regarding the status of the debtor is
broader than necessary. For example, if the holding is strictly applied, a
third party lender who refinances a debtor's non-recourse (but secured) obli-
gation owing to a prior lender would not be entitled to rely on the doctrine
of equitable subrogation to take advantage of the priority of the prior
lender's liens. In addition, in a purchase and sale situation similar to the
facts of the Dietrich case, the lender providing the acquisition financing
would not be entitled to equitable subrogation because its borrower never
had liability on the satisfied debt. The O'Dell court probably did not antici-
pate or intend these results, and other courts relying on O'Dell should con-
sider limiting the application of the O'Dell holding to the facts of the case or
perhaps to mortgage subrogation cases involving holders of intervening
interests. 84
The O'Dell case should be compared with Med Center Bank v. Fleet-
wood,85 which also involved the holder of an intervening interest seeking to
avoid a lender's claim that it was entitled to be subrogated to a lien which
secured debt satisfied by the lender.8 6 The facts concerning the intervening
interest in Fleetwood, however, differ in two significant respects. First, the
renewal transaction for the [equitable subrogation] doctrine to apply." Id. at 416 (emphasis
added); see infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
83. Id.; cf Lindsey, Stephenson & Lindsey v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 158 B.R. 75
(N.D. Tex. 1992) (holding a non-recourse note is a debt for purposes of determining the
debtor's aggregate debt under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12), 109(0 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). In reach-
ing its conclusion that the bank's borrower was not the debtor at the time of the subrogation
transaction, the court relied on two ancient cases, Faires v. Cockrill, 88 Tex. 428, 31 S.W. 190,
194 (1895); and Oury v. Saunders, 77 Tex. 278, 13 S.W. 1030, 1031 (1890). Neither of these
cases dealt with situations in which the purchaser utilized third party financing to acquire the
property. The court should have more appropriately relied on the Fears and Ackerman cases
relied on by the Fifth Circuit in Dietrich Indus. v. United States, both of which are subroga-
tion cases involving third party financing used to fund the purchase price in a sale transaction
between the lender's borrower and the owner of the property. See supra notes 60-74 and ac-
companying text.
84. The O'Dell court could have decided the equitable subrogation argument based solely
on its holding that the bank could not claim the benefits of equitable subrogation since the
equities favored the third lien holder. 856 S.W.2d at 416. In the court's judgment, the bank's
avoidance of the notice provisions (1) unfairly enabled the bank, the fourth lien holder, to
obtain the equity in the property and (2) unfairly denied the third lien holder its right to
protect the property, the only asset from which the third lien debt could be satisfied. Id. The
court could have relied on this reasoning to achieve its apparent goal to deny the bank the
ability to obtain the equity in the property over and above the amount of the first lien debt
without first giving the third lien holder the opportunity of satisfying the first and second lien
notes, as contemplated by the notice provision of the first lien note.
85. 854 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
86. Id. at 285 (quoting Fleetwood v. Med. Ctr. Bank, 786 S.W.2d 550, 553-54 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1990, writ denied)).
1994] 1563
SMU LAW REVIEW
initial holder of the lien to which the subsequent lender claimed a right of
subrogation also held the intervening interest, a leasehold estate expressly
subordinated to the lien. Second, both the lien and the intervening interest
arose out of the same financing transaction. Relying on the principle that
lenders who refinance or satisfy debt should be entitled to be subrogated to
any liens securing the refinanced debt or satisfied debt "unless the superior
or equal equities of others would be prejudiced thereby," the court held that
the refinancing lender in Fleetwood correctly asserted its right of subroga-
tion, thereby extinguishing the subordinate leasehold estate.8 7 Furthering its
observation that subrogation strengthens the recognized policy of allowing
debtors to refinance their debts, the court concluded that "absent a showing
that subrogation results in additional debt having priority over or parity
with the intervening interest, a material change in the terms of the superior
interest, or other pecuniary loss resulting from the subrogation, there is no
prejudice to intervening interest holders."'8 8  Generally, the Fleetwood
court's statements and conclusions are logically made and presented. 89 If
the O'Dell court had utilized similar principles and conclusions, the O'Dell
court could have reached the desired result, without enunciating its broad
holding.
D. NOVATION
In two Survey decisions, a party argued that the execution of a new note
87. Id. at 287-88.
88. Id. at 286. In Fleetwood, the holder of the leasehold estate claimed that it carefully
crafted the transaction to provide for both the lien and the leasehold estate in order to provide
the utmost flexibility concerning its rights in the property covered by both the lien and the
leasehold estate. The court, however, concluded that the intention of the intervening party is
irrelevant with regard to the subrogation determination. Id. at 287. Moreover, allowing the
holder of the leasehold estate to prevent subrogation would, in the court's opinion, "violate the
policy favoring debtor refinancing of debts and the policy against 'clogging' of the equitable
right of redemption of debts." Id. at 286 (relying on Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332, 337 (1877);
Laird v. Weis, 85 Tex. 93, 23 S.W. 864, 865 (1892).
89. While the majority court recognized that subrogation does not wholly depend on eq-
uity where the deed of trust given by the debtor acknowledged the use of the proceeds to pay
off the prior debt and subrogated the lender to the rights of the preceding lender regarding the
prior lien, a dissenting opinion recognized that subrogation is a doctrine of equity, unchanged
by a subrogation agreement between the new lender and the debtor. Id. at 287. This difference
in opinion, however, did not significantly impact the result of the case in light of the majority's
use of equitable principles. The Fleetwood court also addressed a subsidiary issue concerning
subordination. As stated above, the lessee, who also initially held the lien to which the subse-
quent lender claimed a right of subrogation, expressly subordinated the lease to the lien. The
lessee later subordinated its lien to a lien securing long term financing for the property, but did
not expressly subordinate the lease to the lien securing the long term financing. The lessee
claimed that its lease had priority over the lien securing the long term financing since the lease
had never been subordinated to that lien. Without citing any authority for its position, the
court concluded that the lien securing the long term financing had priority over the lease
because the lease had been expressly subordinated to the first lien and the first lien had been
expressly subordinated to the lien securing the long term financing. Id. at-283. The court's
conclusion is extremely questionable since no contractual subordination agreement existed be-
tween the holder of the lien securing the long term financing and the lessee. Cf Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Kemp, 951 F.2d 657, 662-63 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that lot owners were not
entitled to obtain the benefits of a subordination agreement between two lenders because lot
owners were neither parties to nor third party beneficiaries of the subordination agreement).
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extinguished a prior note by reason of a novation, the elements of which are
(1) a prior valid contract, (2) an agreement by all parties to a new contract,
(3) the extinguishment of the old contract, and (4) a new valid contract.90
Both cases recognize that a novation need not be established by a writing,
but may be established by the intent of the parties, which may be inferred
from the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction and the con-
duct of the parties involved in the transaction. 9'
In the first novation case, Vivion v. Grelling,92 the defendant executed a
$500,000 purchase money note in connection with his purchase of certain
property. Subsequently, the defendant sold the property to a third party,
who agreed to finance the acquisition by assuming the purchase money note
and securing its obligation with an assumption deed of trust. In addition,
and apparently as conditions to consenting to the sale of the property and
the assumption of the prior note, the payee under the purchase money note
(1) required the defendant to make a $50,000 cash payment and (2) required
the purchaser to execute a new $450,000 note and a deed of trust, which
provided for the renewal and extension of the lien securing the defendant's
$500,000 note. Thereafter, the purchaser defaulted under the $450,000 note.
The payee then notified the defendant that the defendant was liable under
the $500,000 note and demanded that the defendant continue the payments,
failing which the payee would foreclose its lien against the property. As an
interim measure, the payee and the defendant entered into a letter agreement
pursuant to which the defendant agreed to temporarily make payments to
avoid foreclosure and acknowledged continuing liability under the $500,000
note. Thereafter, the defendant ceased making payments and the payee fore-
closed its lien and sued for a deficiency. The trial court concluded that the
$500,000 note had been extinguished through novation and the payee
appealed.
The appeals court agreed with the trial court, holding that the $500,000
note was extinguished through novation. 93 In so holding, the court found
the following facts and testimony persuasive: (1) the defendant testified that
he understood his $50,000 payment to be in consideration for his release
from liability under the $500,000 note; (2) the purchaser testified that he
believed the defendant had been released from all liability under the
$500,000 note; (3) the $450,000 note, although equal to the unpaid balance
of the $500,000 note, failed to reference the $500,000 note and contained
90. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Waggoner, 999 F.2d 826, 829 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Ref. Co., 822 S.W.2d 153, 163 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1991, writ denied)); Vivion v. Grelling, 837 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ
denied) (citing Talamas v. Bressi Int'l, 727 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ
refd n.r.e.)).
91. Waggoner, 999 F.2d at 829 (citing Chastain v. Cooper & Reed, 152 Tex. 322, 257
S.W.2d 422, 424 (1953)); Vivion, 837 S.W.2d at 258 (citing Bank of N. Am. v. Bluewater
Maintenance, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ refd
n.r.e.)).
92. 837 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied).
93. Id. at 258.
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terms significantly different than the terms contained in the $500,000 note;94
(4) the defendant designated its last payment under the prior note as "final
payment;" '95 (5) the defendant testified that he entered into the letter agree-
ment in order to have sufficient time to assess the situation; and (6) the de-
fendant's legal counsel recommended that the defendant enter into the letter
agreement because he doubted that there was an obligation under the prior
note to revive.96 After reading the case, one might logically conclude that
the case involved a lucky lawyer and a luckier defendant.
In the second novation case, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Wag-
goner,97 the FDIC unsuccessfully argued that a note which consolidated,
renewed and extended two prior notes resulted in a novation of the two prior
notes. The prior notes each provided that the borrower had no personal
liability for the payment of the applicable note. The consolidation note pro-
vided that it renewed and extended the two prior notes, but did not carry
forward the non-recourse language. The borrower later defaulted under the
consolidation note. Approximately two years thereafter, the FDIC, which
acquired the notes through a receivership, asserted that the borrower was
personally liable for the payment of the consolidation note. The borrower
refused to pay and the FDIC sued for collection, arguing that the consolida-
tion note resulted in a novation of the prior notes. The court concluded that
a novation of the prior notes had not occurred, relying on the facts that: (1)
the consolidated note specifically stated that the prior notes were being re-
newed and extended; (2) the FDIC offered no evidence of novation other
than the notes, while the borrower testified that both parties, at the time of
the execution of the consolidation note, agreed not to change the personal
liability exceptions contained in the prior notes; and (3) the FDIC waited
nearly two years following default to assert that the borrower had personal
liability under the consolidation note.98 Even though the equities seem to
favor the borrower, one is left wondering why the FDIC did not attempt to
extend the tentacles of D'Oench, Duhme.99
II. LENDER LIABILITY
Clearly, the proliferation of lender liability cases has declined during the
past several years. Nevertheless, absent a perfect world, we will likely al-
ways see cases in which the lender incurs significant liability.l°° Consider,
for example, the following case: dad needs money; dad visits friendly banker
94. The differences between the new note and prior note included the principal amount,
period of repayment, interest rate and payment terms.
95. The defendant's last payment under the $500,000 note was apparently made shortly
before the sale of the property.
96. Vivion, 837 S.W.2d at 256-57.
97. 999 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1993).
98. Id. at 830-31.
99. See infra notes 133-49 and accompanying text.
100. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Hernandez v. Union Nat'l Bank, 149
B.R. 441, 443 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993) (holding bank's application of a portion of mortgage




to obtain blank notes payable to bank; dad asks daughter to "sign some pa-
pers" which happen to be friendly bank's blank notes; dad delivers signed
notes to friendly banker; friendly banker fills out blank notes to his satisfac-
tion and deposits proceeds of notes into daughter's account; dad withdraws
funds from daughter's account and repays outstanding debts to bank; notes
go into default; bank sues daughter; and bank loses suit on notes based on
fraudulent inducement. 1 1 Is anyone surprised?
Although the above case is clearly a situation in which the borrower had a
legitimate defense and claim against the lender, most cases decided in recent
years, including the case next discussed, show that a borrower must have a
solid legal defense in order to assert damages successfully against a lender or
to avoid its legal obligations to a lender.' 0 2  In First State Bank v.
Keilman, 10 3 the borrower executed a promissory note which provided for an
interest rate at the "prime rate . . .plus Two percent (12.5%) per an-
num." ° 4 After the execution of the note and apparently without notifying
the borrower, the lender deleted the reference in the note to "(12.5%)" and
replaced it with "(2%)." A deed of trust which secured the payment of the
note permitted the trustee to sell the property following a default and accel-
eration of the note "advertising the time, place and terms of the sale of the
... property.., and mailing and filing notices as required by section 51.002
[of the] Texas Property Code."'1 5 Following several renewals and exten-
sions, the borrowers defaulted and the lender posted the property for fore-
closure. The borrower and a companion traveled to the place of the
foreclosure sale. Prior to the commencement of the foreclosure sale, the bor-
rower temporarily departed, but authorized his companion to bid a specified
price for the property if the sale commenced prior to the borrower's return.
101. First State Bank v. Fatheree, 847 S.W.2d 391, 396-97 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993,
writ denied).
102. In Town N. Nat'l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978), the Texas Supreme
Court held that before a maker of a promissory note may present evidence contradicting the
express terms of a promissory note on the basis of fraudulent inducement, the maker must
make a preliminary showing that the payee used "some type of trickery, artifice, or device...
in addition to the showing that the payee represented to the maker he would not be liable on
such note." Id. at 494. In Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wallace, 975 F.2d 227, 229-30 (5th
Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit made the road to avoidance of liability under promissory notes
and other negotiable instruments somewhat more difficult by extending the rule of Broaddus to
"the whole negotiable instrument context, not merely the making of a promissory note." Id. at
230. Stay tuned to see what limits the courts will place on the "whole negotiable instrument
context," but based on Wallace, the Fifth Circuit will apply the Broaddus requirement of
trickery to at least promissory notes, modifications of promissory notes, forbearance agree-
ments relating to promissory notes and guaranty agreements. Id. The Wallace court made
several other significant pronouncements with respect to the Broaddus rule. First, although
the court acknowledged that the issue of trickery is ultimately one of fact, it is a question of
law as to whether the maker established the "requisite preliminary showing of trickery" in
order to present his case to the fact finder. Id. at 231. Secondly, the court severely restricted
the parameters of a preliminary showing of trickery by concluding that sworn affidavits exe-
cuted by FDIC officials stating that the FDIC would, notwithstanding the terms of the for-
bearance agreement, extend the term of the note if the borrower failed to satisfy the note at the
end of the six month period did not establish the requisite preliminary showing of trickery. Id.
103. 851 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
104. Id. at 919.
105. Id. at 922.
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Before the borrower returned, the trustee announced the commencement of
the bidding process. The borrower's companion requested that the trustee
delay the commencement of bidding until the borrower returned, but the
trustee refused. The companion unsuccessfully participated in the bid pro-
cess due to an apparent misunderstanding between the borrower and the
companion regarding the maximum bid that the buyer authorized the com-
panion to make on the borrower's behalf. 106 As often is the case, the foreclo-
sure sale price resulted in a significant deficiency. The lender filed a suit to
collect the deficiency and the borrower counterclaimed, alleging material al-
teration of the note, wrongful foreclosure, and usury. Perhaps to the relief of
the borrower's companion, the jury found for the borrower on all issues.
Unimpressed, the lender appealed.
On appeal, the lender first asserted that the trial court erred in discharging
the borrower from liability under the note due to the lender's alterations of
the note. The Austin court recognized that Texas law discharges an obligor
from all liability under a note if the note is materially and fraudulently al-
tered. 107 Trying to avoid the bad guy penalty imposed by the trial court, the
106. Apparently the borrower's companion misunderstood the amount up to which he had
authority to bid and stopped bidding approximately $3000 short of the authorized maximum
bid amount. Based on the amount of the appraisal and assuming the companion had bid the
maximum amount actually authorized, the companion, in all likelihood, would have succeeded
in acquiring the property at the property sale.
107. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 919 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.407(b)(1)
(Vernon 1968)). The Keilman court's conclusion that § 3.407 requires the alteration of the
financial instrument to be both material and fraudulent should be compared to another Survey
period case, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Plato, 981 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1993), which involved
a claim that a lender had fraudulently altered a letter of credit. In Plato, three attorneys
agreed to purchase an oil coating facility from a corporation. In order to secure certain obliga-
tions under the purchase agreement, the buyers were required to provide a letter of credit
naming the seller as beneficiary. Before agreement on the final form of the purchase agree-
ment, the buyers submitted an application for a letter of credit naming the seller in the draft of
the purchase agreement as the beneficiary and requiring the beneficiary to present a statement
of default by the buyers under the purchase agreement as a condition to drawing under the
letter of credit. After the buyers submitted the application for the letter of credit, the parties
finalized the purchase agreement, and in so doing, changed the name of the seller under the
purchase agreement to the parent corporation of the originally named seller. The parties to the
executed purchase agreement failed to communicate this change to the bank and the bank
issued the letter of credit naming the subsidiary as the beneficiary. In connection with the
issuance of the letter of credit, the buyers signed a blank promissory note payable to the bank
in the amount of the letter of credit, with the oral understanding that the bank had authority
to complete the note upon the bank's funding of a draw made under the letter of credit. Subse-
quent to the issuance of the letter of credit and pursuant to the request of an officer of the
parent corporation, the bank altered the letter of credit to (1) substitute the parent corporation
for the originally named subsidiary as the beneficiary under the letter of credit, (2) require the
parent corporation, as the newly named beneficiary, to present the statement of default as a
condition to drawing under the letter of credit, and (3) extend the expiration of the letter of
credit by five days. Prior to the closing of the purchase agreement, the buyers defaulted and
the parent corporation drew the full amount of the letter of credit. The bank then completed
the blank note and the buyers made some payments due under the note. Eventually, however,
the purchasers defaulted under the note and the bank filed suit for collection of the note. The
district court found that the bank had materially altered the letter of credit, thereby absolving
the buyers from any liability for non-payment of the note. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the alterations to the letter of credit, even if material, were "hardly injurious" to
the buyer as the change of the named beneficiary conformed the letter of credit to the seller
named in the purchase agreement. Id. at 857. Apparently not entirely comfortable with its
1568 [Vol. 47
REAL PROPERTY
lender argued that the alterations to the note were not material. Immedi-
ately leaning to the lender, the court observed that the lender's change to the
note merely conformed the numerical statement of interest to the written
formula of prime plus two percent.' 0 8 This change, the court concluded,
had no legal effect because under Texas law, unambiguous written words in
a promissory note control over arithmetic numbers. 109 Since the change had
no legal effect, the court found that the change was not material and con-
cluded that the trial court erred in discharging the borrower from liability
under the note.1 0
The lender next claimed that the trial court erred in concluding that the
lender had wrongfully foreclosed against the mortgaged property. In re-
sponse, the borrower argued that at least four irregularities had occurred
that deterred third parties from bidding, thus resulting in a wrongful foreclo-
sure. Addressing the issue, the appellate court recognized that a debtor is
entitled to damages for a wrongful foreclosure if an irregularity in the fore-
closure process deters third parties from bidding at the foreclosure sale."'
The borrower based its first claimed irregularity (and clearly its best argu-
ment) on the provision in the deed of trust requiring the trustee to advertise
the time, place, and terms of sale and to mail and post notices as required by
statute before selling the property. The borrower acknowledged that the
trustee posted the necessary statutory notice, but argued that this posting did
not satisfy the advertising requirement of the deed of trust which, according
to the borrower, contemplated advertising by announcement in the local
newspaper or over the local radio station. To resolve the issue, the court
relied on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Baldwin,1
2
wherein the court used a definition of advertising that included calling to the
public attention by any means whatsoever, such as statements made in news-
papers, handbills or notices or on television or radio.' Under the broad
definition of advertising used in Baldwin, the court concluded that the post-
analysis under § 3.407, the court relied on D'Oench, Duhme to reject the buyer's claims. Id. at
858.
108. Keiman, 851 S.W.2d at 920. The court found additional support in testimony from
the borrower that the rate on the note was a floating rate plus 2 percent. Id. at 920-21.
109. Id. at 920 (relying on Guthrie v. Nat'l Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex.
1965)). Having held that the alteration to the note immaterial, it was not necessary for the
court to reach the issue of fraud. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the borrower had the
responsibility to prove fraudulent intent and because the borrower had presented no evidence
to that effect, the court declined to reach a finding of fraudulent intent. Id. at 921.
110. Id. at 920.
111. Id. at 921 (relying on Tarrant Sav. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 475
(Tex. 1965); Pentad Joint Venture v. First Nat'l Bank, 797 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex. App.-Austin
1990, writ denied)). Restating the rule of the cited cases, the court concluded that a debtor
may recover damages for wrongful foreclosure "only if the mortgagee either (1) fails to comply
with statutory or contractual terms, or (2) complies with such terms, yet takes affirmative
action that detrimentally affects the fairness of the foreclosure process." Id. at 921-22. The
court's restatement in clause (1) may be inaccurate with respect to contractual issues if the
failure does not deter third parties from bidding or result in a grossly inadequate sales price.
This is not to say, however, that the mortgagee could avoid liability for other damages result-
ing from its breach of contract.
112. 611 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980).
113. Id. at 614-15.
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ing of the statutory notice constituted a form of advertising. 1 4 Since the
deed of trust did not provide for the use of one form of advertising over
another, the court concluded that the lender had satisfied the advertising
requirement in the deed of trust by posting the statutory notice.115 The
court's conclusion, however, ignores the basic contractual interpretation
principle that presumes that the parties to a contract intend that each provi-
sion in the contract have meaning.' 1 6 Applying this principle to the deed of
trust, a strong argument exists that the parties intended that the separately
stated requirements of advertising and posting have different meanings.
Moreover, if the parties intended to satisfy the advertising requirement
through the posting of the notice, the deed of trust unnecessarily stated that
the trustee be permitted to sell the property only after advertising and post-
ing the statutory notice. In effect, the court made meaningless the separate
references to advertising and posting of the statutory notice as preconditions
to the sale of the property by the trustee.
Having lost its only compelling argument, the borrower somewhat weakly
argued that (1) the foreclosure notice provided inadequate notice of the
property's location because the notice used a legal description of the prop-
erty (as opposed to the property's street address), (2) the foreclosure notice
provided inadequate information to prospective bidders because the notice
did not include the identity of the lender or the telephone and address of the
lender and the trustee, (3) the foreclosure notice provided inadequate notice
of the pending sale because the notice was posted on a cluttered bulletin
board and, during the posting period, was covered by other papers, (4) the
trustee's refusal to wait for the return of the borrower prior to commencing
the bidding process resulted in an unfair sale, and (5) the foreclosure notice's
inclusion of a disclaimer of UCC warranties and a statement that a title
insurance policy would not be provided were in conflict with the deed of
trust and misled prospective bidders. In the court's opinion, the claimed
irregularities (other than the disclaimer of warranties and the statement re-
garding title insurance) all constituted complaints that the lender failed to
take affirmative action not otherwise required by the deed of trust or stat-
ute. 17 Because a mortgagee has no duty to take steps beyond those set forth
in the deed of trust or required by statute," 18 the court concluded that the
alleged irregularities could not support a wrongful foreclosure claim. 19 The
114. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 922.
115. Id.
116. E.g., Carpenter v. Texas & New Orleans R. Co., 89 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 703 (1937); Goldman v. Alkek, 850 S.W.2d 568, 576 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1993, n.w.h.) (citing Ervay Inc. v. Wood, 373 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); see also Ogden v. Dickinson State Bank, 662 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex.
1983); General Am. Indem. Co. v. Pepper, 339 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1960).
117. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 924.
118. Id. at 921, 924 (relying on Pentad Joint Venture v. First Nat'l Bank, 797 S.W.2d 92,
96 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied)).
119. Id. at 924. As to the two assertions that the notice did not provide sufficient informa-
tion, the court acknowledged the facts alleged, but concluded that the Texas statute did not
require the omitted information. Id. at 923 (relying on Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Myers,
955 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1992)) (posted notice sufficient even though it did not advertise
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remaining claimed irregularities, the disclaimer of UCC warranties and the
statement regarding title insurance, did not, in the court's opinion, conflict
with the deed of trust or mislead potential bidders. 120 The deed of trust only
required conveyance of the property by a general warranty deed at the fore-
closure sale and, in the court's judgment, the disclaimer of UCC warranties
had no adverse affect on the warranties of the required deed. 12 1 Moreover,
the disclaimers and the statement regarding title insurance could not possi-
bly mislead potential bidders since all foreclosure purchasers must under-
stand that "[o]ne who bids upon property at a foreclosure sale does so at his
peril."1 22 Accordingly, the court held that the alleged irregularities concern-
ing the disclaimer of UCC warranties and title insurance did not constitute
an act by the lender that would invalidate the foreclosure sale. 12 3
Undeterred, the borrower took new aim at the lender, arguing that the
foreclosure resulted in usury because the market value of the property
purchased by the lender at the foreclosure sale plus the deficiency sought
constituted a charging of interest in excess of the maximum interest permit-
ted by law. Although the borrower's usury argument would have required
some thought if the court had found the foreclosure to be wrongful, the
court summarily disposed of the usury claim, stating that the deficiency law
existing at the time of the foreclosure clearly permitted the lender's applica-
tion of the purchase price against the secured debt and the lender's claim for
the resulting deficiency. 124
As several borrowers unsuccessfully attempted in cases discussed in last
year's Survey article, 125 the borrower in Keilman invoked the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), 126 arguing that the lender's and the
trustee's actions during the foreclosure process were unconscionable under
specific time of sale, nature of property being sold, or address or telephone number of trustee);
Hutson v. Sadler, 501 S.W.2d 728, 731-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no writ) (holding
notice sufficient even though it identified wrong party as owner and holder of note)). Although
the court empathized with the borrower's complaint regarding the posting board by acknowl-
edging the general disarray of county courthouse posting boards, the court concluded that a
party satisfied the Texas foreclosure statute if the foreclosure notice remains posted for the
statutory period as opposed to posted and visible during the statutory period. Id. (relying on
Chambers v. Lee, 566 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ)). Lastly, the
court concluded that neither the deed of trust, the statute, nor Texas law required the trustee
to wait for the borrower to return prior to commencing the bidding process. Id. (citing Bering
v. Republic Bank, 581 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e)
(holding a trustee has no legal duty to wait)).
120. Id. at 924.
121. Id.
122. Id. (relying on Henke v. First S. Properties, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 932. The foreclosure took place in 1989, well before the effective date of the
current deficiency statute, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (Vernon Supp. 1994), which al-
lows a debtor pursued for a deficiency to request a judicial determination of the fair market
value of the property as of the date of foreclosure.
125. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 508 (5th Cir. 1992); Affiliated Capi-
tal Corp. v. Commercial Fed. Bank, 834 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ);
William R. Van Wagner et al., Annual Survey of Texas Law, Real Property, 46 SMU L. REV.
1707, 1709-10 (1993).
126. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
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section 1745(5) of the DTPA. 127 Trying to distinguish its case from the
prior cases, the borrower argued that a deed of trust provision that allows
for the payment of a fee to the trustee constitutes the purchase of a service.
Relying on Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Munn, 28 the court concluded
that the objective of the overall transaction related to the extension of credit
and that the deed of trust provision requiring payment of the trustee's fee
merely provided a method to recover a portion of the costs of foreclosure. 129
Since extension of credit alone does not entitle a borrower to consumer sta-
tus under the DTPA,1 30 the court concluded that the borrower failed to
establish a cause of action under the DTPA.131
III. D'OENCH, DUHME, FEDERAL DEFENSES AND
RELATED ISSUES
During the last several Survey periods, the FDIC and the Resolution
Trust Corporation (RTC) demonstrated the potent power of the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine 132 and its statutory companion, Section 1823(e), 133 one of
the many statutory provisions codified as a result of FIRREA.1 34 During
the current Survey period, the FDIC and RTC continued to argue the appli-
cability of D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e), but began to find the outer
limits of the reach of the doctrine. 135 As one court stated, the "FDIC's
127. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 1987).
128. 804 F.2d 860, 863-64 (5th Cir. 1986).
129. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 929.
130. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 175 (Tex. 1980).
131. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 929. In addition to arguing unconscionability as an in-
dependent cause of action under the DTPA, the borrower appeared to argue that the foreclo-
sure process itself was unconscionable and therefore wrongful. The court held that a finding of
unconscionability under § 17.45(5)(B) (gross disparity between consideration received and
price paid) does not support a wrongful foreclosure because inadequacy of price alone could
not constitute wrongful foreclosure. Id. at 928. In a footnote, the court stated that its opinion
did not address the issue of whether a wrongful foreclosure action could ever be supported by a
finding of unconscionability under § 17.45(5)(A) (which includes acts or practices that take
advantage of another's lack of knowledge, capacity, ability or experience to a grossly unfair
degree). Id. at 928 n.2.
132. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
133. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
134. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183 (1989).
135. Similarly, the FDIC lost on several attempts to expand its rights regarding other pro-
visions of FIRREA. For example, in Dalton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 987 F.2d 1216 (5th
Cir. 1993), the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver of a failed bank, initially was a party to a state
court action. At the time the suit was filed, 12 U.S.C. § 1819, a provision of FIRREA, barred
the FDIC from removing the state court action to federal court. Subsequently, § 1819 was
amended in a manner that would allow the FDIC to remove the state court action to federal
court and on a date after the amendment, the FDIC substituted the FDIC, in its corporate
capacity, for the FDIC, in its receiver capacity.
Under the general removal provisions of FIRREA, the FDIC has a ninety-day period within
which to remove a state court action to federal court, 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1992)
and the Fifth Circuit has held that the time period for removal commences with the date the
FDIC is substituted as or made a party. E.g., Diaz v. McAllen State Bank, 975 F.2d 1145,
1147 (5th Cir. 1992). These holdings, if literally applied to Dalton, would have prohibited the
FDIC from removing the case since the FDIC was a party litigant prior to obtaining the
authority of removal. Not surprisingly, the court concluded that its prior holdings included an
implicit assumption that the FDIC, at the time it became a party litigant, had the right and
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avoidance powers [under D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e)] are awe-
some, but neither infinite nor unrestrained by the statutory language. 1 36
For example, during the Survey period, courts reached the following hold-
ings: D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) do not apply to a bank's sale of
an asset in a non-banking related transaction, such as the sale of a wholly
owned trust company; 137 D'Oench, Duhme does not bar a tort arising inde-
pendently of an agreement between the lender and the debtor' 3 8 or a "tort
actually rendering a contract void ab initio-e.g., 'fraud in the factum' ,,;139
D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) do not bar the debtor from using as
evidence documents in a creditor's files that substantiate repayment of a
note;140 D'Oench, Duhme does not bar a defense to a collection of a renewal
promissory based on non-recourse language contained in the renewed
note; 141 and D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) do not bar a homestead
claimant from denying the validity of a disclaimer of homestead signed in
connection with a deed of trust. 142 On the other hand, the FDIC obtained
authority to remove the case to federal court. Dalton, 987 F.2d at 1221. Under the facts of
Dalton, the FDIC did not have a statutory right to remove the case at the time the FDIC
substituted itself in litigation. Accordingly, the court held that the time for removal did not
commence until the effective date of the amendment to § 1819, upon which date the FDIC
obtained the authority to remove the case to federal court. Id. The FDIC, however, failed to
remove the action within ninety days after the effective date of the amendment and argued that
the period for removal did not commence until the date that the FDIC substituted the FDIC,
in its corporate capacity, for the FDIC, in its receiver capacity. Described by the court as an
overreaching interpretation of the statute which created removal jurisdiction for cases involv-
ing the FDIC, the court refused to hold that the FDIC could extend the removal period
merely by substituting one incarnation of the FDIC for another. Id. at 1222.
136. Thigpen v. Sparks, 983 F.2d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1993).
137. Id. at 646-47.
138. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cook, 840 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ
denied).
139. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Plato, 981 F.2d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 1993).
140. First Heights Bank, F.S.B. v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 608 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1993, writ denied).
141. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Waggoner, 999 F.2d 826, 828 (5th Cir. 1993).
142. In re Hughes, 153 B.R. 736, 744 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 1993) (relying on In re Niland, 825
F.2d 801, 808), modified by 159 B.R. 197 (Bankr. N.D.Tex 1993); In re Stephens, 149 B.R.
414, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992) (relying on In re Niland, 825 F.2d at 808). In In re Hughes,
the FDIC attempted to avoid the effects of Texas law concerning a homestead waiver by argu-
ing that D'Oench, Duhme barred the homestead claimant from arguing the invalidity of the
homestead waiver. In making this argument, the FDIC relied on Buchanan v. Federal Sav. &
Loan Ins. Corp., 935 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1991), wherein the Fifth Circuit held that D'Oench,
Duhme barred the homestead claimant from denying the validity of a mechanic's lien contract
because she lent herself to a scheme or arrangement that was likely to mislead the FSLIC loan
examiners. Id. at 86. Disagreeing with the FDIC, the In re Stephens court relied on Patterson
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 918 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1990), wherein the Fifth Circuit held that
(1) D'Oench, Duhme does not bar a homestead claimant from denying the validity of a dis-
claimer of homestead signed in connection with a deed of trust and (2) the federal holder in
due course doctrine.does not protect the FDIC from the debtor's homestead defense because
the homestead defense is a real defense as opposed to a personal defense. Id. at 546-47. Re-
jecting the FDIC's assertion that Buchanan should control over the earlier decided Patterson
case, the In re Stephens court distinguished the cases, pointing out that the debtor in
Buchanan argued that the deed of trust, as a matter of law, could not encumber the debtor's
homestead, while the debtor in Patterson argued that the debtor executed the mechanic's lien
contract after the date recited therein and after the delivery of materials, thereby invalidating
the lien created by the mechanic's lien contract. Although this observation doesn't necessarily
validate applying D'Oench, Duhme to defeat a homestead claim, the In re Stephens court ac-
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the following favorable holdings: D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) not
only bar debtors' defenses to claims made by the FDIC, but also affirmative
claims made by debtors against the FDIC; 43 legal pleadings located in a
bank's records are not records of the bank for purposes of D'Oench, Duhme
or Section 1823(e);' 44 D'Oench, Duhme bars a borrower from asserting that
a failed lender orally waived a specific provision in a loan agreement, even
though there is some evidence in the failed lender's records reflecting that
the lender previously deviated from the requirement of the loan provision;1 45
D'Oench, Duhme bars claims based on breach of good faith or fiduciary duty
arising out of oral representations contrary to a loan agreement;' 46 D'Oench,
Duhme cannot be circumvented by a party who "[lends] himself to a scheme
that could mislead federal bank examiners, whether or not done unwit-
tingly";1 47 and claims of usury cannot be asserted against the FDIC in its
corporate capacity because of the penal nature of usury penalties 48 or
against the FDIC in its capacity as receiver for a usury violation committed
by a failed institution. 49
Several Survey period cases addressing the standard and depth of review
required of the FDIC under D'Oench, Duhme deserve discussion. The first
such case, First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez,'50 involved a circular lend-
ing transaction initiated by a federally insured savings and loan institution,
the basic effect of which removed $71,000,000 in defaulted loans from its
books through making new loans. To achieve the circular transaction, the
savings and loan located a purchaser for the properties which secured the
defaulted loans and enlisted the help of an uninsured and insolvent state
knowledged the inconsistency of the result with the line of Texas cases holding that a home-
stead claimant may not deny the validity of an existing mechanic's lien contract and
mechanic's lien notes under certain circumstances. In re Stephens, 149 B.R. at 418.
The In re Hughes Court further distinguished Patterson and Buchanan by directing the
FDIC to In re Smith 966 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1992), wherein the Fifth Circuit elected not to
determine a mechanic's lien case on the basis of D'Oench, Duhme and instead reached its result
relying on a line of Texas cases recognizing that a homestead claimant may not deny the
validity of an existing mechanic's lien contract and mechanic's lien notes where the owner
induces a lender to advance funds based on a representation as to the validity of the mechanic's
lien notes and mechanic's lien contract. 966 F.2d at 977.
143. Jackson v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 981 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1992); see also
Bruneau v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 981 F.2d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding D'Oench,
Duhme and Section 1823(e) barred claims based on bank personnel's misrepresentations and
fraudulent acts).
144. Randolph v. Resolution Trust Corp., 995 F.2d 611, 615 (5th Cir. 1993). The court
concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Langley v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 484
U.S. 86 (1987) indicates that bank's records only giving notice of the defense do not satisfy the
requirements of D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e). Id. Pleadings, the court concluded,
merely constitute notice of a defense as opposed to an agreement in the bank's records upon
which the defense is based. Id.
145. Lake Forest Dev. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 989 F.2d 197, 199, 201 (5th Cir.
1993).
146. Id. at 201.
147. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Plato, 981 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1993) (relying on
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Caporale, 931 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1991)).
148. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Condo Group Apartments, 812 F. Supp. 694, 697 (N.D.
Tex. 1992).
149. Id. at 698.
150. 852 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
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savings and loan association. The federally insured savings and loan agreed
to make a $20,000,000 loan to the state savings and loan secured by various
first lien notes having a value of approximately $18,000,000. The state sav-
ings and loan agreed to use a portion of the proceeds of the $20,000,000 loan
to make a $15,000,000 loan to the purchaser of the properties to enable the
purchaser to pay the cash portion of the purchase price and closing costs.' 5 '
The seller of the properties used the majority of the proceeds of the
$15,000,000 loan to pay a profits participation in the purchased properties
held by subsidiaries of the federal savings and loan. The seller of the proper-
ties pledged the remainder of the loan proceeds to the federally insured sav-
ings and loan to secure performance of the purchaser's obligations.
Simultaneously with the funding of the $15,000,000 loan, the federally in-
sured savings and loan loaned $71,000,000 (the amount of the defaulted
loans) to the purchaser, who used those funds to satisfy the defaulted loans.
To secure repayment of the $71,000,000 loan and the $15,000,000 loan, the
purchaser granted first and second liens, respectively, against the purchased
properties even though the aggregate amount of the loans significantly ex-
ceeded value of the purchased properties. By completing the transaction,
the federally insured savings and loan created paper profits for its subsidiar-
ies by selling the property for a price in excess of fair market value and
improved its own balance sheet by replacing the defaulted loans with the
new loans. ' 52
As one might reasonably expect from the facts, (1) the purchaser encoun-
tered difficulties and defaulted on its loan obligations, (2) the insolvent state
savings and loan association never made payments on the loan to the feder-
ally insured savings and loan, (3) the state savings and loan found itself in a
receivership, and (4) the government declared the federally insured savings
and loan insolvent and closed and reopened the failed lender as a federal
savings bank. The federally insured savings and loan filed (and subsequently
the successor federal savings bank pursued) an action against the receiver of
the state savings and loan, seeking payment of the $20,000,000 loan and
foreclosure of its security. The receiver then filed its own action against the
federally insured savings and loan claiming fraudulent inducement and seek-
ing to rescind the entire transaction and cancel the $20,000,000 note, claim-
ing that the seller's distribution of the sales proceeds to the federally insured
savings and loan and its subsidiaries resulted in a repayment of the
$20,000,000 loan. The federal savings bank responded, claiming that
D'Oench, Duhme barred the repayment defense. The trial court submitted
the D'Oench, Duhme issue to the jury on the basis of whether "a reasonably
prudent loan examiner who was examining the loan files [of the failed feder-
ally insured savings and loan would] have concluded that" the bank's loan
151. Apparently, the state savings and loan stood to receive, as an incentive to participate
in the transaction, the difference between the $20,000,000 in loan proceeds received and the
$15,000,000 loan amount funded.
152. Presumably, the state savings and loan received the benefit of the difference between
the $20,000,000 loan made to it and the $15,000,000 loan made by it.
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records established repayment of the $20,000,000 loan. 153 The jury an-
swered the D'Oench, Duhme issue affirmatively, thereby denying the
D'Oench, Duhme defense. Based on the jury's overall findings, the trial
court upheld the validity of the $20,000,000 note, but concluded that the
transaction manufactured by the federally insured savings and loan substan-
tially repaid the note. 154 The federal savings bank appealed, arguing that
the trial court inappropriately used the prudent loan examiner standard as
the legal standard to determine whether the FDIC would have discovered
the repayment defense when reviewing the bank's records1 5 5 and that the
trial court improperly used the phrase "loan files" to describe the bank
records to be reviewed by the FDIC.
On appeal, the court agreed with the trial court's use of the reasonably
prudent loan examiner standard, relying on a federal district court that had
used that standard in applying the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. 5 6 However,
the court's acceptance of the reasonably prudent loan examiner standard is
questionable in several respects. First, the standard, as submitted to the
jury, assumes, without basis, (1) that the FDIC has the same time and op-
portunity to review the records of a bank which suddenly fails as would a
loan examiner in a private acquisition of bank assets and (2) that the level of
examination by a loan examiner is the same under all situations. 5 7 Second,
the standard of a "reasonably prudent loan examiner who examines the loan
files" appears to be much more subjective (and therefore broader) than a
standard which requires review of agreements "clearly evidenced in the
bank's records" and "apparent to [FDIC] examiners."' 58 Finally, just as
"the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine evidences a policy ... to avoid hair-splitting
153. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d at 607 n.17. The instructions regarding the D'Oench, Duhme
issue defined loan files to mean documents created or obtained by the failed federally insured
savings and loan that were maintained in its loan files with respect to the loan described above
during the period from the date the loans were funded until the date the federally insured
savings and loan was declared insolvent. Id. at 608 n. 18.
154. Id. at 604. The court also transferred the first lien notes which had secured the
$20,000,000 loan back to the state savings and loan and held that the federally insured savings
and loan's first liens against the properties had merged with its fee title to the properties, which
elevated the state savings and loan's second lien to a first lien and secured the return of the first
lien notes to the state savings and loan. Id.
155. The federally insured savings bank instead argued for a bright-line test not identified
in the court's opinion. Presumably, however, the federal savings bank argued for a standard
similar to Fifth Circuit's statements that D'Oench, Duhme "bars those defenses of which FDIC
could not have been put on notice by reviewing records on file with the bank." Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Sharif-Munir-Davidson Devel. Corp., 992 F.2d 1398, 1404 (5th Cir. 1993).
156. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d at 608 (citing Fair v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 733 F. Supp.
1099, 1105 (N.D. Tex. 1990)). In applying that standard to a fraud defense, the Fair court
concluded that a reasonably prudent loan examiner would not have concluded from the bank's
records that the bank had defrauded the borrower. Fair, 733 F. Supp. at 1105. Accordingly,
the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine barred the debtor's fraud defense. However, whether the note-
holder agreed with the standard submitted to the jury is not discernible from the case. More-
over, the noteholder, because of its success, would not likely appeal the use of the standard,
thereby limiting the precedential value of the use of the standard.
157. See Langley v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 484 U.S. 86, 91 (1987) (when FDIC is
deciding to liquidate failed bank or provide financing for purchase and assumption, FDIC
must act "with great speed, usually overnight," to preserve value of failed bank).
158. See Beighley v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 868 F.2d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1989).
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fact-based inquiries of the type that will ensue when assessing the obligations
implied from prevailing banking practices,"' 59 the D'Oench, Duhme doc-
trine could also logically prohibit the fact-based inquiries of the type that
will ensue when a reasonably prudent loan examiner applies prevailing bank
practices in conducting its review of a bank's records. Accordingly, until the
Fifth Circuit expressly adopts the use of the reasonably prudent loan exam-
iner standard, there is little certainty that the use of that standard is correct.
The court of appeals also approved of the trial court's usage of the broad
term "loan files" within the D'Oench, Duhme instruction presented to the
jury. 16 Using this definition and relying on cases that have concluded that
bank records include executive committee minutes, appraisals, construction
specifications, and all documents contained in the loan file, the court con-
cluded that the wire transfers made to and from the bank were loan records
that sufficiently established the repayment defense. 16 1 Assuming that the
wire transfer records relating to the $20,000,000 loan and the $15,000,000
loan resided in the bank's files regarding those loans, the court is probably
correct in its conclusion that the records of the wire transfers constitute
bank records. However, whether the records of the wire transfers clearly
evidence the repayment of the $20,000,000 loan or make it clearly apparent
to an FDIC bank examiner that the $20,000,000 loan has been repaid is far
less arguable.1 62 Moreover, the state savings and loan's involvement in the
federally insured savings and loan's scheme flies in the face of the D'Oench,
Duhme established principle that a party who wittingly or unwittingly lends
himself to a scheme that could mislead bank examiners cannot circumvent
D'Oench, Duhme.163  Reasonably, the court could (and perhaps should)
have concluded that the FDIC was entitled to rely upon the facially unen-
cumbered terms of the note signed by the failed state savings and loan, with-
out having to determine why the federally insured savings and loan sent and
received wired funds on the same day. 164
159. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hamilton, 939 F.2d 1225, 1230 n.5. (5th Cir. 1991).
160. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d at 608.
161. Id.
162. The Fifth Circuit has stated the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine requires agreements to be
"clearly evidenced in the bank's records" and "apparent to bank examiners." Beighley v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 868 F.2d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1989).
163. E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Plato, 981 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1993); Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp v. Caporale, 931 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1991). In Plato, the Fifth Circuit, applying
the doctrine of lending oneself to a scheme, concluded that the debtors should have foreseen
the consequences of signing a blank note. 981 F.2d at 858. Similarly, the state savings and
loan should have foreseen the consequences of participating in the scheme devised by the feder-
ally insured savings and loan.
164. The Gutierrez case should be compared with Stiles v. Resolution Trust Corp., 831
S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), rev'd, 867 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. 1993). In Stiles, the bor-
rower defaulted on its note and the RTC sued for collection of the note. The RTC filed a
motion for summary judgement, without stating that D'Oench, Duhme barred any defenses
alleged by the borrower. The borrower responded to the summary judgment motion, arguing
that the borrower had repaid the note. The trial court granted the RTC's motion for summary
judgment, without specifying the supporting grounds. The borrower appealed, arguing that
D'Oench, Duhme did not bar the borrower's repayment defense because the RTC had failed to
raise D'Oench, Duhme as a defense in its motion for summary judgment. The appeals court
discarded the borrower's argument, concluding that the borrower failed to meet its affirmative
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Although not addressing the issue of the proper standard of review for
bank records imposed on the FDIC, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Sharif-Munir-
Davidson Development Corp. 165 provides some guidance regarding the depth
of review required of the FDIC in connection with reviewing documents in a
failed bank's records. In Sharif, a borrower and the guarantors of a loan
defended a suit on a note and guaranty on the basis that the lender breached
a bilateral contractual obligation by unreasonably refusing to approve vari-
ous leases, thereby decreasing the value of the collateral for the loan and
increasing the amount of the deficiency following foreclosure. Although the
Fifth Circuit recognized that a borrower may defend a suit brought by the
FDIC on the basis of a failed lender's breach of an express provision in a
loan agreement between the failed lender and borrower, the court concluded
that no such provision existed in the applicable loan agreement which obli-
gated the lender to provide reasonable approval of each lease agreement. 66
Apparently, the borrower and guarantors argued that under state law, if a
proposed lease is commercially reasonable, the lender is under an obligation
to approve the proposed lease. Without determining whether such a defense
existed under state law, the court held that the FDIC is not required to
"research every possible defense based on state law, at least when the basis of
the defense is not stated explicitly on the face of the documents in
question." 167
In two Survey period cases, the Fifth Circuit declined to recognize the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and Section 1823(e) as "transactionally infinite"
or as "limitless per se guarantees of victory by federal banking agencies and
their successors in interest."' 68 In the first such case, Thigpen v. Sparks,169 a
national bank (which subsequently failed) agreed to sell a trust company to
an individual. In connection with the sale, the bank's chairman made cer-
tain oral representations to the purchaser that proved to be false and the
purchaser sued. The trial court granted summary judgment to the FDIC on
the ground that Section 1823(e) barred the affirmative claims against the
FDIC. The purchaser appealed, arguing that the purchase transaction was
not covered by Section 1823(e). While not giving up its Section 1823(e) de-
obligation to show that D'Oench, Duhme did not bar the borrower's defense. Stiles, 831
S.W.2d at 28. After the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court agreed with the borrower,
holding that the trial court inappropriately used D'Oench, Duhme as a ground upon which to
grant summary judgment since the FDIC failed to raise D'Oench, Duhme as a defense in its
motion for summary judgment. Stiles v. Resolution Trust Corp., 867 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex.
1993).
165. 992 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir. 1993).
166. Id. at 1405.
167. Id. at 1406 (emphasis omitted). In reaching its holding, the court relied on Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hamilton, 939 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1991), wherein the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the FDIC should not be required to investigate prevailing banking customs in
order to determine if a defense existed against collection of a promissory note. Id. at 1229-30.
In the Hamilton case, the court stated that "the case law interpreting the D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine evidences a policy to prevent any such type of investigations and to avoid hair-split-
ting fact-based inquiries of the type that will ensue when assessing the obligations implied from
prevailing banking practice." Id. at 1230 n.5.
168. Alexandria Assoc., Ltd. v. Mitchell Co., 2 F.3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1993).
169. 983 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1993).
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fense, the FDIC asserted a defense not previously presented to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, arguing that Section 1821(d)(9)(A) of Title 12 of the United States
Code, 170 which generally provides that a claim against the FDIC may not
be based on or substantially comprised of an agreement which fails to meet
the requirements of clauses (1) through (4) set forth in Section 1823(e), also
barred the borrower's affirmative claims. 17 1 Significantly, the word "agree-
ment", as used in Section 1821(d)(9)(A) is not, as is Section 1823(e), modi-
fied by the phrase "which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the
[FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this section or section 182 1.172
Congress, according to the FDIC, intended that section 1821 (d)(9)(A) apply
to any agreement as evidenced by section 1821(d)(9)(A)'s failure to include
the modifying language contained in Section 1823(e). The court rejected the
FDIC's argument, holding that section 1821 (d)(9)(A) applies only to Section
1823(e) agreements.173 A contrary holding, concluded the court, would re-
sult in absurd results, such as rendering unenforceable the claims of a failed
bank's trade creditors and otherwise allowing the FDIC to use a "meat-axe
for avoiding debts incurred in the ordinary course of business."'
17 4
Shortly after the Thigpen court refused to extend section 1821(d)(9)(A)
(and indirectly Section 1823(e)) to all types of agreements, an unlikely party
argued to the Fifth Circuit that D'Oench, Duhme should be expanded to
non-banking transactions. In Alexandria Associates, Ltd. v. Mitchell Co. 175
an indirect subsidiary of a federally insured bank (which was subsequently
taken over by the FDIC) conveyed to a third party certain interests in real
estate partnerships. 176 The purchaser satisfied a portion of the purchase
price by delivering its promissory note, secured by a security agreement.
Subsequently, the purchaser defaulted, the indirect subsidiary foreclosed,
170. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
17 1. Clauses (1), (2), (3), and (4) of Section 1823(e) generally require that the agreement be
(1) in a writing, (2) executed by the failed institution and the person claiming the adverse
interest against the failed institution, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by
the failed institution, (3) approved by the failed institution's board of directors or loan commit-
tee, as reflected in the corporate minutes, and (4) continuously in the official records of the
failed institution from the time of its execution. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
173. Id. at 649. The court's holding is somewhat contrary to the Eighth Circuit's holding
in North Ark. Medical Center v. Barrett, 962 F.2d 780 (8th Cir. 1992); however, the Fifth
Circuit attempted to downplay the difference between the two circuits, stating that the relevant
language in Barrett was dicta and suggesting that Barrett revolved around "loan-related trans-
actions entered into by the bank in its unique capacity as a lending institution." Thigpen, 983
F.2d at 649.
174. Thigpen, 983 F.2d at 649. In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that no
legislative history existed evidencing the meaning of "agreement" as used in § 1821(d)(9)(A).
After reaching its holding regarding § 1821(d)(9)(A), the court had little difficulty concluding
that the failed bank's sale of the trust company was clearly not an asset acquired by the FDIC,
as contemplated by Section 1823(e). Id. See Section 1823(e) which requires that the agree-
ment must be contemporaneously executed by the failed institution and the party claiming the
adverse interest, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the depository institu-
tion. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
175. 2 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1993).
176. A non-banking subsidiary of a bank apparently formed the two defendant general
partnerships and that non-banking subsidiary became the corporate general partner of each of
the two defendant general partnerships.
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and the purchaser sued the indirect subsidiary for securities fraud and vari-
ous common law tort claims. The indirect subsidiary defended, claiming
that D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) barred the purchaser's claims.
The district court agreed and, perhaps amazed, the purchaser appealed.
On appeal, the purchaser argued that D'Oench does not apply to non-
banking transactions, such as the conveyance of the partnership interests by
an indirect subsidiary of a federal savings bank. 177 Reasoning that there was
no discernible difference between D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) as to
whether a transaction should be covered by the common law or statutory
doctrine and that, under Thigpen, Section 1823(e) would not apply to sale of
interests of the nature involved, 78 the court agreed with the purchaser and
held that the common law D'Oench, Duhme doctrine does not apply to the
sale of interests in real estate partnerships, especially when consummated by
a third generation subsidiary of a failed institution. 179 In reaching its hold-
ing, the Fifth Circuit offered a host of justifications, including its observation
that "[c]ommercial expectations simply do not include the belief that every
agreement with a bank ... must be scrutinized, approved, and recorded by
the bank's executive committee or board."' 80
During the Survey period, the FDIC twice attempted to flex its muscles
against local taxing authorities, with conflicting results. In a federal court
action, Birdville Independent School District v. Hurst Associates, '8' the FDIC
suffered defeat as the district court held that the provisions of FIRREA, and
specifically sections 1825(b)(2), 1821(d)(13)(C), 1821(c)(2)(C) and 1821(j)
of the United States Code,' 82 do not prohibit a local taxing authority from
177. The purchaser also argued that (1) even if D'Oench, Duhme applies to non-banking
transactions, the indirect non-banking subsidiaries of a federal savings bank are not entitled to
rely on D'Oench, Duhme and (2) Section 1823(e) preempts the common law D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine. The Fifth Circuit concluded that it was not necessary to decide these two issues in
light of the court's holding that D'Oench, Duhme does not apply to non-banking transactions.
178. Alexandria Associates, 2 F.3d at 603-04. The court recognized, however, that a re-
ceiver, conservator or successor institution disposing of assets through a liquidation of a failed
or troubled institution might be entitled to the benefits of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. Id. at
603 n.30. Accordingly, if in Alexandria Associates, the federal savings bank, as opposed to the
indirect subsidiary, had disposed of the partnership interest, D'Oench, Duhme may have been
applicable to that transaction.
179. Id. at 604. Although significant, the court's reference to engagement by third genera-
tion subsidiaries is somewhat contradictory to its statement that it was not deciding the issue
of whether D'Oench, Duhme applies to transactions "conducted by a third generation, non-
banking subsidiary." Id. at 601.
180. Id. at 603.
181. 806 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
182. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(c)(2)(C), 1821(d)(13)(C), 1821(j), 1825(b)(2), 1825(b)(3) (Supp.
1989). The FDIC primarily relied on 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2), which provides:
When acting as a receiver, the following provisions shall apply with respect to
the [FDIC]:
(2) No property of the [FDIC] shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnish-
ment, foreclosure, or sale without the consent of the [FDIC], nor shall any in-
voluntary lien attach to the property of the [FDIC].
12 U.S.C. § 1825 (b)(2) (Supp. 1 1989).
The court concluded that the taxing authority sought to foreclose upon the real property
owned by another, as opposed to the FDIC's lien interest against that real property. Accord-
ingly, the court held that § 1825(b)(2) did not prevent the taxing authority from foreclosing its
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foreclosing a tax lien even though the foreclosure would extinguish a
subordinate, contractual lien acquired by the FDIC through the failure of a
financial institution.18 3 By contrast, in a state court action, State v.
Bankerd,184 the FDIC successfully argued that section 1825(b)(2) prevented
the local taxing authority from foreclosing its tax lien.185 Contrary to the
holdings and rationale of Birdville Independent School District, the state
court concluded that the FDIC's lien interest was property covered by sec-
tion 1825(b)(2) and that a foreclosure of the tax lien against the real property
would constitute a sale, levy, attachment or foreclosure of the FDIC's prop-
erty, reasoning that the tax lien foreclosure would extinguish the FDIC's
lien rights. '8 6 If required to pick a side, choose Birdville Independent School
District as the better reasoned and fairest reading of section 1825(b)(2).
During the last Survey period, the Fifth Circuit decided Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Camp,'8 7 wherein the court held that the affidavit of an account
officer of the RTC is sufficient for summary judgment purposes to prove the
RTC's ownership of a note, even though the account officer had no personal
knowledge of the loan transaction when it occurred and learned about the
loan only after the bank went into receivership.188 This holding, coupled
with the Camp court's statement that "suits on promissory notes provide fit
grist for [the] summary judgment mill"' 189 may have caused the FDIC and
lien, even though the foreclosure would extinguish the FDIC's subordinate lien. Birdville In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. at 127. Section 1821(c)(2)(C) generally provides that the FDIC,
when acting as a receiver, is not subject to the direction or supervision of a federal or state
agency when exercising its rights and powers, and § 1821(j) generally prohibits courts from
taking any action to restrain or affect the FDIC's ability to exercise its rights or powers as a
receiver. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(c)(2)(C), 1821(j). The court concluded that if Congress in-
tended for those sections to protect the FDIC's subordinate lien rights, Congress would have
so written. Accordingly, the court held that neither of the two sections prohibited the taxing
authority from foreclosing its lien. Birdville Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. at 128. Section
1821(d)(13)(C) generally prohibits attachment or execution on assets in the possession of the
FDIC as receiver. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d)(13)(C). As the court concluded with respect to
§ 1825(b)(2), the court held that Section 182 1(d)(13)(C) did not prevent the taxing authority's
foreclosure upon real property owned by a non-governmental agency, as opposed to the
FDIC's lien rights against that real property. Birdville Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. at 127.
Finally, § 1825(b)(3) generally exempts the FDIC from liability for any penalties or fines, in-
cluding those arising from another party's failure to pay taxes. See 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(3).
The court logically concluded that the taxing authority had not sought to hold the FDIC
liable, but rather foreclosed a lien against the real property owned by another. Birdville Indep.
Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. at 128.
183. Birdville Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. at 129. See also Nueces County v. Whitley
Trucks, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, n.w.h.). In Nueces County,
the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals was faced with the same issue presented in Birdville and
Bankerd. The court, after discussing both the Birdville and Bankerd opinions, chose to follow
the Birdville rationale in holding that neither section 1825(b)(2) nor section 1825(d) barred the
tax district from foreclosing its tax liens against private property which also happened to be
encumbered by junior mortgage liens obtained by the FDIC in its capacity as receiver. Id. at
864-65.
184. 838 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
185. Id. at 641-42.
186. Id. at 642.
187. 965 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1992).
188. Id. at 29.
189. Id. (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cardinal Oil Well Serv. Co., 837 F.2d 1369,
1372 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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RTC to celebrate, especially in light of the massive records problems faced
by both. The Camp court cautioned, however, that it would not have hesi-
tated to hold the affidavit as insufficient summary judgment proof of note
ownership if the obligor could have pointed to evidence in the record that
legitimately placed into question ownership of the note. 190 In two Survey
cases, the Fifth Circuit began to make clear what facts might legitimately
place into question ownership of a note.
In the first case, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Selaiden Builders,
Inc., 9 1 the FDIC's sole summary judgment proof regarding ownership of
the note consisted of the affidavit and testimony of a department supervisor
and an asset manager, stating that the FDIC, as receiver for a failed institu-
tion, owned the promissory note being sued upon. 192 The obligor, on the
other hand, pointed to the endorsements on the notes and argued that none
of those were to the FDIC as receiver for the failed institution. The FDIC
argued that the endorsements omitted the irrelevant words "Association"
and "FSA" and that the party to whom the notes were endorsed never ex-
isted. 193 The court, however, found no sympathy for the FDIC and held
that the faulty endorsement established a legitimate question as to ownership
of the note being sued upon. 194
In the second case, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. McCrary,19 5 the
FDIC, in its corporate capacity, brought suit to collect on a promissory note
it claimed to have acquired from the FDIC in its receiver capacity for a
failed financial institution. To establish ownership of the note, the FDIC
offered an affidavit of its custodian of the applicable loan documents. The
FDIC also placed into evidence, but not for purposes of establishing note
ownership, a contract of sale pursuant to which the FDIC, in its receiver
capacity, transferred to the FDIC, in its corporate capacity, all assets of the
failed institution that were not purchased by a third party bank pursuant to
a purchase and assumption agreement. In response to the FDIC's motion
for summary judgment, the obligor under the note argued that the affidavit
failed to establish the FDIC's ownership of the note because the contract of
sale neither specified the individual assets to be transferred to the third party
bank under the purchase and assumption agreement, nor the individual as-
sets to be conveyed to the FDIC pursuant to the contract of sale. Agreeing
with the obligor, the court concluded that the contract's failure to specify
the individual assets to be acquired by the third party bank and the FDIC,
respectively, supported a legitimate fear that the FDIC was not the owner
and holder of the note. 196
190. Id.
191. 973 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1992).
192. Id. at 1255.
193. Id. The endorsement read "the FDIC as Manager of the FSLIC Resolution Fund as
Receiver for Vernon Savings & Loan." A correct endorsement would have referred to
"Vernon Savings & Loan Association, FSA." Id.
194. Id.
195. 977 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1992).
196. Id. at 195.
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In view of the number of years that have passed since the large wave of
failures of financial institutions occurred in the Fifth Circuit's jurisdictional
area during the mid to late 1980s, the FDIC has begun to face significant
limitations issues in cases where the FDIC is seeking monetary damages
under a contract. The applicable pre-FIRREA limitations statute, section
2415(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code, generally bars the FDIC and
its predecessors from bringing any action for money damages founded on a
contract, unless the FDIC or predecessor agency files the complaint within
six years after the action accrues. 197 The FIRREA statute of limitations,
section 1821(d)(14(A)), 98 generally follows section 2415(a), with the excep-
tion that the six year period commences to run on the later to occur of the
date the FDIC is appointed as conservator or receiver or the date on which
the cause of action accrues. 199 During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit
issued two important decisions concerning the six year limitations
statutes. 200
In the first of these decisions, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Belli,20
the Fifth Circuit addressed the issues of when an action accrues for purposes
of section 2415(a) and section 1821(d)(14) and whether section 182 1(d)(14)
applies retroactively. In a clear setback for the FDIC, the Fifth Circuit held
that under section 2415(a), a cause of action accrues with respect to a note
on the date that the obligor defaults and not, as argued by the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the date that the FSLIC or other
federal agency is appointed receiver. 20 2 As to the retroactive effect of section
1821(d)(14), the court held that the FIRREA provision retroactively "ap-
plies to claims held by the FDIC that were alive on August 9, 1989"2 03 and
will not revive claims barred by limitations before August 9, 1989.204 Ac-
cordingly, as to note obligations which go into default prior to August 9,
1989, the claim must not only be brought within the applicable time period
under section 1821(d)(14)(A), but also must be alive under section 2014(a)
on August 9, 1989.
In the second decision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Bledsoe,20 5 the
court addressed the issue of whether the party to whom the FSLIC assigns a
promissory note is entitled to the six year limitations period under section
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988).
198. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14(A)) (Supp. IV 1993).
199. Id.
200. At least one other decision relating to the six year limitations periods deserves note.
In Davidson v. Mills, 821 F. Supp. 1176 (W.D. Tex. 1993), the court concluded that
§ 1821(d)(14) applies to non-judicial actions, such as a foreclosure of a deed of trust lien, as
well as the judicial actions such as suits on a note or guaranty. Id. at 1179.
201. 981 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1993).
202. Id. at 840-42.
203. Id. at 842.
204. Id. at 842-43. The Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court recognize the general princi-
ple that a transfer of a note cannot revive a claim already barred by a state statute of limita-
tions. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 142 (1938); Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Hinkson, 848 F.2d 432, 434 (5th Cir. 1988). However, neither the Supreme Court nor
the Fifth Circuit has directly reached this holding as to FIRREA.
205. 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993).
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2415(a). Prior to Bledsoe, some courts held that such an assignee is entitled
to the benefits of the six year statute,20 6 while at least one court held that an
assignee is not entitled to those benefits. 207 Relying on the cases extending
the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine to private assignees and the common law prin-
ciples which recognize that an assignee steps into the shoes of its assignor,
the Bledsoe court held that assignees of the FDIC are entitled to the same six
year limitations as the FDIC.20 8
The Fifth Circuit, through a line of cases, has clearly established the prin-
ciple that a federal appellate court, in exercising its judicial discretion, may
permit the FDIC to raise D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) for the first
time on appeal, if the appeal is from a judgment entered in favor of the failed
lender and the FDIC did not have the opportunity to raise the doctrines at
the trial level. 20 9 In a 1992 case, Larsen v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp. ,210 the Texas Supreme Court recognized that federal courts have some
flexibility to allow the FDIC to raise D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e)
for the first time on appeal, but concluded that a Texas court has no discre-
tion to permit an argument, whether based on D'Oench, Duhme, Section
1823(e) or otherwise, to be raised for the first time on appeal, absent a show-
ing of fundamental error.2 1' Although the Larsen holding is broad enough
206. E.g., Jon Luce Builder, Inc. v. First Gibraltar Bank, 849 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1993, writ denied); Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1992), writ denied per curiam, 851 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1993). In a deci-
sion decided after the end of the Survey period, Jackson v. Thweatt, 37 Tex. S. Ct. J. 546 (Mar.
12, 1994), the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the Austin Court of Appeals' holding in Thweatt
v. Jackson, 838 S.W. 2d 725 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992) that in an action to recover on assets
purchased from the FDIC, the purchaser is entitled to the benefits of the six year statute of
limitations period provided by § 1821(d)(14). 37 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 560. In Jon Luce Builder,
the Austin court also addressed a statute of limitations issue and, contrary to the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in Belli, concluded that under § 2415(a) the FSLIC's cause of action accrued on
the date of the appointment of the FSLIC as receiver. Jon Luce Builder, 849 S.W.2d at 454.
In this instance, however, harmless error occurred because (1) the state limitations statute did
not bar the action at time of appointment of the FSLIC as receiver and (2) the borrower
brought its suit against the FSLIC and the FSLIC filed its counterclaim seeking payment of
the note prior to the expiration of the state statute of limitations period.
207. During the Survey period, the Dallas Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Federal
Debt Management, Inc. v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d 774, 778-79 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992),
holding that the purchaser of assets from the FDIC is not entitled to the six year limitations
period provided under § 1821(d)(14). Id. at 778-79. After the Survey period, the Texas
Supreme Court reversed the Dallas Court of Appeals, holding that in an action to recover on
assets purchased from the FDIC, the purchaser is entitled to the benefits of the six year statute
of limitations period provided by § 1821(d)(14). Federal Debt Management, Inc. v. Weath-
erly, 37 Tex. S. Ct. J. 555, 560 (March 12, 1994).
208. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 811. To prevent the FDIC from abusing the court's holding and
the possibility of creating an infinite limitations period, the court stated that "the FDIC cannot
gain an additional six years by assigning the note to a private party and then receiving it
again." Id. at 811 n.8.
209. E.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. McCrory, 951 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 459 (1992); In re 5300 Memorial Investors, Ltd., 973 F.2d 1160, 1163-64 (5th Cir.
1992). A corollary principle is that the FDIC is prohibited from raising D'Oench, Duhme and
Section 1823(e) for the first time on appeal if the appeal is from a judgment adverse to the
failed lender and voids the asset that the FDIC is seeking to protect. McCrory, 951 F.2d at 71
(citing Thurman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 889 F.2d 1441, 1447 (5th Cir. 1989)).
210. 835 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1992).
211. Id. at 74.
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to cover cases in favor of or against a failed lender, a question remains as to
whether the Larsen holding applies only to cases against the failed lender
that result in a voiding of the asset, since those facts existed in Larsen. In
Gray v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,212 the Houston Court of Appeals
provided its answer to the question, holding that consistent with Larsen,
regardless of whether the trial court's judgment is in favor of or against the
failed lending institution, "the federal common law defenses ... cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal to disturb a trial court judgment that adju-
dicates the respective rights of the parties and that is rendered before the
receivership. ' 21 3 Although the scope of this holding is extremely broad, the
court implicitly limited its holding to the circumstances of the case, which
involved (1) the issuance of a trial court judgment in favor of the failed
lender, (2) the substitution of the FDIC, as receiver, for the failed lender
following the filing of the failed lender's appeal and (3) the appellate court's
reversal of the trial court on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the trial
court failed to render summary judgment in favor of the borrower on the
basis of an absolute defense plead by the borrower that would have survived
a D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) challenge. 2 14
In a case discussed earlier, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Bodin Con-
crete Co. ,215 the Dallas Court of Appeals utilized Larsen to enable the FDIC
to raise D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) defenses for the first time on
remand. In Bodin Concrete, the holders of mechanic's liens filed a declara-
tory action against a lender, seeking, among other relief, a finding that the
lender wrongfully foreclosed its lien. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the lender and the holder of the mechanic's lien appealed.
Following the filing of the appeal, the lender became insolvent and the
FDIC, as receiver, was substituted in the litigation for the failed lender. The
appeals court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Dur-
ing the remand trial, the payee of the note, who apparently was unrelated to
the holder of the mechanic's lien, testified that (1) the note which secured
212. 841 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1992), set aside, 848 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.
1993). After the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court set aside the Houston court's deci-
sion pursuant to a joint motion of the parties resulting from settlement of the case.
213. Id. at 81. The court's holding does not expressly apply to Section 1823(e) since it is a
statutory defense, as opposed to a common law defense. Presumably, however, the court in-
tended that its holding apply to Section 1823(e) since the FDIC based its defense on both
D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e).
214. The implicit understanding arises out of the court's statement that its holding does not
address the FDIC's ability to raise a D'Oench, Duhme type defense for the first time on appeal
where the party seeking a voiding of the asset fails to show that every event necessary to the
voiding of the asset took place prior to the failure of the lending institution and where the trial
court's error permits the appellate court to reverse and remand, but not reverse and render.
Id. In the Gray case, the estate of the obligor argued that the bank failed to give the estate
notification of repossession and intended disposition pursuant to § 9.504 of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504 (Vernon 1991). The court
concluded that, as a matter of law, the bank failed to give reasonable notice to the estate as
required by § 9.504. Gray, 841 S.W.2d at 85. Based on this conclusion, the appeals court
found that, as a matter of law, the trial court should have entered judgment against the failed
lender, thereby voiding the claim against the estate prior to the date that lender failed. Id. at
89.
215. 869 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
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the lender's deed of trust was delivered to the lender in connection with the
lender's issuance of a letter of credit for the benefit of the payee, (2) the bank
agreed that the note would not be funded except to the extent draws were
presented under the letter of credit and (3) the letter of credit expired with-
out any draws having been presented thereunder. The FDIC defended, ar-
guing that the bank's oral agreement was barred by D'Oench, Duhme and
Section 1823(e). The trial court concluded that the FDIC was barred from
raising D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) on remand because the FDIC
failed to raise those defenses in the initial appeal and entered judgment for
the holders of the mechanic's liens.216 The FDIC appealed, claiming, among
other points, that the trial court erred in concluding that the FDIC was
barred from raising D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) on remand. With
little difficulty, the Dallas Court of Appeals agreed with the FDIC, reason-
ing that the remand trial afforded the FDIC its first opportunity to raise
D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e), as the Larsen case prohibited the
FDIC from raising those defenses in the initial appeal. 217 If the Larsen case
is interpreted to absolutely prohibit the FDIC from raising D'Oench, Duhme
or Section 1823(e) for the first time on appeal except in the case of funda-
mental error, the court's holding in Bodin Concrete appears necessary in or-
der to avoid placing the FDIC in a Catch-22 situation.218
More sweeping in theory than D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) is the
pliable assertion that state law will be preempted when it frustrates the
FDIC's ability to accomplish objectives mandated by the Congress. One
case decided during the Survey period, Sweet Jan Joint Venture v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp.,219 provides some indication of the breadth of the
preemption defense. Sweet Jan presented the federal district court with the
issue of whether two notes transferred by a federal savings bank to the
FSLIC as part of a bulk transfer constituted a fraudulent conveyance under
the Texas fraudulent conveyance statute.220 Under one of these notes, the
federal savings bank had potential liability for failing to fund certain
amounts that its predecessor had agreed to fund. Under the other note, the
plaintiffs had no apparent defense, except for a right of setoff if the federal
savings bank was found liable under the first note.221 The borrower claimed
that the transfer of these notes to the FSLIC violated the Texas Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act 222 because the transfers were made to take advan-
216. Id. at 375-76.
217. Id. at 379. This rationale is consistent with Fifth Circuit cases which provide that the
FDIC may raise D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) for the first time on appeal if the trial
court judgment is in favor of the failed lender and the FDIC had no opportunity to raise the
defenses at the trial level. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
218. This holding also seems consistent with Gray, 841 S.W.2d at 81. See supra note 213
and accompanying text.
219. 809 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1992). The facts of this case are more fully set forth in
the concurrently released opinion of Sweet Jan Joint Venture v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
809 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
220. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (Vernon 1987).
221. Id.; Sweet Jan, 809 F. Supp. at 1256. The plaintiffs considered the right of offset
extremely important due to the bank's then precarious financial condition. Id.
222. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.001-.013 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
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tage of the federal defenses that would prohibit the borrower from arguing
that it could offset its damages incurred under the first note against amounts
owed on the second note. The FDIC argued that the transfers of the bor-
rower's notes were not fraudulent under the fraudulent conveyance act be-
cause they were part of a bulk transfer made to satisfy certain provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, argued the FDIC, all of the notes
which were part of the bulk transfer were selected on the basis of the same
objective criteria. Relying on prior case law, 2 23 the court held that, notwith-
standing the federal savings bank's intent in transferring the borrower's
notes to the FSLIC, the state fraudulent conveyance act was preempted. To
hold otherwise would, according to the court, unduly chill if not completely
compromise the FDIC's ability to operate in similar cases. 224 Moreover,
where the application of a state law, such as the Texas fraudulent convey-
ance act, can overturn the FDIC's or its predecessor's assistance decisions,
that state law, in the court's judgment, must give way to the powers and
authority of the FDIC and its predecessor entities. 225
The FDIC and RTC also have certain statutory rights regarding their
ability to reject certain written agreements. For example, under section
1821(e) of Title 12 of the United States Code,226 a receiver of an insured
depository institution may promptly, after being appointed receiver, disaf-
firm any contract or lease to which that depository institution is a party and
(1) the performance of which, in the receiver's discretion, is burdensome to
the institution and (2) the disaffirmance or repudiation of which, in the re-
ceiver's discretion, would promote the orderly administration of the institu-
tion's affairs. In Fowler v. Resolution Trust Corp.,227 the El Paso Court of
Appeals concluded that the RTC had not successfully repudiated a lease
pursuant to section 1821(e) because the RTC had failed to establish the bur-
densome nature of the lease and that the repudiation of the lease would pro-
mote the orderly administration of the failed institution's affairs. 2 28 The
court's holding, however, is subject to criticism, since the court at no time
discusses the fact that the statute enables the receiver to make the determina-
tion of whether, in the receiver's discretion, the lease would be burdensome
and whether, in the receiver's discretion, the revocation would promote the
orderly administration of the institution's affairs. 229
223. Valley Ranch Dev. Co. v. Sunbelt Say., 714 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Tex. 1989), affd on
other grounds sub nom., Gulley v. Sunbelt Say., 902 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 673 (1991). In the context of an initial receivership function involving the transfer of
assets effected by a purchase and sale assumption transaction, the Valley Ranch court upheld
the preemption of the Texas fraudulent transfer law, reasoning that it "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and . . . objectives of Congress." Valley Ranch, 714 F. Supp. at 818.
224. Sweet Jan, 809 F. Supp. at 1256.
225. Id.
226. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (1988).
227. 855 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, n.w.h.).
228. Id. at 37.
229. The Fowler court also concluded that the RTC had not ratified the lease by accepting
rental payments for four months following the foreclosure, reasoning that the mere acceptance
of rent by a governmental agency does not estop an agency from rejecting the lease. Id. at 35.
Interestingly, however, even though the lease appears to have been subordinate to the lien, the
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IV. USURY AND RELATED ISSUES
During the Survey period, lenders and obligees benefitted from the follow-
ing holdings relating to usury issues, some of which are very familiar: even if
interest commences before disbursal of a loan, the spreading doctrine will be
utilized to determine if the loan, over its entire term, is usurious;230 a notice
of acceleration which erroneously demands payment of installments of prin-
cipal and interest previously paid will not support a claim of usury because
the demand arises out of a failure to credit paid amounts as opposed to a
demand or charge for interest; 231 the discovery rule does not apply to usury
claims; 232 a late charge assessed in a non-lending transaction will not sup-
port a claim of usury;233 a payment based on a percentage of sales will not
support a claim of usury because of the contingent nature of the payment; 234
a court's assessment of prejudgment interest or postjudgment interest will
not support a usury claim;235 and a guarantor may not assert a claim that
RTC did not attempt to avoid the lease on the basis that the foreclosure of the lien extin-
guished the lease.
230. R.V. Indus. v. Urdiales, 851 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992), rev'd per
curiam sub noma., R.V. Indus. v. County of Webb, 851 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1993) (correcting
error of lower court stating that the county should take nothing; judgment should have stated
that R.V. Industries and others would take nothing).
231. Kentor v. Karotkin, 852 S.W.2d 261, 267 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
232. Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).
In Aguilar, the court also stated that the limitations period provided for under TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1987) commenced to run on the date that the
payor made its first payment under the installment note, regardless of the amount of that
payment. Aguilar, 855 S.W.2d at 803 (relying on Cook v. Frazier, 765 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.
App.-Ft. Worth 1989, no writ); Danziger v. San Jacinto Sav. Ass'n, 732 S.W.2d 300, 303
(Tex. 1987)). The court's reliance on Danziger is misplaced as the relevant portions of Dan-
ziger deal with the issue of the period over which interest is spread in order to determine if
usury occurred and not the commencement of the statute of limitations. Cf TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1987) (stating that usury claim must be brought
"within four years from the date when the usurious interest was charged or collected"); Bexar
County Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Swensen's Ice Cream Co., 859 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio, 1993 writ denied) (holding that limitations period under article 5069-1.06(3)
commenced to run on date of last payment of alleged usurious charge and not on date of
contract, even though contract provided for allegedly usurious charge).
233. Swensen's, 859 S.W.2d at 406-07.
234. Id. at 407.
235. Solomon v. Briones, 805 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991), writ deniedper
curiam, 842 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. 1992) (holding that a demand for postjudgment interest
arising from judicial process is not a charging under the usury laws); Sage Street Assoc. v.
Northdale Constr. Co., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1118, 1120 (June 30, 1993). Each of these cases
represents a logical extension of George A. Fuller Co. v. Carpet Serv., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 603
(Tex. 1992), wherein the Texas Supreme Court formed the beginnings of the principle that a
claim of usury may not accrue solely out of the judicial process by holding that a claim for
prejudgment interest in a pleading filed with a court will not serve as a basis for a usury claim.
Id. at 605-06. In Sage Street, the borrower attempted a constitutional end run around Carpet
Services, by arguing that an assessment of prejudgment interest by the court was usurious
under TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11. The court had no difficulty rejecting the constitutional
argument, applying the Carpet Services rationale that a significant difference exists between the
interest awarded by a court as a result of a breach of contract and the consensual interest
charged in a private transaction and that the subject of pleading and awarding prejudgment
interest is "best dealt with in the context of the judicial process ... rather than through the
Texas usury laws." 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1119, 1120 (quoting Carpet Services, 823 S.W.2d at
603).
[Vol. 471588
1994] REAL PROPERTY 1589
the debt which it guaranteed is usurious. 2 36 Although the vast majority of
usury cases decided during the Survey period favor lenders and obligees, a
borrower successfully convinced the El Paso Court of Appeals to hold that a
pleading for an incorrect amount of penalty charges does not preclude a
debtor from collecting the proper amount of damages when usury is actually
proved. 237
Three cases decided during the Survey period deserve more than a refer-
ence to the holding.2 38 In the first case, Moore v. Liddell, Sapp, Zively, Hill
& LaBoon,239 a borrower attempted to extend the Alamo Lumber doc-
trine240 to a lender's requirement that its borrower guarantee the debt of a
third party as a condition to a loan to the borrower. 241 The court refused to
extend Alamo Lumber to a guaranty of another party's debt, reasoning that
the guaranty was a secondary and contingent debt and vastly different from
payment and assumption. 242 In the court's opinions, the inclusion of the
amount of the guaranteed debt in the interest paid under the borrower's obli-
gation would "go against the parties expectations and greatly increase uncer-
236. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Condo Group Apartments, 812 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Tex.
1992).
237. Berryman v. El Paso Natural Gas, 838 S.W.2d 610, 615 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1992), rev'd on other grounds, 858 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1993).
238. Perhaps a fourth case, Pearcy Marine, Inc. v. Acadian Offshore Serv., Inc., 832 F.
Supp. 192 (S.D. Tex. 1993) deserves a little attention because of the uniqueness of the case. In
Pearcy Marine, a noteholder became financially strapped. To generate much needed cash, the
lender requested the obligor under the note to prepay a portion of the note in exchange for the
noteholder's agreement to forgive interest thereafter due under the note. Apparently believing
the deal to be attractive, the borrower agreed to the lender's proposal, but also seized the
opportunity to extract the noteholder's written agreement to pay the cost of certain repairs to
two vessels that had been under charter to the noteholder. This agreement required the note-
holder to promptly pay the repair costs, failing which the obligor had the right to offset the
amount of the costs against the note obligation. Apparently the noteholder failed to pay any
repair charges and the obligor offset an amount approximately equal to 600% of the amount
prepaid. In contesting the offset, the noteholder claimed that the amounts offset against the
note constituted usury. The noteholder argued that the prepayment by the obligor constituted
a loan and that the forgiven interest on the note and the offset of the alleged repair charges
against the note constituted interest on the "prepayment loan." Although impressed by the
noteholder's imagination and inventiveness, the court had little difficulty in concluding that
the prepayment was not a loan. Id. at 196-97. Purely for the sake of argument, the court
assumed the prepayment charge to be a loan and immediately concluded that neither the for-
given interest on the note nor the repair charges would constitute interest for purposes of a
usury determination. The court stated that if it treated the forgiven interest as anything more
than a reduction of interest, every borrower who renegotiated a lower interest rate on his debt
would be guilty of usury. Id. at 197. As to the repair costs, the court concluded that these
costs would be in the nature of contingent charges that would not be includable in a usury
calculation. Id. at 198 (relying on Moore v. Liddell, Sapp, Zively & LaBoon, 850 S.W.2d 291,
294 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied). This case is indicative of the fact that some courts
will pay some attention to ridiculous, but imaginative, arguments.
239. 850 S.W.2d at 293.
240. In Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold, 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1983), the court held that if a
lender requires its borrower to assume or pay the debt of another as a condition to the exten-
sion of credit to the borrower, the amount of the third party debt assumed or paid shall be
deemed to be interest for purposes of usury. Id. at 928.
241. In Moore, the borrowers were a father and son and as a requirement of various loans
to the father and son, the bank required the father to separately guarantee the son's pre-ex-
isting and future debt to the bank.
242. 850 S.W.2d at 293-94.
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
tainty in lending transactions." 243 Although the court's holding makes good
sense on the basis of the contingent nature of a guaranty, 244 the court's refer-
ence to the expectations of the parties and uncertainty in lending transac-
tions is weak at best.
Article 5069-1.07(0 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes245 generally pro-hibits the charging of a prepayment penalty on a loan secured by the bor-
rower's residential homestead if the interest rate on the loan exceeds the
amount specified in subsection (d) of article 5069-1.07(0.246 In Groseclose v.Rum, 247 the borrower obtained a residential loan which provided for interest
at the rates of 9.50% per annum during the first loan year, 10.00% per an-
num during the second loan year, 11.00% per annum during the third loanyear, 12.00% per annum during the fourth loan year and 12.50% per annumthereafter. The note evidencing the loan prohibited prepayment. The bor-
rower attempted to sell the property and retire the note prior to maturity,but the lender refused to accept prepayment of the note. The borrower filed
a declaratory action, arguing that the lender's prohibition on prepayment
violated article 5069-1.07(). The trial court granted the borrower's motion
for summary judgment and the lender appealed.
On appeal, the lender first argued that a prohibition on prepayment does
not constitute a prepayment charge under article 5069-1.07(0). The court,
although recognizing that a difference existed between a prepayment charge
or penalty and a prepayment clause prohibiting prepayment, concluded that
a prepayment clause prohibiting prepayment violates article 5069-1.07(f).248
To conclude otherwise, the court reasoned, would frustrate the purpose of
article 5069-1.07(0, which is to allow homeowners to prepay loans financed
at a high rate of interest.249
Having lost the battle on the no prepayment clause issue, the lender thenargued that the interest rate of the loan did not exceed 12% per annum, the
maximum interest rate then permitted under 5069-1.07(d)(1), 250 relying onthe interest spreading statute, article 5069-1.07(a). 251 The borrower arguedthat the spreading statute applies only in usury cases and therefore was not
applicable to the issue before the court. The court agreed that the spreading
statute applies only to usury cases, but nevertheless sided with the lender,
243. Id. at 294.
244. See Swensen's, 859 S.W.2d at 406-07, wherein the court held that late payment feesassessed on royalty payments not timely made would not support a usury claim because the
royalty payments were contingent in nature.
245. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(f) (Vernon 1987).246. Subsection (d) provides for a maximum rate of the lesser of (1) 12% per annum or (2)the average per annum market yield rated adjusted to constant maturities on ten-year UnitedStates Treasury Notes plus 2%, rounded to the nearest 1/4%. Id. § 5069-1.07(4).
247. 860 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, n.w.h.).
248. Id. at 557.
249. Id.
250. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(d)(1) (Vernon 1987).251. Article 5 06 9 -1.07(a) generally provides that in determining whether interest on a loansecured by real estate is usurious, all interest collected, charged or received from the borrowershall be spread in equal parts over the stated term of the loan. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 5 06 9 -1.07(a) (Vernon 1987).
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holding that if the interest on the loan to the borrower exceeded 12% as
alleged by the borrower, the loan to the borrower would be usurious under
article 5069-1.07(f) and the spreading statute would apply. 252 The court
reached this holding by reasoning that (1) because 5069-1.07(f) prohibits a
lender from charging a prepayment penalty on a loan which bears interest in
excess of the rate specified in article 5069-1.07(d)(1), a rate charged in excess
of that specified in 5069-1.07(d)(1) exceeds the rate permitted by law and (2)
because a rate charged in excess of that specified in 5069-1.07(d)(1) exceeds
the rate permitted by law, that rate is usurious under article 5069-1.01(d), 25 3
which defines usury to include contracting for interest in excess of a rate
permitted by law. 254 The basic flaw in the court's reasoning is its conclusion
that a rate in excess of article 5069-1.07(d)(1) is in excess of the maximum
rate permitted by law. Article 5069-1.07(f) does not prohibit contracting for
a rate in excess of that set forth in article 5067-1.07(d)(1), but rather merely
provides that one may not assess a prepayment charge if the interest rate
exceeds that specified in article 5067-1.07(d)(1). A reading of this opinion
leaves the clear impression that the court was more interested in reaching a
particular result rather than establishing the basis upon which that result
could be reached.
Real estate practitioners, when dealing with commitment and other fees
charged in connection with a loan, should be aware of article 342-508 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes. 25 5 Article 342-508 provides in part:
No bank shall charge ... any loan fee or any other charge ... for the
granting of a consumer loan unless authorized by law. . . . In all con-
sumer loan transactions in which the amount loaned is $100 or more
and the loan period is one month or more, a bank may charge any bor-
rower the reasonable value of services rendered in connection with the
making of any loan, in an amount agreed upon, but not to exceed $15
for each loan transaction. If the amount that the bank charges for those
services exceeds $15, the amount of interest contracted for shall be
forfeited. 256
In Brazosport Bank v. Oak Park Townhouses, 2 5 7 a bank charged a borrower
two fees in connection with making a loan, both of which fees exceeded $15.
The bank collected one of the fees prior to the funding of the loan in consid-
eration for the issuance of the bank's loan commitment. The bank collected
the second fee in consideration for renewing the loan after it had matured.
After the renewal, the borrower defaulted and the bank accelerated the note.
Thereafter, the bank initiated a lawsuit to collect on the note. Following a
loss in the trial court, the bank appealed from the trial court's determina-
252. Groseclose, 860 S.W.2d at 558.
253. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(d) (Vernon 1987).
254. Groseclose, 860 S.W.2d at 558.
255. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-508 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
256. Id.
257. 837 S.W.2d 652, 656 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992), rev'd on other grounds,
851 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1993). In reversing this case, the Texas Supreme Court expressed no
opinion regarding the court of appeals' reasoning which supported the reversal of the trial
court. 851 S.W.2d at 191 n.4.
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tions that (1) the bank's commitment fee and renewal fee were not author-
ized under article 342-508, and (2) the bank's collection of interest, in
addition to the commitment fee and renewal fee, constituted usury. 258
On appeal, the bank argued that the first sentence of article 342-508 did
not require the forfeiture of interest, as the bank's fees were not charged for
rendering services. Agreeing with the bank's reading of article 342-508 and
relying on the jury's findings that the fees were for making and renewing the
loan as opposed to a charge for the reasonable value of the bank's services,
and the fact that interest is a charge authorized by law, the court concluded
that article 342-508 did not prohibit the bank from collecting interest and,
accordingly, reversed the trial court's finding of usury.259 Its analysis unfin-
ished, the court concluded that the bank violated the first sentence of article
342-508 by charging the commitment fee because the bank failed to establish
that the commitment fee constituted either interest or a bona fide commit-
ment fee. 260 Noting that the first sentence of article 342-508 does not pro-
vide for an express remedy in the event a bank charges an authorized fee, the
court concluded that the most appropriate remedy is the return of the fee, as
opposed to loss of interest or imposition of usury penalties. 261
V. CHOICE OF LAW
Tel-Phonic Services, Inc. v. TBS International, Inc. 262 is the only choice of
law case decided during the Survey period that could potentially impact fu-
ture decisions. Tel-Phonic Services involved various disputes relating to a
contract containing a choice of law provision. Although not the primary
issue of the case, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of what law applied to
contractual disputes between the parties to the contract and what law ap-
plied to claims of fraudulent inducement and breach of fiduciary duty as-
serted in the case. As to the contractual disputes, the Fifth Circuit declared
258. At the time of the default by the borrower in Brazosport Bank, article 342-508 was
different from the current version of article 342-508 in several respects. First, the prior version
of article 342-508 applied to all loans, as opposed to just consumer loans. Second, the prior
version of article 342-508 not only provided for the forfeiture of interest if the fee for the
bank's services exceeded $15.00, but also limited the fee that a bank could charge for its serv-
ices to $15.00. Act of June 10, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 370, § 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 1003.
259. Id. at 656-57.
260. In Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976),
the Texas Supreme Court recognized a lender may charge bona fide commitment fees and that
such fees do not constitute interest. On the other hand, if a fee is not a bona fide commitment
fee under Gonzales, then for usury purposes the fee is to be treated as interest. Id. In Brazos-
port Bank, the court concluded that the evidence regarding the commitment fee did not con-
clusively establish the commitment fee to be a bona fide commitment fee or interest. On this
basis, the court declined to make a determination that the commitment fee constituted a
charge authorized by law. Brazosport Bank, 837 S.W.2d at 656-57. The court's refusal to treat
the commitment fee as a charge authorized by law is somewhat questionable since under Gon-
zales, the fee should have been either a bona fide commitment fee or interest, both of which are
authorized by law. Gonzalez, 543 S.W.2d at 906. As to the renewal fee, the court concluded
that the evidence established that fee to be interest, and, accordingly, a charge authorized by
law. Brazosport Bank, 837 S.W.2d at 657.
261. Id. at 656-57.
262. 975 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1992).
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its task to be simple, relying on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.263 as establishing the principle that Texas rec-
ognizes the right of parties to a contract to agree to a contractual choice of
law provision. Although the court's statement regarding Duncan v. Cessna
is correct, the court ignores the analysis required with respect to a contrac-
tual choice of law clause later established by the Texas Supreme Court in
DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp. 264 As to the fraudulent inducement claim, the
court concluded that Texas courts would apply section 201 of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS. 2 6 5 Reasoning that fraud in the
inducement is of the nature of a misrepresentation relating to a contract, the
court utilized comment a to section 201 to conclude that the law chosen by
the parties in the contract governed the fraud in the inducement claim.2 6 6
Although the Fifth Circuit seems to imply improperly that the Texas courts
have adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS in its en-
tirety, the court's application of comment a to section 201 does not seem out
of line. Additionally, the court's conclusion that an action involving fraudu-
lent inducement is governed by contractual choice of law provisions as op-
posed to tort choice of law provisions appears appropriate since Texas courts
have previously held that a party who has been the subject of fraud may
elect to rescind the contract or, in the alternative, sue for damages under the
contract. 267 The court finally concluded that the breach of fiduciary duty
claim should be controlled by the law selected by the parties in the contract,
reasoning that the claim sounded in contract since the fiduciary duty, if any,
would have arisen out of the contractual relationship of the parties. 268
Far more important than the Fifth Circuit's decision in Tel-Phonic Serv-
ices is the legislature's addition of section 35.51 to the Texas Business &
Commerce Code, 269 which generally provides that the parties to a transac-
tion 270 in which a party pays or receives or is obligated to pay or entitled to
receive, or lends or borrows or is entitled to borrow or receive, funds or
credit in excess of $1,000,000 (a "qualified transaction") may elect in writing
(with some exceptions): 27 1
(i) to have the laws (other than conflict of law rules) of any jurisdiction
having a reasonable relationship with the transaction 272 govern an
263. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
264. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990). DeSantis generally requires that the validity of a con-
tractual choice of law clause be analyzed under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187 (1971). Id. at 677-681.
265. Tel-Phonic Services, 975 F.2d at 1142.
266. Id. (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 201 cmt. a (1971),
which generally provides that questions involving misrepresentation in a contract are to be
determined by the law chosen by the parties, provided they have made an effective choice.)
267. Dallas Farm Mach. Co. v. Reaves, 307 S.W.2d 233, 239 (Tex. 1957).
268. Tel-Phonic Services, 975 F.2d at 1142.
269. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
270. A transaction is defined in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(a)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1994). Section 35.51 does not apply, however, to choice of law provisions relating to
construction contracts. Such provisions are instead governed by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 35.52 (Vernon Supp. 1994). See infra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
271. Id. § 35.51(a). See § 35.51(e) and (f) for certain exceptions to this rule.
272. Section 35.51(d) provides a non-exclusive laundry list of facts that will establish a
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issue relating to the transaction (including enforceability of an
agreement), regardless of whether the selected jurisdiction's law
would be contrary to a fundamental or public policy of Texas;273
and
(ii) to have the laws (other than conflict of law rules) of any jurisdiction
govern the interpretation or construction of any agreement relating
to the transaction or a provision of an agreement relating to the
transaction, regardless of whether the transaction bears a reason-
able relationship to the selected jurisdiction.274
Section 35.52 also provides that if the law chosen by the parties in a quali-
fied transaction renders a particular provision of an agreement unenforceable
or invalid, then the law of the jurisdiction (other than the conflict of law
rules) having the most significant relation to the transaction, the subject mat-
ter of the transaction and the parties will apply to the applicable provi-
sion.275 Although the statute does not suggest the basis of determining the
jurisdiction with the most significant relation, the courts presumably will
follow the most significant relationship test adopted in Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co. 276
Real estate practitioners should be aware that section 35.51 expressly ap-
plies to real estate transactions, other than a determination of any of the
following: whether a transaction transfers or creates an interest in real prop-
erty for security purposes; the nature of an interest in real property that is
transferred or results from a foreclosure or is otherwise created by a transac-
tion; the method for foreclosure of a lien against real property; or the man-
ner and effect of recording or failing to record evidence of a transaction
transferring real property or creating a real property interest. 277
Section 35.51 clearly provides contracting parties with an easier route to
choosing a particular forum's law and, from this perspective, the state legis-
lature is to be commended. Although the authors are not aware of any for-
mal written discussion concerning the constitutionality of section 35.51,
there may be an issue regarding whether section 35.51 violates the open
courts provision of the Texas State Constitution.278 The constitutionality
reasonable relationship between the transaction and the selected jurisdiction. Id. § 35.51(d).
The laundry list includes the following: (1) a party to the transaction is a resident of the
selected jurisdiction; (2) a party to the transaction has its place of business in the selected
jurisdiction, or if a party conducts its business in multiple jurisdictions, either that party's chief
executive office or an office from which the party conducts a substantial part of the negotia-
tions relating to the transaction is located in the selected jurisdiction; (3) all or a part of the
subject matter of the transaction is located in the selected jurisdiction; (4) a party to the trans-
action is required to perform a substantial part of its obligations (including the obligation to
make payments) relating to the transaction in the selected jurisdiction; and (5) a substantial
part of the negotiations were conducted, and at least one party executed an agreement relating
to the transaction, in the selected jurisdiction. Id.
273. Id. § 35.51(b).
274. Id. § 35.51(c).
275. Id. § 35.51(e).
276. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
277. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(0(1), (g) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
278. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. Section 13 provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and
every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law." Id.
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issue is beyond the scope of this article, but prior to utilizing section 35.51 as
the sole basis of substantiating a contractual choice of law provision, practi-
tioners should give this issue appropriate consideration. Moreover, real es-
tate practitioners giving legal opinions regarding the enforceability of a
contractual choice of law provision should, as belt and suspenders, consider
analyzing the enforceability of the clause as contemplated by DeSantis.
In addition to the choice of law provisions of section 35.51, the Texas
legislature added section 35.52 to provide that a party to a contract that is
principally for the repair or construction of improvements to real property
located within Texas may void any provision which makes the contract or
disputes thereunder subject to the law of another state or litigation or arbi-
tration in another state. 279 A contract is principally for the repair or con-
struction of improvements if a party's principal obligation under the
contract is to provide labor or materials for the construction or repair of
improvements, as a contractor or subcontractor. 28 0 A contract is not princi-
pally for the repair or construction of improvements if the contract is (1) a
partnership agreement or any other agreement covering an entity or trust,
(2) an agreement providing for a loan or other extension of credit and any
promise to construct or repair improvements under the contract is done so
only as part of its agreement with the provider of the loan or credit or (3) an
agreement for the management of real property or improvements and the
promise to construct or repair is done so as a part of the overall property
management obligation. 28 '
VI. HOMESTEAD
The courts decided numerous homestead cases during the Survey period,
none of which require discussion. However, a number of the holdings
and/or recognized principles are worthy of note: to claim a business home-
stead, the property claimed as the homestead must be (1) located in the same
urban area as the claimant's residential homestead, (2) reasonably adapted
and necessary to the homestead claimant's calling or business and (3) used as
a place from which the homestead claimant operates its calling or busi-
ness;2 8 2 the mere rental of property for use by a tenant does not generally
279. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.52 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
280. Id. § 35.52(b).
281. Id. § 35.52(c). The provisions of § 35.52(c) are not exclusive, thereby leaving the door
open for courts to establish which other contracts are and are not contracts principally for the
construction or repair of improvements. Id. § 35.52(d).
282. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 1994); In re Hughes, 153 B.R. 736,
741 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (where homestead claimant resided at and conducted business
from same structure and the business conducted from the structure constituted the claimant's
primary and most profitable business within the urban area, court concluded that claimant
established the structure as claimant's business homestead), modified by 159 B.R. 197 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1993) (the opinion published at 153 B.R. 736 has been withdrawn because reconsid-
eration of the opinion is pending). See In re Finkel, 151 B.R. 779, 781 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1993) (because spouse of a deceased restaurant operator failed to establish that she had contin-
ued the operation of the restaurant business following her husband's death, court held that she
had abandoned the business homestead at which her husband had operated the restaurant). In
formulating the elements of the business homestead, the Finkel court improperly stated that its
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constitute a calling or business for the purpose of establishing a business
homestead, 283 but where the homestead claimant occupies a portion of a
structure as a residence as well as its place of business, the mere rental of the
remaining portion of the structure will not necessarily defeat the homestead
character of the structure;284 a waiver or disclaimer of homestead is gener-
ally ineffective, but such a waiver may be effective if, at the time the home-
stead is encumbered, the claimant's occupancy of the property is dubious; 285
the extension, consolidation and renewal of a loan properly secured by a lien
against the borrower's residential homestead will not affect the validity of
the lien against the homestead so long as the borrower acts in good faith and
does not intentionally increase the burden on the homestead for purposes
other than those necessary to accomplish the extension, consolidation or re-
newal;286 in order for a family to claim a homestead, the claimant must show
that (1) the family personally used the claimed homestead as its home-
stead 287 and (2) the head of the family had the legal or moral responsibility
to support the remainder of the family members and the remainder of the
family members depended on the head of the family for support; 288 although
a purchaser of property constituting the seller's homestead may generally
assert the seller's homestead protection against liens which arose during the
formulation of the elements of a business homestead was consistent with Webb v. Reserve Life
Ins. Co. (In re Webb), 954 F.2d 1102, 1108 (5th Cir. 1992).
283. In re Finkel, 151 B.R. at 782 (citing Mays v. Mays, 43 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1931, no writ), distinguishing Orr v. Orr, 226 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1949, no writ)). In In re Finkel, the court concluded that the claimant's
rental of restaurant property to a corporation in which she owned a 49% interest did not, in
and of itself, constitute a calling or business. The court also concluded that neither the claim-
ant's ownership of a 49% interest in a corporation which operated the restaurant business nor
the claimant's minimal participation in the operation of the restaurant business supported a
finding that the restaurant constituted the claimant's business homestead. Id. at 783-87.
284. In re Hughes, 153 B.R. 736, 741-43 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993), modified by 159 B.R.
197 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (the opinion published at 153 B.R. 736 has been withdrawn
because reconsideration of the opinion is pending).
285. Id. at 744 (relying on In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 808 (5th Cir. 1987)), modified by
159 B.R 197 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993); Stephens v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Stephens),
149 B.R. 414, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992) (relying on In re Niland, 825 F.2d at 808); see also
NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Carpenter, 849 S.W.2d 875, 881 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993,
n.w.h.) (citing First Interstate Bank v. Bland, 810 S.W. 2d 277, 285-86 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, no writ) as support for the principle that a borrower may be estopped from
claiming a homestead where the borrower represents to the lender that the encumbered prop-
erty is not the borrower's homestead, the lender relies on the borrower's representation and, at
the time the representation is made, the physical facts of the property open to observation
support a conclusion that the property is not the borrower's homestead).
286. Freytag v. American Fed. Bank (In re Freytag), 155 B.R. 150, 154 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1993)( relying on Machicek v. Barcak, 170 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. 1943)). In In re Freytag, the
court concluded that, in connection with a refinancing of existing homestead debt, the addition
of accrued interest and loan fees and other fees charged as an integral part of the refinancing to
the principal balance and changing the amount of scheduled payments did not constitute an
improper intentional increase of the burden on the homestead, as contemplated by Machicek.
Id. at 155.
287. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Carpenter, 849 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1993, n.w.h.) (citing First Interstate Bank v. Bland, 810 S.W.2d 277, 286 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1992, no writ)).
288. Id. (citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Shoaf, 434 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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seller's ownership of the property but which did not attach to the property
because of its homestead status, such a lien will attach to the acquired prop-
erty if the seller abandoned or alienated the homestead after the perfection of
the lien and prior to the recordation of the purchaser's deed;28 9 abandon-
ment of a homestead requires both cessation of use of the homestead and the
intent to permanently abandon the homestead; 290 section 41,002(c) of the
Texas Property Code291 does not provide an exclusive means of determining
whether a homestead is a rural homestead; 292 and section 41.001(c) of the
Texas Property Code 293 ceases to protect the proceeds from the sale of a
homestead at such time as the party seeking protection under section
289. Intertex, Inc. v. Kneisley, 837 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, writ denied) (relying on Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1973, writ refd n.r.e)). In Intertex, two parties claimed ownership of certain property under
constable deeds delivered following execution on judgment liens. One judgment lien was filed
at a time the prior owner used the property as his homestead. Thereafter, that owner sold its
property, thereby alienating the homestead. Prior to the date the purchaser recorded its deed,
another creditor of the seller obtained a judgment against the seller and filed a judgment lien
against the conveyed property. After the purchaser recorded its deed, the second judgment
creditor executed against the conveyed property and received a constable's deed. Subse-
quently, a party claiming rights to the property under the first judgment creditor brought suit
to try title against a party claiming rights to the property under the second judgment creditor.
After losing at the trial level, the party claiming the rights to the property under the first
judgment creditor appealed. The appeals court reversed, concluding that, due to the gap be-
tween the sale of the homestead and the filing of the deed, the first judgment creditor's lien
attached at the time the seller sold the homestead. Id. at 138. In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied on Hoffman; however, the court's reliance on Hoffman is improper as that deci-
sion did not address the gap issue. Nevertheless, as a general matter, the court's conclusion
seems logical in light of the alienation of the homestead and TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 13.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994), which generally provides that a conveyance of real property
is void as to a creditor unless the conveyance instrument has been acknowledged, sworn to or
proved and filed of record.
290. Womack v. Redden, 846 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (rely-
ing on Franklin v. Woods, 598 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no
writ)). In Womack, the court concluded that although the homestead claimant argued that she
never intended to abandon her homestead, strong circumstantial evidence supported the lower
court's finding that the claimant intended to abandon her homestead. Id. at 8. This evidence
included the claimant's failure to live in the claimed homestead for a period of several years,
although her husband lived in the claimed homestead during this period of time, the claimant's
purchase and occupancy of another home with community funds, the claimant's removal of all
furnishings from the claimed homestead following her husband's death and the claimant's
failure to visit the homestead for several years preceding her husband's death. Id.
291. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
292. United States v. Blakeman, 997 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1992); Thornberry v. Davis (In re
Davis), 152 B.R. 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992). The Davis court also concluded that
§ 41.002(c) applies only "in foreclosure situations where the issue of homestead status has
already been resolved." Id. at 135. The court reached this conclusion, relying on footnote 18
in Bradley v. Pacific S.W. Bank (In re Bradley), 960 F.2d 502, 511 n.18 (5th Cir. 1992),
wherein the Fifth Circuit recognized that § 41.002(c) may not apply to all homestead disputes,
but that it at least applies to cases involving threatened foreclosure of a homestead. The In re
Davis court statement that § 41.002(c) applies only to foreclosu re situations twists the Fifth
Circuit's position set forth in note 18 of In re Bradley and more recently in Blakeman. The
better position is that § 41.002(c) is a non-exclusive method of determining whether a home-
stead is rural, especially as § 41.002(c) in no way indicates that it preempts common law or
that it is otherwise intended to be the exclusive method for determining the existence of a rural
homestead.
293. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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41.001(c) acquires another homestead. 294
VII. MECHANIC'S LIENS
Two mechanic's lien cases decided during the Survey period deserve dis-
cussion. 295 In the first mechanic's lien case, Valdez v. Diamond Shamrock
Refining and Marketing Co. ,296 a subcontractor performed work in connec-
tion with the construction of improvements on a 7.9 acre tract of land. Prior
to completion of construction of the improvements, the owner of the 7.9
acres replatted the land into two separate tracts, one of which consisted of
7.1 acres and the other of which consisted of .8 acres. The owner thereafter
sold the .8 acre tract (in an undeveloped state) to a third party. Following
the sale, the subcontractor filed a lien against the entire 7.9 acres, but did not
deliver a notice of the filed mechanic's lien to the purchaser of the .8 acre
tract. Thereafter, the subcontractor sought to foreclose its lien against the
acquired parcel. However, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the
purchaser and the appeals court affirmed. 297 Not to be denied, the subcon-
tractor appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
Recognizing that section 53.022(c) of the Texas Property Code298 pro-
vides that a mechanic's lien extends to the entire lot on which work is being
performed, the court found it necessary to determine the meaning of "lot" as
used in section 53.022(c). The purchaser argued that the term lot should
only apply to the improvements and the land immediately surrounding the
improvements. Rejecting the purchaser's position, the court found no evi-
dence that the legislature intended the term "lot" to have a meaning other
than that usually given to the term lot. Relying on a legal dictionary, the
court concluded that the term "lot" as used in section 53.022(c) refers to a
"single tract of land as recorded in the county deed records" at the time of
commencement of construction. 299 Since the .8 acre tract constituted a part
of a single platted tract of land at the time of commencement of construction
of the improvements, the court concluded that the subcontractor's lien, if
properly perfected, extended to the .8 acre tract.300
294. England v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re England), 975 F.2d 1168, 1175 (5th Cir.
1992). The district court case, In re England, 141 B.R. 495 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) is dis-
cussed in last year's Survey article on Real Property. See William R. Van Wagner et al., Real
Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law 46 SMU L. REV. 1707, 1764 (1993) [hereinafter Van
Wagner, 1993 Annual Survey].
295. Two additional cases are worthy of note: Dossman v. Nat. Loan Investors, L.P., 845
S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (holding that a statutory
mechanic's lien does not secure payment of attorneys fees); J&J Equipment, Inc. v. Pilkinton,
850 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (stating that a mechanic's
lien statute does not confer a lien for demolition or removal of structures, unless a written
agreement between parties provides that such a lien may be filed).
296. 842 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1992).
297. The court of appeals decision is reported at 820 S.W.2d 956, and is discussed at length
in last year's Survey article. See Van Wagner, 1993 Annual Survey, supra note 294, at 1785-87.
298. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.022(c) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1994).
299. Valdez, 842 S.W.2d at 275 (relying on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 946 (6th ed.
1990)).
300. Id. at 275.
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The purchaser further argued that even if the subcontractor's mechanic's
lien extended to the .8 acre tract, the subcontractor did not properly perfect
its lien against the .8 acre tract since the subcontractor failed to deliver writ-
ten notice of the unpaid balance to the purchaser, as owner of the .8 acre
tract, in accordance with section 53.056(b) of the Texas Property Code.30 1
Relying on another provision of the Texas Property Code (and ignoring the
plain meaning analysis that the court used in interpreting section 53.022(c)),
the court concluded that the term "owner," as used in section 53.056(b),
refers to the "owner or reputed owner.1302 Perhaps feeling insecure with
this position, the court held that, as a matter of law, a purchaser's knowledge
of the recent construction of improvements on a single piece of property is
sufficient to impose constructive notice of a worker's right to assert a
mechanic's lien within the statutory period.30 3 In light of this holding and
the stipulated fact that construction had commenced on the 7.1 acre tract
prior to the purchaser's acquisition of the .8 acre tract, the court had little
difficulty concluding that the subcontractor's mechanic's lien attached to the
.8 acre tract. 3°4
In the second mechanic's lien case, Vulcan Materials Co. v. Jack Raus,
Inc. (In re HL W Enterprises of Texas, Inc.),305 the IRS, as a tax lien claim-
ant, asserted a right to construction payments made by an owner to a general
contractor and held by the general contractor as retainage payable to a sub-
contractor indebted to the IRS. At the same time, a supplier of the subcon-
tractor (who had filed a lien for nonpayment) asserted entitlement to a
portion of the retainage on the basis that a portion of the retainage repre-
sented amounts owed by the subcontractor to the supplier for payment of
materials. Seeking to avoid liability for improper distribution of the
retainage, the general contractor filed an interpleader action seeking a judi-
cial determination of the proper distribution of the retainage. The IRS ar-
gued that its tax lien had priority over the supplier's lien claim since the
IRS's lien arose prior to the mechanic's lien. 30 6 Recognizing that the IRS's
301. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1994). Section 53.056(b)
generally provides that if a lien claim arises from a debt incurred by a subcontractor, the
claimant must give the original contractor written notice of the unpaid balance not later than
the 15th day of the second month following each month in which the claimant's labor was
performed or material delivered. The same notice must be given to the owner or reputed
owner and original contractor not later than the 15th day of the third month in which all or
part of the claimant's labor was performed or material was delivered. Id.
302. Valdez, 842 S.W.2d at 276. The court relied on TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 53.054(a)(2) which, for purposes of a mechanic's lien affidavit, allows the claimant to list the
"owner or reputed owner" of the property upon which the subcontractor performed work or
supplied materials. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.054(a)(2) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1994). This
provision, according to the court, is "necessarily implicated" when interpreting other refer-
ences to the term "owner" within the Texas Property Code. Valdez, 842 S.W.2d at 276.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. 157 B.R. 592 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
306. Generally, the priority of a federal tax lien is governed by the principle of "first in time
is the first in right." Id. at 595 (citing e.g., United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526
(1993)). When determining priority under this rule, (1) a federal tax lien's priority dates from
the date of filing of the notice of tax lien, regardless of the date the federal tax lien attaches and
(2) the priority date of the competing lien dates from the date on which the lien has been
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lien had priority over its mechanic's lien, the subcontractor invoked an alter-
native means of recovery permitted under sections 162.001 and 162.003 of
the Texas Property Code, 307 which generally provide that (1) construction
payments made to a contractor or subcontractor pursuant to a construction
contract for the improvement of real property are trust funds308 and (2) the
contractors, subcontractors, laborers and suppliers furnishing labor or
materials for the construction of the improvements are the beneficiaries of
the trust funds.309 Generally, the supplier argued that the subcontractor had
no interest in the retainage because the retainage constituted a trust fund
held for the payment of the supplier's unpaid bills. Accordingly, the IRS's
tax lien could not attach to the retainage. The IRS countered, arguing that
section 162.001 should be read as creating a trust fund for the benefit of a
materialman only at such time as the party with whom the materialman
directly contracted receives a construction payment. If the court adopted
such a reading, the supplier would not be entitled to any portion of the
retainage since the retainage had not yet been paid to the subcontractor.
Although recognizing the plausibility of the IRS's argument, the court con-
cluded that the specific wording of the statute mandated a conclusion that
when any contractor or subcontractor received a payment from an owner,
that payment gave rise to the trust for the benefit of all materialmen and
other beneficiaries recognized under section 162.003. 310
VIII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
During the Survey period, the courts were presented with various landlord
and tenant issues, some of which resulted in the following holdings and
statements: a material modification of a lease must be in writing if the lease
is required to be in writing;311 a non-waiver provision contained in a lease
perfected in the sense that "the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the
amount of the lien are established." McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1528 (quoting United States v.
New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954)). As to mechanic's liens, the date of perfection likely
dates from the date the mechanic's lien is filed pursuant to the state statute since that is the
date that the identity of the property subject to the lien becomes known. Interestingly, the
McDermott case concluded that the date of priority of a judgment lien against after acquired
property is the date that the property is acquired by the debtor and not the date the judgment
lien is recorded. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1529-30.
307. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001, 162.003 (Vernon 1984).
308. Id. § 162.001.
309. Id. § 162.003.
310. In re HL W Enterprises, 157 B.R. at 597. The court relied on that portion of § 162.001
which provides that trust payments include payments "made to a contractor or subcontrac-
tor." Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.001 (Vernon 1984)). The court could have
found more favorable language in § 162.003, which provides that mechanics, contractors, ma-
terialmen and other named parties are beneficiaries of "any trust funds paid or received in
connection with the improvement." Id. § 162.003. Moreover, there exists at least one Texas
appellate court case which supports the court's holding. McCoy v. Nelson Util. Serv., Inc.,
736 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that retainage held by
owner and payable to contractor constituted a trust fund for the benefit of contractor's
materialmen).
311. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Timely Secretarial Serv., Inc. (In re Timely Secretarial
Serv., Inc.), 987 F.2d 1167, 1173 (5th Cir. 1993) (relying on Kerrville HRH, Inc. v. City of
Kerrville, 803 S.W.2d 377, 388-89 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied)). The most
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may be waived just as any other provision contained in the lease;3 12 a tenant
may exclude third parties, including the landlord, from entering the tenant's
premises, unless the entering party has a contractual or other legal right to
enter;3 13 a tenant has an insurable interest in leased property where the ten-
ant derives pecuniary advantage from the property or would suffer pecuniary
loss from the destruction of the property;3 14 for purposes of determining
whether a constructive eviction occurred, the tenant's abandonment of the
premises more than two years after becoming aware of the condition alleg-
edly causing the constructive eviction did not constitute abandonment of the
premises within a reasonable period of time;3 15 the mere use of the word
"warranty" to create a covenant within a lease will not necessarily create an
express warranty for purposes of a claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade
significant issue in Timely Secretarial concerned the question of whether agreements between a
debtor and a creditor to lift an automatic stay must be in writing. Without answering the
question, the Fifth Circuit gave a strong indication that such agreements must be in writing or
otherwise made a part of the record to be enforceable. Timely Secretarial, 987 F.2d at 1173,
n.6. In refusing to enforce the alleged oral agreement which would modify the terms of a
written lease, the Timely Secretarial court not only relied on the principle cited in the text, but
also a provision in the lease which required all amendments to be in writing. The court's
reliance on the contract provision requiring all amendments to be in writing is overly broad.
Specifically, one line of Texas cases holds that a written contract containing a no-oral modifica-
tion provision may be orally modified, so long as the contract is not required by law to be in
writing (e.g., Hyatt Cheek Builders v. Board of Regents, 607 S.W.2d 258, 265 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1980, writ dism'd)), while another line of cases more broadly holds that a
written contract containing a no-oral modification provision may be orally modified, on the
theory that a written bargain is of no higher legal degree than an oral one, e.g., Apperson v.
Shofner, 351 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.- Waco 1961, no writ). Moreover, a provision
of article 2 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 2.209(c) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1984), provides that an agreement subject to article 2 which contains a no-oral
modification clause may not be orally modified, except that if a merchant supplies a form to
another merchant containing a no-oral modification clause, that form must be separately
signed by the merchant receiving the form. Id. § 2.209.
312. Winslow v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 849 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ
denied); Zwick v. Lodewijk Corp., 847 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ
denied). In reaching its holding, the Winslow court relied on Zwick. In Zwick, the court
rejected the waiving party's reliance on Giller Indus., Inc. v. Hartley, 644 S.W.2d 183, 184
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ), which held that, as a matter of law, an anti-waiver clause
contained in a lease allowed a landlord to declare a default for failure to timely pay rent, even
though the landlord had accepted late rent payments for the preceding six months. The Zwick
court appropriately distinguished Giller, noting that the anti-waiver clause in Giller provided
that waiver of past defaults would not constitute a waiver of future defaults, while the anti-
waiver provision in Zwick provided that the lessor's failure to timely declare a default or take
action thereon would not constitute a waiver of that default. Zwick, 847 S.W.2d at 317, n.2.
313. Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 860 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1993,
writ dism'd w.o.j.).
314. Jones v. Texas Pac. Indem. Co., 853 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, n.w.h.). In
Jones, the court concluded that the tenant had no insurable interest in the property because the
tenant occupied the property as a tenant at sufferance following a foreclosure. Id. at 795.




Practices Act (DTPA);3 16 the Texas Smoke Detector Statute3 17 exclusively
provides for the landlord's duties and the tenant's remedies with respect to
residential smoke alarms,318 and those duties and rights may be enlarged
only by specific written agreement between the landlord and tenant; 31 9 the
Texas Smoke Detector Statute does not violate the open courts provision of
the Texas Constitution320 or due process; 321 and options to renew a lease
generally must be exercised strictly according to the option provisions.322
One case decided during the Survey period addresses claims based on
breach of the implied covenant of suitability for commercial purposes estab-
lished by the Texas Supreme Court in Davidow v. Inwood North Professional
Group.323 The Davidow court explained that this warranty means that there
are no latent defects in facilities vital to the use of the commercial premises
and that those facilities will remain in a suitable condition during the term of
the lease. 324 In Gober v. Wright,325 the Houston Court of Appeals declared
that, as a matter of law, only the tenant's express agreements within the lease
to repair certain defects limit the implied warranty of suitability for commer-
cial purposes.326 The court's declaration broadens the holding of Davidow
and the Davidow court's explanation of its holding. Specifically, there is lit-
tle reason to assume that the Davidow court intended to override express
contractual agreements between a landlord and tenant relating to such mat-
ters as casualty damage or interruption of utilities, both of which would
likely result in a temporary interruption of vital facilities. Clearly, the Da-
vidow court did not address these issues or discuss whether there could be
any exceptions to its holding other than the one stated exception relating to
agreements by the tenant to undertake repairs relating to the defective
facility. 327
316. Enterprise-Laredo Assoc. v. Hachar's, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822, 831 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1992), writ denied per curiam, 843 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. 1992). The contested provision
in Hachar's stated that the "[lI]andlord warrants that Tenant shall not be required to pay a
charge for the use of common areas" greater than that charged to any other tenant. Id. at 830.
Reasoning that a warranty commonly extends to the character, quality, title, quantity, capac-
ity, condition or fitness of the goods or thing sold, the Hachar's court concluded that the
landlord's warranty was not a warranty for purposes of the DTPA but rather constituted a
covenant not actionable under the DTPA. Id. at 831-32. But cf Golman v. Alkek, 850
S.W.2d 568, 572-74 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ requested) (holding that the cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment contained in lease construed to be warranty for purposes of DTPA).
317. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.251-92.262 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1994).
318. Epps v. Ayer, 859 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, writ denied); Coleman v.
United Sav. Ass'n, 846 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, n.w.h.).
319. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.006 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
320. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
321. Cannon v. Lemon, 843 SW.2d 178, 183 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ
denied).
322. Hush Puppy of Longview, Inc. v. Cargill Interests, Ltd., 843 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ). In Hush Puppy, the court held that a renewal option expired
due to the tenant's failure to exercise the option within 90 days of the expiration of the lease as
required by the option provisions. Id. at 122.
323. 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988).
324. Id. at 377.
325. 838 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
326. Id. at 798.
327. Davidow, 747 S.W.2d at 377.
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Perhaps one justification for the breach of the implied warranty of suita-
bility established by Davidow is to ease the burden imposed by the breach of
a covenant of quiet enjoyment, which generally requires a tenant to establish
a constructive eviction by showing that (1) the landlord intended that the
tenant no longer enjoys the use of the premises, (2) a material act of the
landlord substantially interfered with the intended use and enjoyment of the
premises, (3) the tenant is permanently deprived of the use of the premises
and (4) the tenant abandoned the premises within a reasonable period of
time after the commission of the landlord's material act.32 8 In Goldman v.
Alkek, 329 the tenant sued for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, but
avoided the requirement of showing a constructive eviction. The appellate
court reasoned that the tenant should not be required to demonstrate the
general requirements of constructive eviction because the tenant sought
damages, as opposed to avoidance of rent and the termination of the lease. 330
Therefore, according to the court, the tenant need to only show a breach of
the express terms of the contractual covenant of quiet enjoyment. 33'
Although this portion of the court's opinion makes legal sense, the court
improperly went on to construe the contractual covenant of quiet enjoyment
as a warranty of quiet enjoyment covered by the DTPA.332 Although the
court recognized that a mere breach of contract is not actionable under the
DTPA, the court insisted on characterizing the covenant of quiet enjoyment
as a warranty that the landlord breached by subjecting the tenant to obliga-
tions not required under the lease, thereby committing deceptive acts. 333
The court apparently concluded that the warranty status of the covenant
arose from the express language of the covenant, which generally provided
that the tenant would be entitled to peaceable and quiet possession of the
premises "without hindrance or molestation of Lessor. '334 Regardless of
the fact that the quoted words expanded the covenant of quiet enjoyment,
the expansion should have not caused the covenant to be converted to a
warranty.
Two cases decided during the Survey period address the issue of whether a
provision in a lease requiring all modifications and amendments to be in
writing is enforceable as written. In Zwick v. Lodewijk Corp. ,335 the Texar-
kana Court of Appeals chose to ignore a provision of a contract requiring all
amendments and provisions of a lease to be in writing and permitted an oral
amendment to the lease to be enforced. The court based the enforceability of
328. Goldman v. Alkek, 850 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ
requested).
329. Id.
330. Id. at 572.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 574.
333. Id. In reaching this holding, the court relied on TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.46(b)(19) (Vernon Supp. 1994), which generally provides that a deceptive trade practice
includes a representation that a guaranty or warranty confers rights or remedies which are not
included in the guaranty or warranty. The court inappropriately used § 17.46(b)(19) since the
covenant of quiet enjoyment does not constitute a warranty.
334. Goldman, 850 S.W.2d at 572.
335. 847 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
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the oral amendment on the basis of an exception to the statute of frauds.336
Another decision decided during the Survey period, In re Timely Secreta-
rial Service, Inc. 337 addressed a similar contract clause. Arriving at a con-
trary result, the Fifth Circuit concluded that not only the statute of frauds,
but also a clause within the lease, required all modifications to the lease to be
in writing, thereby barring an alleged oral modification to the lease. 338 If
forced to choose, select Timely Secretarial as being correct and label Zwick
as a prime example of a court inappropriately choosing to ignore the express
requirements of the parties' contract.
Alexander v. Cooper339 clearly establishes that it is imprudent, at best, to
stick a negotiated lease document in a drawer after its execution by the par-
ties. In Alexander, the lessee leased certain property and the improvements
thereon. The lease provided that all alterations and improvements placed
upon the leased property during the term would become the lessor's prop-
erty. Improvements included all buildings, equipment and fixtures. Some
time after the execution of the lease and apparently without reviewing the
lease instrument, the lessee constructed a car wash operation on the prop-
erty, which included a building and car washing equipment bolted to the
building. Shortly before the expiration of the lease, the lessee removed all
car washing equipment from the property, including the equipment bolted to
the car wash structure constructed by the lessee. The lessor thereafter sued
the lessee for unauthorized removal of the car wash equipment. The trial
court found for the lessor and the lessee appealed. Having little trouble con-
cluding that the car wash equipment constituted improvements under the
lease, the appellate court held that the car wash equipment had become the
lessor's property upon installation and should have been surrendered with
the other portions of the leased premises. 340
Generally, a lessee can be comfortable with its right to occupy its leased
premises to the exclusion of others, except to the extent that the lessee other-
wise agrees in writing. Even though the court in Mobil Pipe Line Co. v.
Smith 341 agreed with this general principle, 342 the court concluded that an
owner of land covered by a lease may, without the consent of the lessee of
that land, grant a pipeline easement under the surface of the leased land, but
the lessee may recover damages resulting from interference with the lessee's
right to possession of the surface. 343 The court reached this holding by rely-
ing on various cases addressing the correlative rights of a landowner, its sur-
face lessee and its mineral lessee. 344 The lessee argued that these cases were
336. Id. at 319 (relying on TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1984); Trout-
man v. Interstate Promotional Printing Co., 717 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
337. 987 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1993).
338. Id. at 1173.
339. 843 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.).
340. Id. at 646-47.
341. 860 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
342. Id. at 159.




inapposite because each involved a severance of an estate into a surface es-
tate and a subsurface estate, thereby creating competing interests between
the two estates. The court rejected this distinction, concluding that if a land-
owner has the right to burden the estate of a lessee with a mineral estate,
surely it could burden the estate of a lessee with a pipeline easement, which
in the court's judgment was far less burdensome than a mineral estate.3 4
Both the lessee's and court's position have merit, but the lessee's position
appears better argued based on existing case law.
Although not a landlord/tenant case, the holding of Harmon v. General
Motors Corp.3 46 could well be applicable to certain premises liability claims
brought by an employee of a tenant against the landlord. Relying on a Texas
Supreme Court case, 347 the Fifth Circuit concluded that, as a matter of law,
an employee of a contractor who entered an area not authorized by the con-
tract between the contractor and the owner became a trespasser, regardless
of the employee's knowledge of whether he was authorized to enter the par-
ticular area.348
In Barnes v. Wendy's International, Inc. 349 an employee of a tenant suf-
fered personal injuries as a result of a fall within the premises and sued the
landlord. Realizing that a landlord is not generally liable for areas con-
trolled by the tenant Unless the landlord has undertaken, but failed to per-
form, a repair obligation or has agreed to repair the premises, 350 the
employee argued that certain provisions of the lease obligated the landlord
to make repairs which, if performed, could have prevented the personal in-
jury. Specifically, the employee argued that the provisions in the lease which
granted the landlord the right to re-enter the premises in the case of a tenant
default constituted a retention of control by landlord over the premises,
thereby giving rise to a duty to maintain the premises. The court summarily
dismissed the employee's argument, concluding that the lease granted the
landlord a right, without imposing an obligation. 35' Having lost the control
argument against the landlord, the employee, claiming third party benefici-
ary status to the lease, next argued that the landlord should be liable for its
failure to enforce a provision in the lease which required the tenant to carry
worker's compensation insurance to the extent required by law. Again, the
court had little difficulty dismissing the tenant's argument, concluding that
the contract evidenced no intent to confer third party beneficiary status upon
the employee. 35 2 Even if the parties intended that the employee be a third
345. Id. at 160.
346. 999 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1993).
347. Id. at 965-66 (relying on Burton Constr. & Shipbldg. Co. v. Broussard, 154 Tex. 50,
273 S.W.2d 598, 602-03 (1954) (holding that a person who rightfully occupies or is on an
owner's land and who then enters upon another portion of the owner's land which the person
has no right to occupy or use, such person becomes a trespasser or mere licensee)).
348. Harmon, 999 F.2d at 966, n.3.
349. 857 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
350. E.g., George v. City of Fort Worth, 434 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
351. Barnes, 857 S.W.2d at 730.
352. Id. at 731.
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party beneficiary of the lease, the court concluded that the employee's claim
must fail because Texas law does not require an employer to carry worker's
compensation insurance. 353
IX. PARTITION
A co-tenant of real property has a right to partition of the co-owned prop-
erty under section 23.001 of the Texas Property Code3 54 and the courts have
generally recognized that right as absolute. 355 For example, in Carter v.
Charles,356 an ex-wife brought an action against her ex-husband to partition
property in which each owned an undivided interest pursuant to a divorce
decree. The ex-husband claimed that a two-year limitations period con-
tained in section 3.90 of the Texas Family Code and the doctrine of res judi-
cata barred the partition action.357 Recognizing the right to partition as
absolute, the appeals court concluded that even if section 3.90 barred en-
forcement under the Family Code, that section does not bar an otherwise
valid partition action.358 Moreover, stated the court, the ex-wife's action
sought only to enforce her partition right with respect to the joint ownership
interests awarded by the court and not to relitigate the property divisions
awarded by the divorce decree.359
While the Texas Property Code grants the statutory right to partition, the
judicial procedures for conducting a partition action are set forth in Rule
771 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 360 A common challenge to a
judicial partition is the argument that the trial court failed to reject a com-
missioner's report as materially erroneous or unequal and unjust in accord-
ance with Rule 771 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 36 1 In Ellis v. First
City National Bank,36 2 the petitioner argued that the commissioner's report
unjustly partitioned the property between the co-tenants. In support of the
petitioner's claim, one of the commissioners testified that he did not consider
the division fair, and several other parties testified that the commissioner's
report awarded the other co-owners a disproportionate share of the most
attractive land. The petitioner further argued that due to the number of co-
owners (twenty-nine), the limited road frontage and lake frontage could not
be fairly divided among the co-owners. The court, however, concluded that
this evidence did not establish, as a matter of law, the unequal or unjust
nature of the commissioner's report and the court therefore declined to over-
353. Id. The court also concluded that even if the contract imposed an obligation on the
tenant to carry worker's compensation insurance, any claim would be against the tenant and
not the landlord. Id.
354. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.001 (Vernon 1984).
355. E.g., Carter v. Charles, 853 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993,
n.w.h.) (citing Ware v. Ware, 809 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ)).
356. Id.
357. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.90 (Vernon 1993).
358. Carter, 853 S.W.2d at 671.
359. Id. at 672.
360. TEX. R. Civ. P. 771.
361. Id.
362. 864 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, n.w.h.).
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turn the trial court's acceptance of the divisions of property set forth in the
commissioner's report. 363
The most interesting partition case decided during the Survey period is a
case involving the doctrine of equitable partition, which one court described
as follows:
[O]ne cotenant has no power to divest the title of other cotenants by
selling specific parts of the common property, yet under the well-settled
doctrine of equitable partition the court in adjusting the equities of all
the interested parties will protect such purchasers by setting aside to
them the particular tracts purchased, if it can be done without injury to
the other owners, where . . . [the] property is of equal and uniform
value; and will set aside to the nonjoining cotenants the equivalent of
their interest in all the land out of the unsold tract if it is sufficient to
satisfy same.364
In Barfield v. Holland,365 three individuals, J.H., Otha and Tessie, 366
jointly owned a tract of land consisting of approximately 100 acres. The
three owners surveyed the tract of land into three tracts (A, B and C) of
approximately equal acreage, but did not seek to judicially partition the
land. Thereafter, in simultaneous transactions, J.H. conveyed his undivided
interest in the surface of tract B to Otha and Otha conveyed her undivided
interest in the surface of tract A to J.H. Both deeds reserved all minerals in
favor of the conveying party. Approximately six years later, J.H. and Otha
conveyed their respective undivided interests in the surface of tract C to Tes-
sie, but reserved all minerals in their respective deed. Tessie at no time con-
veyed to J.H. or Otha any part of her undivided interests in tracts A and B.
The three deeds apparently were properly recorded in the appropriate real
property records. Subsequently, Holland acquired J.H.'s undivided interest
in tract A, Otha's undivided interest in tract B and Tessie's undivided inter-
est in tract C. None of the deeds reserved minerals and each party conveyed
its interest by general warranty deed. Holland subsequently leased the min-
erals and production thereafter commenced. Following the commencement
of production on each of the tracts, J.H. Otha and Tessie claimed rights to
the minerals and, as a result, Holland filed suit seeking a determination that
he owned 100% of the minerals. The trial court found for Holland, con-
cluding that he acquired 100% of the minerals through the doctrine of equi-
table partition. Naturally, J.H., Otha and Tessie appealed.
Reversing the trial court, the appeals court concluded that although the
doctrine of equitable partition required a finding that J.H, Otha and Tessie
partitioned the surface of the entire tract by allocating the surface of tract A
to J.H., 367 the surface of tract B to Otha and the surface of tract C to Tessie,
363. Id. at 557.
364. Larrison v. Walker, 149 S.W.2d 172, 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1941, writ
refd).
365. 844 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
366. J.H., Otha and Tessie, through marriage, death or conveyance, further divided, shared
or conveyed their ownership interests, but for ease of discussion of the case, these subsequent
divisions are irrelevant and ignored.
367. Although the court seems to say this finding is of no concern to Holland, see id. at
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the doctrine could not be utilized by Holland to adjust the ownership of the
mineral interests owned by J.H., Otha and Tessie, as cotenants, which had
been expressly reserved from the deeds pursuant to which J.H., Otha and
Tessie divided the overall tract.368 Equitable partition, in the court's judg-
ment, did not apply to the plaintiff's claim of ownership of 100% of the
minerals; rather the claim constituted a suit on title, which should be gov-
erned by a construction of each of the deeds in the chain of title. Since the
minerals had been effectively severed from the partition deeds and those
deeds had been recorded in the appropriate records, Holland had no claim to
the minerals other than the mineral interest that each grantor had with re-
spect to the individual tract conveyed by such grantor. 369
X. ADVERSE POSSESSION
If a party does not obtain good title through a conveyance, he or she may
try adverse possession. For example, in Barfield v. Holland,3 70 a party
claimed title to minerals beneath the surface of its property through adverse
possession. Although the court recognized that adverse possession of the
surface estate generally extends to the underlying mineral estate, the court
also recognized that after the mineral estate is severed from the surface es-
tate, adverse possession of the mineral estate may be claimed only through
production of the minerals and taking them from the ground. 37' Since the
claimant did not claim adverse possession on the basis of production of the
minerals, the court found for the legal property owner. 372
765, Holland would not have acquired an undivided 100% interest in the surface of tracts A
and B without the application of the doctrine of equitable partition, as Tessie never conveyed
her undivided interest in the surface of tract A to J.H. and never conveyed her undivided
interest in the surface of tract B to Otha.
368. Id. at 765. The court stated that "the doctrine of equitable partition applies only to an
adjustment of equities between the cotenants themselves." Id. This statement fails to ac-
knowledge the holdings in the equitable partition cases relied on by the court, which recognize
that the doctrine exists to protect a vendee who acquires from a cotenant a specific parcel of
land, where and to the extent that can be done without prejudice to the interests of the remain-
ing cotenant. See id. at 763-64.
369. Id. at 765. Holland also argued that the doctrines of estoppel and ratification and
acquiescence supported his claim to 100% of the minerals under the entire 100 acres. As to
the doctrine of ratification and acquiescence, the court recognized the applicability of the doc-
trine to equitable partition cases. Id. However, having already concluded that Holland's
claim for 100% of the minerals under the 100 acre tract could not be based on equitable
partition, the court refused to apply the ratification and acquiescence doctrine to the facts
before it. Id. at 766. The court also recognized that the doctrine had been applied to situa-
tions in which a cotenant attempted to convey a specific part of common property to a third
party, but neither J.H., Otha nor Tessie had attempted to convey a specific part of common
property. Id. In making his estoppel argument, Holland claimed that each of the cotenants, in
conveying the individual tracts to Holland, made certain misrepresentations regarding the
state of their title. Maybe so, implied the court, but land titles are governed by deeds, the
interpretation thereof and recording statutes, and not by personal representations, warranties,
reliance and estoppel. Id. at 766-67.
370. 844 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
371. Id. at 767 (citing e.g., Greene v. White, 137 Tex. 361, 153 S.W.2d 575, 585 (1941);
Steed v. Crossland, 252 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
372. Id. at 769-70.
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Knupp v. Miller 373 involved 24 acres of land consisting of a 12.5 acre tract
and an 11.5 acre tract. A stand of trees suitable for lumber existed on the
eastern half of the 24 acres, while no such stand existed on the western half
of the tract. Miller claimed ownership of the 12.5 acres through a deed
which contained an inaccurate beginning point and maintained that the 12.5
acres consisted of the eastern half of the 24 acre tract. The defendant
claimed ownership of the 11.5 acre tract through a deed which also con-
tained an inaccurate beginning point and also maintained that the 11.5 acre
tract consisted of nearly all of the eastern half of the 24 acre tract. The
defendant harvested the trees and Miller sued, claiming ownership of the
tract through his deed and through adverse possession under the three, five,
ten and twenty five year adverse possession statutes. 374 During the trial,
Miller presented testimony from a surveyor supporting Miller's claim that
his 12.5 acre tract consisted of the eastern half of the 24 acre tract. Miller
presented further evidence that he had fenced in the 12.5 acres, that he had
maintained and repaired the fence lines, that he had from time to time
cleared the land of brush, that he had cut timber from the land, and that
others had assisted him in the management of the 12.5 acre tract. Finally,
Miller supported his chain of title by submitting into evidence his deed and
an abstract of title. The jury found that Miller established adverse posses-
sion of the 12.5 acres tract under the three, five, ten and twenty-five year
statutes and the defendant appealed. With little discussion, the appeals
court found the evidence clearly sufficient to support the jury's findings re-
garding adverse possession. 375
In McAllister v. Samuels,376 the Samuels purchased a residential lot which
bordered a lot owned by the McAllisters. The two lots were separated by a
fence which the Samuels desired to tear down and replace with a new fence
along a new fence line. The McAllisters, however, suggested that the new
fence be constructed in the same location as the old fence. Each party com-
missioned a survey to determine the proper boundary line and, to the dismay
of the McAllisters, both surveys reflected the old fence line to be located on
the Samuels' lot, approximately nine inches inside the boundary line of the
two lots. Buoyed by the surveys, the Samuels removed the old fence and
constructed a new fence on the common boundary line reflected in the
373. 858 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, n.w.h.).
374. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024, 16.025, 16.026, 16.028 (Vernon
1986).
375. Knupp, 858 S.W.2d at 952. One justice filed a dissent, arguing that the court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case because in a trespass to try title case the petition must contain a
description of the property by metes and bounds or with sufficient certainty to identify the
same. Because Miller never sought reformation of the deed to correct the error, the dissenting
justice argued that the judgment did not describe the same property as the petition and there-
fore awarded title to property not in controversy. Id. at 956. The majority, however, con-
cluded that the deed's reference to the 12.5 acre tract being the "same land in a deed from
Harriet Bean, et al, to Bernal Kerr" sufficiently supported Miller's position that the deed
erroneously referred to a commencement point of the "S.E. corner of a 24 acre tract set apart
by Allie Powell and James Powell" and should have instead referred to the S.E. corner of a
24.5 acre tract set apart by Harriet Bean and Albert Bean. Id. at 955.
376. 857 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
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surveys. The skirmish having escalated to a war, the McAllisters sued,
claiming that they had acquired the nine-inch strip of land through adverse
possession. The trial court declared the Samuels the winners and the McAl-
listers appealed.
The appeals court reviewed the McAllisters' claim for adverse possession
under the three, five, ten and twenty-five year adverse possession statutes.377
The court had little difficulty rejecting the adverse possession claims under
the three year, five year and twenty-five year statutes, as each of those stat-
utes requires possession through a deed or some other written instrument
and the McAllisters made no such claim of title to the nine-inch strip of
land. 378 The ten year statute requires a claimant to hold property in peacea-
ble, quiet and adverse possession and to cultivate, use and enjoy the property
claimed by the claimant.3 79 Adverse possession is generally defined to mean
an actual and visible appropriation of real property, commenced and contin-
ued under a claim of right that is inconsistent with and hostile to another
person's claim to the same real property.380 In denying the McAllisters'
claim of adverse possession based on the ten-year adverse possession statute,
the court focused on two requirements of adverse possession. 38' First, there
must exist a "visible appropriation" of the property and second the appropri-
ation must be "hostile" to the claims of another party. 382 Applying the fair
notice requirements generally applicable to the doctrine of encroachment, 383
the court concluded that the slight nature of the nine-inch encroachment
could not constitute notice of actual and visible appropriation of the strip.
Although the court's result is probably correct, the court's holding improp-
erly emasculates a party's right, under section 16.10, to make an adverse
possession claim as to any tract similar to the nine-inch tract in McAl-
lister.384 The court should have more appropriately utilized the reasoning of
377. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024, 16.025, 16.026, 16.028 (Vernon
1986).
378. Id. §§ 16.024, 16.025, 16.028.
379. Id. § 16.026.
380. Id. § 16.021(1).
381. McAllister, 857 S.W.2d at 776.
382. Id.
383. Id. The doctrine of encroachment is generally invoked to defend against a party's
claim that, through adverse possession of a portion of a tract which is part of a larger tract, the
claimant has obtained ownership of the larger tract. E.g., McCall v. Grogan-Cochran Lumber
Co., 186 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. 1945). In applying the encroachment doctrine, the McCall
Court concluded that the claimant's use and possession of the smaller tract must provide suffi-
cient notice to show the other party that the claimant's possession was "incidental or subsidi-
ary to the claimant's possession of the smaller body of land." Id. The McAllister court utilized
the fair notice requirements of the encroachment doctrine even though McAllister's claim did
not include a larger tract. McAllister, 857 S.W.2d at 776. The McAllister court should have
more appropriately relied on McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1971), wherein
the Texas Supreme Court concluded that under the predecessor of § 16.026, a claimant's ap-
propriation of land "must be of such a character as to indicate unmistakably an assertion of a
claim of exclusive ownership in the [claimant]." McDonnold, 465 S.W.2d at 141.
384. The court ran into trouble by relying on cases in which the courts recognized that the
encroachment doctrine will refute a party's claim that its use of an insignificant portion of a
large tract entitles that party to make an adverse possession claim as to the larger tract. See
Grogan Mfg. Co. v. Lane, 173 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1943, writ ref'd
w.o.m.) and cases cited therein.
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the McDonnold case and the overall notice provided by the facts to deter-
mine whether the McAllisters' occupancy and use of the nine-inch tract con-
stituted a visible appropriation of the nine-inch tract. 385
Parker v. McGinnes38 6 demonstrates the importance of designedly enclos-
ing property intermittently used for farming and grazing by constructing a
fence on the perimeter boundaries. In Parker, L.B. and his brother annually
grew rice or grazed cattle on two platted, but unfenced, lots from 1943-1975.
Initially, L.B. and his brother leased the lots. In 1957, L.B. acquired a one-
half interest in the lots from the lessor's father and recorded that deed sev-
eral years later. In 1975, L.B. received a deed for both lots from the widow
of the lessor's father and recorded the deed shortly thereafter. From 1967
until 1974, L.B. leased the lots to a third party, who used the lots for grazing
cattle. In connection with the grazing, the lessee constructed a fence around
the perimeter of the lots. At the end of the lease term, L.B. removed the
lessee's fence and shortly thereafter a neighboring property owner, Parker,
planted rye grass on the lots, grazed cattle on the lots, surveyed the lots and
constructed a fence around the lots. In 1977, Parker determined that a per-
son other than L.B. held record title to the lots and Parker obtained a deed
from that person. In 1980, Parker ceased grazing cattle on the lots and
someone removed Parker's fence. In 1981, L.B. planted a rice crop on the
lots in December of 1980 or January of 1981. Following the harvest of the
rice crop, Parker constructed a new fence around the lots and used the lots
for pasture and hay until 1984. During 1984, someone removed Parker's
new fence and L.B. planted a final rice crop. Shortly thereafter, Parker filed
a trespass to try title action against L.B. and others to establish title to the
lots. L.B. answered, claiming that he had obtained title to the property
through the three, five, ten, and twenty-five year adverse possession statutes.
The trial court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Parker by
awarding record title to Parker, but submitted all issues concerning L.B.'s
adverse possession claims to the jury. The jury found that L.B. had peacea-
ble and continuous possession of the lots for ten years or more from 1943
until 1982 and that L.B. (or others claiming under him) had peaceable and
continuous possession for any twenty-five year period existing between the
years 1943 and 1982.387 Parker appealed.
On appeal, the appellate court focused on the issue of whether L.B. ad-
versely possessed and cultivated, used or enjoyed the lots for a period of at
least ten consecutive years. The court initially recognized that if an adverse
possession claim is based on grazing, the claimant must fence the land to
show that the land is designedly enclosed and that the claimant asserts a
claim hostile to the real owner. 388 The court further recognized, however,
that adverse possession claims, such as L.B.'s, based on mixed grazing and
385. See discussion supra note 384.
386. 842 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
387. Id. at 359.
388. Id. at 360 (relying on Cunningham v. Eastham, 465 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971 , writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Orsborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp.,
153 Tex. 281, 267 S.W.2d 781 (1954)).
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farming use will turn on the facts of each case. 38 9 Based on the facts before
it, the court acknowledged that L.B. proved that he had alternately farmed
and graze d cattle on the lots for the requisite periods of ten and twenty-five
years, but concluded that L.B. failed to prove that he had farmed the lots for
ten consecutive years or that he had fenced the land during the years in
which he had not farmed the lots. 390 Absent these showings, the court con-
cluded that, under applicable case law, L.B. had failed to show that he had
met all requirements necessary to adversely possess the lots for the required
periods of time.39 1
XI. CONVEYANCING
Conveyancing cases proved to be a fruitful source of litigation during the
Survey period. Although some cases do not warrant discussion because they
exceed the scope of this article or are merely noteworthy, 392 a number of
389. Id.
390. Id. at 362.
391. Id.
392. Temple-Inland Forest Prod. Corp. v. U.S., 988 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 1993) (where (1)
grantor reserved minerals on certain land, (2) deed provided that, upon initial expiration date
(and any extension thereof), the reservations would be extended for successive five year periods
as to all areas within a one-half mile radius of each well operating on the applicable expiration
date and (3) deed provided that if upon any expiration date mineral operations were not being
conducted, then the right of the grantor to mine and remove minerals would terminate, the
court construed the reservation as follows: first, if on the initial expiration date no well was
being operated, then the reserved interest would terminate; and second, if any well was operat-
ing on the initial expiration date or a subsequent expiration date, then (x) the mineral reserva-
tion would be renewed as to each then operating well (and the area within a 1/2 mile radius)
for successive 5 year periods and (y) the mineral reservation would terminate as to any well
(and the area within a 1/2 mile radius) if, on any expiration date, the well was no longer
operating.); Natland Corp. v. Baker's Port, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1993, n.w.h.) (upland land owner gained title to land created by gradual run-off of material
dredged from channel by U.S. Army Corp of Engineers and placed on shore line); Dyson
Descendant Corp. v. Sonat Exploration Co., 862 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1993, n.w.h.) (holding that defective nature of acknowledgment of deed due to notary's pecuni-
ary interest in transaction did not cause deed to be ineffective because defect did not exist on
face of acknowledgement); Wyatt v. McGregor, 855 S.W.2d 5, 10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1993, writ denied) (stating that property description was sufficient for deed where description
provided three sides of tract, thereby leaving only one line to satisfy the property's limits);
McInroe v. Lloyd, 847 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, n.w.h.) (holding that
where provision in deed provided for vendor's lien and further provided that deed would not
become absolute unless grantee fully exercised an option to purchase and the deed otherwise
complied with terms of option agreement, vendor's lien held to secure both payment of note
and the grantee's obligation to exercise the option in accordance with the option agreement);
Trison Inv. Co. v. Woodard, 838 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied)
(holding that even though husband had obligation to pay a note owing to ex-wife upon the
earlier to occur of a stated date or sale of certain property, implied vendor's lien held not to
attach to that property to secure payment of the note because divorce agreement did not ap-
portion consideration between real and personal property and gave the husband the right to
hold the property free of any claim of his ex-wife); Savell v. Savell 837 S.W.2d 836, 839-40
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (explaining that where appellant and
appellee agreed that, notwithstanding recitation of consideration in deed, grantee gave no con-
sideration in connection with delivery of deed, (i) law permitted parties to offer evidence as to
whether grantor intended delivery of deed and (ii) recordation of deed did not conclusively
establish delivery of the deed); MTrust Corp. v. LJH Corp., 837 S.W.2d 250, 252-53 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (holding that statute of frauds satisfied where property
descriptions consisted of maps which reflected abstract numbers, survey information and block
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cases are significant or interesting enough to warrant extending the unfore-
seeable end of this article.
Texas law has long recognized that an "as is" clause is enforceable in
contracts for sale. 393 On the other hand, Texas law has also previously rec-
ognized that an "as is" clause will not defeat an action for fraud based on an
affirmative misrepresentation. 394 In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Jefferson
Associates, Ltd.,395 the court was presented with the issue, among others, of
whether the "as is" clause contained in the contract would defeat the claims
of the purchaser. In Jefferson, the seller and buyer entered into a contract of
sale which gave the buyer the right to inspect the subject property and which
provided for sale of the property on an "as is" basis. Following the closing
of the sale, the buyer discovered that the improvements had asbestos-con-
taining materials and filed suit against the seller, alleging affirmative misrep-
resentation under the DTPA, fraud and fraudulent concealment of the
asbestos containing materials. Upon the conclusion of presentation of evi-
dence to the jury, the parties agreed to submit the issue of liability on a
general charge requesting the jury to determine if the buyer should be enti-
tled to damages as a result of any "wrongful conduct" of the seller. The jury
found that the seller engaged in "wrongful conduct" and awarded actual and
punitive damages. Shocked, the seller appealed, bringing numerous points
of error, including an argument that no or insufficient evidence supported
the jury's finding of wrongful conduct.
Because of the submission of the liability issue on a general charge, the
appellate court concluded that the law required the court to uphold the judg-
ment of the trial court if the evidence provided sufficient proof to establish
any theory of liability plead by the buyer. 396 On this basis, the court chose
not to expressly address the jury's finding of "wrongful conduct" and instead
sought to determine whether sufficient evidence existed to support a finding
of affirmative misrepresentations actionable under the DTPA or actionable
fraud, 397 both of which were plead by the buyer and neither of which, ac-
cording to the court, would be barred by the "as is" clause. 398 The court's
numbers for the area in which the land was located and schedule which listed individual tracts
and general location).
393. E.g., Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d
308 (Tex. 1978); Singleton v. LaCoure, 712 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
394. Cockburn v. Mercantile Petroleum, Inc., 296 S.W.2d 316, 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dal-
las 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (relying on TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4004, now codified as
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1987)). The court in Cockburn did not distin-
guish between "as is" agreements and other types of agreements, but instead stated that an "as
is" agreement is subject to rescission or damages under art. 4004 as any other cause of action
covered by art. 4004 where there is evidence and jury findings of fraud. Id. In Cockburn,
although the contract at issue contained an "as is" clause, the seller's agent actually repre-
sented that all five of the gas wells which were the subject of the contract were producing wells
when, in fact, not all five wells were producing wells. Id. at 322.
395. 839 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ granted).
396. Id. at 869.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 873 (relying on Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985) (holding
that affirmative misrepresentation as to the quality of goods purchased creates liability irre-
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conclusion, however, that an "as is" clause does not bar claims under the
DTPA or claims based on fraud is overly broad. For example, in a Texas
Supreme Court case relied on by the Jefferson court, the Texas Supreme
Court held that an "as is" contract would not defeat a claim under the
DTPA where the claim is based on an affirmative misrepresentation, but the
court also recognized that if the defendants had remained silent "as to the
quality of the relevant systems, the outcome of [the] case would have been
different. ' 399 Moreover, although another case relied upon by the Jefferson
court recognized the fraud exception to the "as is" doctrine, the facts of that
case indicate that the defendant made an affirmative, false representation as
a material inducement to the purchaser.4o° If the fraud exception to the "as
is" clause is not limited to situations where a party makes affirmative false
representations or fraudulently conceals facts, much of the intended effect of
an "as is" clause would be emasculated. 4° 1 Moreover, failure to so hold
arguably renders the "as is" clause generally ineffective in light of the fact
that the Texas Supreme Court has, in the absence of an "as is" clause, de-
scribed a seller's disclosure obligation under a contract as the duty to "dis-
close material facts which would not be discoverable by the exercise of
ordinary care and diligence on the party of the purchaser, or which a reason-
able investigation and inquiry would not uncover." 402 Surely, the introduc-
tion of an "as is" clause should be held to reduce the general disclosure
obligation imposed on a seller of real estate. The Texas Supreme Court has
granted writ of error with respect to the "as is" issues in this case and the
court hopefully will expressly set forth the type of fraud and DTPA claims
that are not barred by an "as is" clause. 403
With respect to the plaintiff's claim of a violation of the DTPA based on
an affirmative misrepresentation, the Jefferson court concluded that an agent
of the seller affirmatively represented the quality of the building by stating
that the building had no defects, other than one problem relating to the con-
crete floor in the mechanical room of the building, and that the building was
"one of the finest little properties in the City of Austin" and was a "superb,
super fine building. '' 404 While the buyer argued that these statements consti-
tuted affirmative representations and that the representations were breached
spective of contractual disclaimer); Cockburn v. Mercantile Petroleum, Inc., 296 S.W.2d 316,
326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding that "as is" clause does not defeat
action for fraud)).
399. Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 601.
400. See Cockburn, 296 S.W.2d at 326.
401. An "as is" contract most generally includes an inspection right and it seems reason-
able to conclude that the parties to such a contract fully intend that the purchaser should not
be entitled to complain of any defect which could have been discovered in a reasonable
inspection.
402. Smith v. National Resort Communities, 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979).
403. Because the DTPA has been held to create an independent cause of action, see Smith
v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980), the Texas Supreme Court could justifiably con-
clude that an "as is" clause does not bar any liability under the DTPA. Accordingly, if the
parties to a contract desire not to have the DTPA apply to their contract, the parties, to the
extent permitted under § 17.42 of the DTPA, should include a provision in their contract
expressly waiving the provisions of the DTPA.
404. 839 S.W.2d at 871.
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because of the existence of the asbestos containing materials in the building,
the seller argued that the agent's statements were nothing more than puffing.
Even though the court acknowledged that the agent's representations might
not be sufficient to support a specific cause of action, the court concluded
that they were legally sufficient to support the jury's finding of "wrongful
conduct" in response to the general charge of liability. 40 5 As to whether
sufficient evidence existed to support a conclusion that the seller had fraudu-
lently concealed the existence of the asbestos containing materials in the
building, the seller argued that no such concealment could have occurred
since the seller did not have actual knowledge of the existence of the asbestos
containing materials in the building at the time of the sale of the building.
While acknowledging that it did not produce any direct evidence showing
that the seller had actual knowledge of the existence of the asbestos contain-
ing materials in the building, the buyer argued that it had produced sufficient
circumstantial evidence to enable the jury to impute such knowledge to the
seller. Recognizing that circumstantial evidence may be used to support a
cause of action, 40 6 the court relied primarily on several facts proved by the
buyer in holding that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to sustain the
jury's finding of wrongful conduct. ° 7 Just as the court failed to reach a
405. Id. at 873. In fact, the court may have erred in reaching a determination that the
agent's statements constituted affirmative representations as opposed to mere puffing. Specifi-
cally, the court concluded that the agent's statements were similar to a statement that the
building was perfect or meticulously constructed, both of which have been held to constitute
actionable misrepresentations. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. 1980)
(finding that false statement that boat was in excellent or perfect condition constituted actiona-
ble misrepresentation under the DTPA); HOW Ins. Co. v. Patriot Fin. Serv., Inc., 786 S.W.2d
533, 544-46 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ) (use of term "meticulous construction" de-
noted high quality of construction and is a representation of a material fact which, if false,
constitutes actionable misrepresentation under the DTPA). On the other hand, a statement
that a Mercedes is the best engineered car in the world, when in fact it is not, does not qualify
as an actionable representation under the DTPA. Autohaus, Inc. v. Aguilar, 794 S.W.2d 459,
454 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The seller's agent's statement that the building
was one of the best little buildings in Austin, Texas seems very similar to the statement regard-
ing Mercedes automobiles and probably should not have constituted an actionable misrepre-
sentation. Moreover, the statement regarding defects in the building arguably does not cover
such matters as to the makeup of the materials used in the construction of the building.
406. 839 S.W.2d at 872-73 (citing McMillen Feeds, Inc. v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123, 130
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ refd n.r.e.)).
407. Id. at 873. In support of its holding, the court relied primarily on the following
evidence: (1) the seller's agent stated that the seller did not have plans and specifications for
the base building, when in fact it did; (2) a confidential memorandum written by the seller
directing its nationwide employees not to fill out a potential (or perhaps existing) tenant's
disclosure forms relating to whether asbestos containing materials existed in buildings owned
by seller and leased or to be leased to that tenant; (3) the seller's circulation of articles relating
to the health hazards of asbestos to personnel within the national corporate office and with
instructions not to circulate the articles outside of the seller; and (4) a policy proposal relating
to the disclosure of certain matters and the modification of that proposal by the seller's chief
legal counsel for real estate matters to delete a provision relating to the disclosure of asbestos
containing materials within buildings owned by seller. The points in clauses (2), (3), and (4)
seem to provide no support for a conclusion that the seller knew that the building contained
asbestos materials. The point in clause (1) provides some evidential support, but certainly
some question exists as to whether it alone is sufficient to establish that the seller knew that the
building contained asbestos materials. Moreover, in light of the obvious extensive discovery
performed by the buyer, the inability to produce some direct evidence is quite amazing, unless,
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specific conclusion that the seller's agent's representations were false and
actionable under the DTPA, the court also failed to reach a specific conclu-
sion that the buyer provided sufficient evidence to establish the specific ele-
ments of fraudulent concealment.
The court's conclusions that the buyer satisfied its burden of proving a
DTPA violation and fraudulent concealment by establishing "wrongful con-
duct" are improper in two respects. First, the conclusions are contrary to
the court's recognition that in order to uphold the jury's determination of
wrongful conduct, the law required the court to find that the defendant
proved a specific theory of recovery plead by the defendant. Clearly, the
court did not reach such a conclusion. Second, even assuming the correct-
ness of the court's general statement that an "as is" clause does not bar
liability under the DTPA or in the case of fraud, the plaintiff should be
required to prove each element of its action under the DTPA and fraud
claim in order to avoid the "as is" clause. If a plaintiff must do nothing
more than to plead a DTPA or fraud action or prove "wrongful conduct"
(whatever that means), then it seems likely that in most disputes an "as is"
clause could be avoided. Based on this reasoning, the Texas Supreme Court
would have basis to reverse the Austin Court of Appeals.408
Luker v. Arnold 4° 9 is a case of some significance because it creates new
law.410 In Luker, a developer acquired a residential subdivision site, estab-
lished various residential lots within the subdivision, established and re-
corded a declaration of restrictions and covenants with respect to the
subdivision and apparently constructed certain infrastructure improvements.
As with most residential subdivision developments, the developer intended
to sell individual lots to contractors, who in turn would construct residences
for sale to individuals. The lots did not have city sewer services and, accord-
ingly, each future lot owner would be required to install a septic system in
order to utilize the lot as a residence. One of the provisions in the declara-
tions generally required that the construction of any residence or other
of course, the seller's representatives had no conscious knowledge of the existence of the asbes-
tos containing materials and did not intend to deceive the buyer.
408. As mentioned in the text, the parties agreed to submit the issue of liability on a general
charge and as a result the various elements of each theory of liability were not presented to the
jury. If the general charge had not been given to the jury, the various elements of the DTPA
and fraudulent concealment claims, in all probability, would have been presented to the jury.
The existence of the general charge could cause the Texas Supreme Court to reach a conclu-
sion which it might not reach if the general charge had not been given. If this is the case,
hopefully the Texas Supreme Court will so state.
409. 843 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, n.w.h.).
410. Although the most important portions of this case relate to the court's holding regard-
ing the developer's implied warranty to develop in a good and workmanlike manner, this case
may also be cited in the future on the basis of its determination that the plaintiff was a con-
sumer for purposes of the DTPA. Basically, the developer argued that the DTPA did not
confer consumer status upon the plaintiff as to the plaintiff's relationship with the developer
because the plaintiff had not acquired goods or services from the developer. The court, how-
ever, concluded that the DTPA did confer consumer status on the plaintiff as to the developer
because the other defendants in the case as to whom the plaintiff was a consumer were inextri-
cably intertwined with the developer. 843 S.W.2d at 112 (relying on Qantel Business Sys. v.
Custom Controls, 761 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1988)).
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structure not be commenced until the developer approved the structure, as
well as the plans and specifications for the structure. The plaintiff acquired
from an individual five duplexes which had been constructed in the subdivi-
sion. Following the acquisition, the plaintiff discovered problems with the
septic system serving the duplexes and sued the developer.4 1' The trial
court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, based on a jury finding that
the developer had violated the DTPA by breaching the declaration and an
implied covenant that the developer had failed to develop and replat the
subdivision in a good and workmanlike manner. 4 12
On appeal, the developer argued that a developer does not impliedly war-
rant that it has developed a subdivision in a good and workmanlike manner.
Agreeing that current law did not provide for such an implied warranty, 413
the Fort Worth court decided to make new law, holding that "a developer
owes an implied warranty to develop in a good and workmanlike man-
ner.' ' 4' 4 Relying on other Texas cases which have extended the implied war-
ranty of good and workmanlike manner to contractors and others, its
holding satisfied the public interest in protecting consumers from defective
work.4 15  Having established a warranty for purposes of the DTPA, the
court concluded that the developer breached that warranty because (1) the
size of the lots, which had originally been established by the developer, did
not provide sufficient area for a septic field and (2) the builder failed to prop-
erly install the septic system. 4 16
Three conveyancing cases involved claims to the earnest money required
by a purchase and sale agreement. The lesson provided by the first of these
cases, Equisource Realty Corp. v. Crown Life Insurance Corp. ,417 is that each
party should strictly comply with the notice and termination provisions of
its contractual agreement when claiming the earnest money under the con-
tract. In Equisource the purchase and sale agreement permitted the pur-
chaser to inspect the property during a stated period of time. Prior to the
expiration of the inspection period, the purchaser had the right to terminate
the contract for any reason. If, upon the expiration of the inspection period,
the purchaser failed to notify the seller of the purchaser's election to termi-
411. The plaintiff also sued the seller, but this aspect of the case is irrelevant to the
discussion.
412. Id. at 110.
413. Id. at 115.
414. Id. at 116.
415. Id. (referring specifically to Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.
1987)).
416. The court concluded that the developer was in the best position to prevent improper
lot sizes and to ensure a contractor's compliance with the declarations. 843 S.W.2d at 116. As
to the contractor's failure to comply with the declarations, the court noted that the declaration
gave the developer the right to approve all structures, plans and specifications. Id. The court
also noted that the developer had provided its written approval by stating that the duplexes
complied with all provisions of the declarations. Id. The court's opinion does not indicate,
however, that the contractor failed to comply with a specific provision of the declarations. For
this reason, the court's conclusion that the developer breached the implied warranty of good
and workmanlike manner due to the contractor's failure to perform in accordance with the
declaration is subject to question.
417. 854 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, n.w.h.).
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nate the contract, then the purchaser became obligated to deposit additional
earnest money and to close the purchase, failing which the earnest money
would be paid to the seller. On the final day of the inspection period, the
purchaser notified the escrow agent holding the earnest money that the pur-
chaser elected to terminate the contract. Although the escrow agent at-
tempted to telecopy notice of the termination to the seller, the transmission
did not occur.418 Neither the purchaser nor the escrow agent later notified
the seller of the purchaser's termination and the purchaser failed to deposit
the additional earnest money as required by the contract. The seller then
terminated the contract and sued for the earnest money. The trial court
awarded summary judgment to the seller and the purchaser appealed, argu-
ing that the escrow agent acted as the seller's agent under the contract for
receipt of notice of termination. 41 9 Although the court of appeals recog-
nized that the escrow agent acts as a fiduciary to both the buyer and seller in
the performance of its role as escrow agent under the contract, the court
concluded that the escrow agent is not the agent of a party to the contract
for receipt of notices unless so appointed. Because the contract did not au-
thorize the escrow agent to receive notices and the purchaser failed to pro-
duce any other evidence that the seller had authorized the escrow agent to
receive notices on behalf of the seller, the court concluded that the seller did
not receive the notice of termination prior to the expiration of the inspection
period. 420 Accordingly, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's sum-
mary judgment.42'
In the second earnest money case, Herbage v. Snoddy,422 the earnest
money contract contained a financing contingency which required the buyer
to use all reasonable efforts to obtain a fifteen-year bullet loan in a specified
principal amount payable in monthly installments not in excess of a stated
amount. Although the financing contingency provision did not require the
loan to bear a specific rate of interest, the contract arguably provided for a
rate not in excess of ten percent per annum. 423 When applying for the loan,
the buyer completed a hand written application for the specified fifteen-year
bullet loan, but at an interest rate of 9-7/8% per annum. However, the typed
loan application signed by the buyer provided for a thirty-year loan at an
interest rate of 10-1/2% per annum. The lender declined the borrower's
typed loan application and the buyer terminated the contract and requested
the return of the earnest money. The trial court held that the buyer
418. There is no indication of the reason for the unsuccessful telecopy transmission. The
contract notably permitted delivery by telecopy. Because of the contract clause, it is somewhat
curious that neither the purchaser nor the title company made this an issue in the case.
419. Id. at 696. In making its argument, the purchaser relied on general agency and princi-
pal law and a Texas case that, according to the purchaser, recognized that an escrow agent acts
as the agent for both the buyer and the seller. Id. (relying on Campbell v. Barber, 272 S.W.2d
750, 753 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ rerd n.r.e.)).
420. Id. at 697.
421. Id.
422. 864 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
423. With the principal amount, the monthly payments and the term of the loan all known,




breached its obligation under the contract to apply for financing conforming
to the contract provision and accordingly awarded damages to the seller.
The buyer appealed.
On appeal, the buyer argued that (i) it had complied with the contract by
applying for a fifteen-year bullet loan at an interest rate not exceeding 10%
and (2) when the lender refused to make the loan on those terms, the buyer
became entitled to the earnest money. 424 The court, however, construed the
contract and the law as (1) requiring the buyer to show that he was unable to
obtain third party financing in the stated amount at a rate of 10% per an-
num 425 and (2) not requiring the buyer to accept an interest rate in excess of
10% per annum. 426 The seller directed the court's attention to Smith v. Ev-
ans427 as standing for the principle that if a buyer's obligations under a con-
tract are conditioned upon the buyer's ability to obtain a loan upon stated
terms, then that condition is not met if the buyer fails to apply for a loan
complying with the stated terms. 4 28 The court, however, distinguished the
Smith case, pointing out that the Smith court concluded that the buyer's
breach resulted from the buyer making only one application for the required
loan, thereby making "it impossible to determine whether a loan on the spec-
ified terms would be 'approved' by a lender." 429 However, unlike the facts
before the Smith court, the facts before the Herbage court made it possible to
determine if a loan on the specified terms would have been approved by the
lender. Specifically, the fact that the lender refused to make a loan to the
buyer at 10 1/2% per annum permitted, in the court's judgment, a conclusion
that a lender would not have approved a loan to the buyer at 10% per an-
num. 430 Clearly, the court concluded, there would be little reason for a
lender to reject the borrower's application at 10 '/2% per annum and then
approve a loan on the same terms, with the exception of a rate at 10% per
424. The buyer's argument, as noted by the dissent, 864 S.W.2d at 701-02, complies with
the express requirements of the contract. However, such a construction would permit the
buyer to avoid the contract merely by applying for a 15 year bullet loan at a very low rate and
with a very large bullet payment at the end of the term.
425. The court stated that if the buyer's only evidence consisted of the hand written appli-
cation which provided for an interest rate of 9-7/8% per annum, the buyer would have
breached the financing provision. Id. at 698-99. The court reasoned that proof of an applica-
tion at 9-7/8% per annum would not be evidence of whether the lender would have agreed to a
loan at 10% per annum. Id. at 699.
426. Id. at 698. Although the court's conclusion has basis, the court is subject to some
criticism because its finding assumes that the buyer and seller absolutely agreed to an interest
rate of 10% per annum and the amount of the bullet payment payable by the buyer at the end
of the term. However, there is no evidence discussed that would indicate that there was such
an agreement between the parties. Moreover, by adjusting the bullet amount, the loan could
provide for an interest rate greater or less than 10% per annum without changing the amount
of the monthly payments. Perhaps the most important point of this case is the parties to an
earnest money contract must clearly express their agreements regarding the requirements of a
financing contingency clause.
427. 620 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
428. 864 S.W.2d at 699. Interestingly, the dissent argued that Smith supported a finding in
favor of the buyer because the buyer submitted a loan application for a 15 year bullet loan at a
rate not exceeding 10% per annum, as required by the contract. Id. at 700-02.
429. Id. (quoting Smith, 620 S.W.2d at 628).
430. Id. at 699-700.
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annum.431 For these reasons, the court held that the buyer's application for
the loan at 10 /2% per annum substantially complied with the requirements
of the financing contingency provision of the contract, thereby entitling the
buyer to the return of the earnest money.432
In the last earnest money case, Enclave, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp.,433
the court not surprisingly held that a buyer breached its contract by failing
to close its contract on the closing date set forth in the tenth extension agree-
ment entered into between the seller and buyer over a two-year period.434
The more interesting feature of this case is the court's conclusion regarding
the buyer's claim that the earnest money deposited under the contract con-
stituted an unenforceable penalty. Although dicta,435 the court concluded
that the earnest money under the contract did not constitute an unenforce-
able penalty.436 The amount of the earnest money, in the judgment of the
court, clearly met the test of reasonability applicable to liquidated damages
in light of the numerous unmet closings, the buyer's failure to close and the
fact that the total amount of earnest was money approximately 5% of the
purchase price.437
431. Id. at 700. The court noted that, in the abstract, a borrower might qualify for the
same loan at a lower rate. Id. n.6. However, the seller provided no evidence that the lender
would have made a loan to the buyer at a rate of 10% per annum or that loans were then being
made in the market place at 10% to borrowers similar to the buyer. Moreover, the court noted
that the seller's own evidence indicated that the lender rejected the buyer's application for a 30
year loan at 10 1A% per annum on the grounds of the buyer's income and the value of the
home. Id. at 699. Interestingly, the court also indicates that the seller made no claim that the
buyer could have bought down the interest rate from 10 1/% to 10% per annum. Id. This
statement leaves an improper implication that a buyer should be required to buy down the
interest rate in order to obtain the interest rate provided for in a financing contingency provi-
sion of a contract. Clearly, such a requirement would alter the buyer's financial expectations.
432. The court also stated that the buyer's willingness to accept a higher rate actually
benefitted the seller and that an ironic result would occur if the court held that the buyer's
offer to pay a higher price defeated the buyer's claim for the earnest money. Id. at 700.
433. 986 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1993).
434. Id. at 133. Although the contract and certain of the extensions provided that time
was of the essence, the buyer argued that at the time the parties agreed to the ninth amend-
ment, time was no longer of the essence. The court had little difficulty rejecting the buyer's
assertion, citing the fact that the original contract provided that time was of the essence. Fur-
thermore, the court cited a Texas case which held that when parties contractually extend the
time for performance under a contract, the extensions are evidence that the parties consider
time to be material. Id. at 133 (citing Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co., 583 S.W.2d 852, 864 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ)).
435. The court actually held that the buyer had released all claims regarding the earnest
money pursuant to a settlement agreement entered into between the seller and buyer following
the buyer's failure to close after the ninth extension. Id. at 133-34. The court's conclusion
that the earnest money did not constitute an unenforceable penalty is therefore dicta.
436. Under the original contract, the buyer deposited earnest money of $182,000. Pursu-
ant to the various extensions, the buyer increased the earnest money to $451,500 and paid the
seller extension fees totaling $135,878.73.
437. Although the court's conclusion is correct because the amount of the earnest money
approximated 5% of the purchase price and damages for breach of a real estate contract are
generally recognized as uncertain, (see Stewart v. Basey, 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1952)), the
numerous unmet closings and the fact that the transaction never closed should be irrelevant to
the issue of the validity of the liquidated damages.
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XII. EASEMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS
Although no significant easement or restriction cases were decided during
the Survey period, several cases deserve note43 8 and two cases deserve
discussion.
Samuelson v. Alvarado,439 although not establishing new law, provides in-
teresting facts and a proper application of the doctrine of implied easement
by necessity. In Samuelson, Menefee owned two tracts of land, one having
access to a public road and the other being located directly behind the first
tract and having no direct access to the public road. Menefee sold the rear
tract to her brother and the deed granted her brother an "access license"
through her property in order to permit her brother access to the public
road. For approximately seven years, Menefee's brother used a strip of land
along a boundary of Menefee's tract in order to access the public road. Ap-
parently, after several years, Menefee became upset with her brother and
constructed a fence which diverted access from this access strip to another
path within Menefee's property and which ran through a cesspool located on
Menefee's property. To emphasize her unhappiness, Menefee also con-
structed a gate on the path and immediately in front of the cesspool, thereby
438. Sargent v. Smith, 863 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, n.w.h.) (where (1)
developer established and recorded declaration of restrictions and declaration established a
private lake and park area for the use and enjoyment of lot owners within developer's subdivi-
sion consisting of 24 lots, (2) there existed some evidence that developer intended to convey to
each lot owner a 1/24 interest in the lake and park area and that several lot owners had in fact
acquired a 1/24 interest in the lake and park area, (3) several years after recording the declara-
tion, developer conveyed by quitclaim deed a portion of the park area to a third party in
connection with that third party's acquisition of a large tract adjacent to the subdivision and
(4) quitclaim deed had incomplete blanks, incorrect wording, no date of execution and im-
proper acknowledgement, court held that grantee under quitclaim deed acquired no title to
park area and stated that if the grantee had acquired such an interest, the rights of the lot
owners burdened that interest); Silver Spur Addition Homeowners v. Clarksville Seniors
Apartments, 848 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied) (where declaration of
restrictions (1) provided that only "one family residences" may be constructed on lots and
prohibited the lots from being used for any business purpose other than apartment houses, (2)
required construction of specific size single family dwellings on all but 12 lots and (3) provided
no specific designation of use for those 12 lots other than noted in (1) above, the court con-
cluded that restrictions prohibited the construction of apartments on any lot specifically ad-
dressed in declaration other than the 12 lots); Peacock v. Schroeder, 846 S.W.2d 905 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ) (lessee under oil and gas lease entitled to implied ingress
and egress easement of necessity over lessor's adjoining property where land subject to the oil
and gas lease would be landlocked absent such easement); Mobil Pipeline Co. v. Smith, 860
S.W.2d 157 (Tex App.-El Paso 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (lessor may, without consent of
lessee of land, grant pipeline easement under surface of land, subject to lessee's right to recover
damages for interference with lessee's right of possession of surface) (see supra notes 341-45
and accompanying text for discussion). In the Sargent case cited above, the court stated that a
quitclaim conveys no title or actual interest in land, but rather transfers only a claim. 863
S.W.2d at 246. This statement is contrary to established Texas case law, which holds that a
quitclaim deed, in the absence of limiting language, conveys such right, title and interest in the
property covered by the quitclaim deed as fully as if the grantor had executed a deed purport-
ing to transfer fee title. Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1963). Nevertheless, the Sargent
court's conclusion is probably harmless error in light of (A) its conclusion that the defects in
the quitclaim deed rendered the deed ineffective (which conclusion also is subject to some
question), 863 S.W.2d at 250, and (B) the fact that the rights of the lot owners in the park were
superior to any right acquired in the park under the quitclaim deed. Id. at 248-49.
439. 847 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
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effectively requiring her brother to walk through the cesspool in order to
open the gate and obtain access to the public road. With feelings surely
hurt, the brother sued his sister, requesting the court to establish his right to
an easement by necessity along the strip of land he had used for nearly eight
years. The trial court held that the brother established his right to an ease-
ment by necessity along the strip of land designated by the brother and, in an
effort to separate the feuding brother and sister, ordered the brother to con-
struct a fence between the access strip and the sister's land.440 The sister
appealed.
On appeal, Menefee conceded that her brother had a right to pass over her
property to access the public road, but apparently argued that she had the
right to designate the location of the access path. The court reminded Mene-
fee, however, that her brother was not claiming under the license, but rather
asserting entitlement to an easement by necessity. Accordingly, although
Menefee, as the owner of the servient estate, had the right to select a reason-
able location of the easement at the commencement of the term of the ease-
ment, she failed to exercise this right and acquiesced to the easement claimed
by her brother over the strip of land along the border of Menefee's tract.4'
Once the parties established the location of the easement, Menefee had no
right to relocate the easement without her brother's consent. 442 As to the
fence which the trial court ordered constructed, the court concluded that the
trial court, through judicial fiat, effectively conveyed fee simple title to the
strip of land in question to the brother and accordingly reversed this portion
of the trial court's judgment. 443
In an express easement case, Jones v. Fuller,444 B.D. divided three tracts
of real property between his three children 'through conveyance by gift
deeds. B.D. apparently executed the deeds simultaneously, but delivered the
property to the grantees over a five year period. Although not a model of
clarity, each of the deeds contained the following provision:
Grantor [B.D. Douthitt] does hereby convey to the Grantee herein...
and assigns the right, privilege and as an appurtenance to the lands and
premises herein described to the free and uninterrupted use ... together
with an easement and right of way for passage ... over and across any
and all lands now owned and/or right of ways and easements now
owned or to which Grantor... might have a right of way and easement
to reach the hereinabove described lands ... in order that the Grantee
herein and the Grantees in the other deeds mentioned herein may have
a free, unobstructed and uninterrupted passageway and easement to and
from a public road and across the lands owned . . . by the Grantor
herein to reach the lands herein and hereby conveyed from a public
440. Id.
441. See id. at 323 (relying on Cozby v. Armstrong, 205 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth, 1947, writ ref d n.r.e.); Grobe v. Ottmers, 224 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1949, writ refd n.r.e.)).
442. See id. (relying on Meredith v. Eddy, 616 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1981, no writ)).
443. Id.
444. 856 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
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road or a means of ingress and egress to and from the hereinabove de-
scribed lands and premises. 445
Only one of the conveyed tracts had access to a public road (the front tract).
At the time of conveyance, a private road crossed the middle of the front
tract, continued over the second (middle) tract and stopped at the adjoining
boundary of the third (rear) tract. The owners of the middle and rear tracts
used this road to access the public road. Sometime after the initial convey-
ances, the owners of the middle and rear tracts, at the request of the owner
of the front tract, commenced using a second private access road that ran
along the northern boundary of the front tract and stopped at the adjoining
boundary of the middle tract. Several years later, the owner of the front
tract conveyed to B.D. that portion of the front tract which included the
second access road and conveyed to a third party the remainder of the front
tract.446 The purchaser of the remainder of the front tract, apparently un-
happy with the location of the first access road, subsequently blocked access
to the first access road and began entering and leaving the front tract from
and to the public road by using the portion of the front tract that had been
conveyed to B.D. Incensed, the owners of the middle and rear lots sued,
claiming an express easement for ingress and egress over the first access road
and that the purchaser had constructive knowledge of the easement and lo-
cation thereof. The trial court found for the purchaser and the owners of the
middle and rear lots appealed.
Apparently recognizing that not one of the deeds could be read to create
effective easements claimed by the middle and rear lot owners, the appellate
court held that as a matter of law the deeds were component parts of a single
transaction and therefore must be read and interpreted together.44 7 Having
reached this holding, the court interpreted the common provision in the
deeds quoted above as a clear expression of the grantor's intention to create
easements appurtenant over and across the front tract to provide the owners
of the middle and rear tracts access to the public road.448 The purchaser
argued that even if the deeds created an express easement, the validity of
that easement could not be upheld because the deeds failed to specify the
location of the easement. The court, however, found little difficulty with this
point because the middle and rear lots obtained access to the public road
over the first access road at the time of the execution of the deeds in favor of
the children and, under Texas law, the location of the easement could not be
changed without the consent of the owners of those lots.449 Moreover, con-
445. Id. at 599-600.
446. Although not stated in the facts, the owner of the front tract apparently made the
conveyance to B.D. in order to assure access to the public road from the middle and rear
tracts.
447. Id. at 601-02 (relying on Rudes v. Field, 146 Tex. 133, 204 S.W.2d 5, 7 (1947)).
448. Id. at 602.
449. Id. at 602 (relying on Elias v. Horak, 292 S.W. 288, 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1927, writ ref d)). The court seems to ignore the fact that, without any apparent objection and
at the request of the owner of the front tract, the owners of the middle and rear tracts used the
second access road and, except when the second access road became unusable, did not use the
first access road for the eight year period immediately preceding the transfer of the front lot to
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cluded the court, the purchaser had been made constructively aware of the
existence of the express easements through the recordation of the deeds in
favor of the children and, like the court, the purchaser should have con-




As in prior Survey periods, the courts were relatively busy deciding emi-
nent domain cases during this Survey period. In addition to the holdings
and cases discussed in this section, the courts reached the following hold-
ings: where a lease does not terminate upon the occurrence of a condemna-
tion and the tenant has not waived the rights it may have in respect to a
condemnation award, the tenant is entitled to share in the condemnation
award if the condemnation resulted in a loss of all or a part of the tenant's
leasehold interest;451 the damage alleged in an action based on inverse con-
demnation must not result from the condemnor's negligence; 452 the state's
condemnation of land for purpose of constructing a post office constitutes a
taking for a public use;45 3 a city's refusal to rezone a landowner's property
from residential to industrial to allow for a junk yard did not constitute an
the purchaser. Certainly the purchaser could have argued that these events constituted the
consent of the parties to the relocation of the first access easement. One must wonder whether
the purchaser presented this argument or the court simply ignored the purchaser's argument.
450. Id. at 603.
451. Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc. v. Crown Plaza Group, 845 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ requested). In Crown Plaza, Texaco leased property
pursuant to a lease which provided that the lessee had the option to terminate the lease in the
event of a condemnation of a portion of the premises. If Texaco failed to terminate the lease,
the lease term would continue and the rent would be equitably adjusted. Apparently the lease
did not require Texaco to waive any rights that it may have in a condemnation award. In fact,
a condemnation of a portion of the premises occurred near the end of the lease term and the
remaining property provided insufficient area to continue to operate a gas station. Further-
more, Texaco elected not to terminate the lease and instead exercised a renewal option, since
Texaco's share of the condemnation award (100%) greatly exceeded its rental obligation dur-
ing the renewal term. The lessee claimed that Texaco acted in bad faith. The trial court
agreed, but the appellate court reversed, concluding that not only did Texaco not act in bad
faith in exercising its contract rights, but also that Texaco had no duty to act in good faith. Id.
at 342.
452. Dalon v. City of DeSoto, 852 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ refd) (ero-
sion resulting on landowner's property and caused by city's upstream repairs and maintenance
activities would not support an inverse condemnation action as the erosion resulted from al-
leged negligent acts of city).
453. Texas Fruit Palace, Inc. v. City of Palestine, 842 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992,
writ denied), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 305 (1993) (relying on TEX. L. GOV'T CODE § 280.01
(Vernon Supp. 1994), which generally allows a city or state to condemn land for the use of the
United States government). In Texas Fruit Palace, the owner of the leasehold which the city
condemned also alleged that the city acted in bad faith in condemning the property. None of
the bad faith arguments were persuasive, however, and the court easily rejected each such
argument. Nevertheless, practitioners should be aware that claims of bad faith, when properly
plead and submitted to the jury, may have viability in light of the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 454 (Tex. 1992), wherein the court ac-
knowledged that the policy reasons on which it held that the condemning authority's delay,
reasonable or unreasonable, in completing an announced condemnation will not support an
inverse condemnation claim "might not be applicable where the condemning authority is ac-
cused of intentionally injuring a landowner." Id. The Westgate court, however, expressly
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inverse condemnation;454 and the accommodation doctrine applies to the de-
termination of whether a condemning authority inversely condemned a
leasehold mineral interest; however, if there is only one reasonable manner
by which the minerals may be produced, the lessee has the right to pursue
that use even under the accommodation doctrine and if the condemning au-
thority's use of the surface eliminates the lessee's ability to exercise the only
reasonable means of recovery of minerals, then an inverse condemnation of
the mineral estate has occurred. 455 In addition to the foregoing holdings,
practitioners should be aware that the Texas Supreme Court has granted
writ of error 456 on an unpublished court of appeals opinion, Taub v. City of
Deer Park, and one of the points of error the court agreed to review ad-
dresses the issue of whether the city's dual roles as arbiter of the fate of the
landowner's zoning application and as condemnor of portions of the owner's
land should be considered as a factor bearing on the question of whether a
taking occurred. 457
Saunders v. Titus County Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 1 45 demonstrates
the fact that a condemning authority may not use its condemnation author-
ity to take one's land to resolve the authority's private dispute with another
property owner. In Saunders, the condemning authority condemned a por-
tion of Hackler's land to create a reservoir. After the creation of the reser-
voir, Hackler sued the condemning authority, claiming that the authority, as
a result of the condemnation, cut off access to the remainder of Hackler's
property. Attempting to avoid an adverse judgment, the condemning au-
thority sought to acquire a strip of Saunders' land for the purpose of creating
a private access road for use by Hackler. Saunders refused to sell and the
declined to address the issue of whether the condemning authority acted in bad faith because,
even though properly plead, the jury issues did not include the issue of bad faith. Id. at 455.
454. City of Pharr v. Pena, 853 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
In Pena, the court concluded that the city's considerations of aesthetics and preservation of
property values for refusing to rezone the property would not serve as a basis for an inverse
condemnation claim. Id. at 61. The landowner also argued that representatives of the city had
made representations to the landowner that the city would cooperate with his rezoning request
if the landowner would request annexation into the city. After assuming the city representa-
tive made the representations as alleged, the court concluded that the city could not be bound
by those agreements since they would constitute a surrender of the city's police power. Id. at
61-62. Moreover, although the Pena court recognized that the Texas Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Westgate, Ltd. v. State, discussed supra note 453, acknowledged that a city's bad faith
might serve as a basis for an inverse condemnation claim and that the representations allegedly
made by the city could support a bad faith claim, the Pena court declined to reach a decision
because, as in Westgate, the issues submitted to the jury did not include the issue of bad faith.
Id. at 62 n.3.
455. Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement Dist. No. I v. Haupt, Inc., 854
S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1993). The accommodation doctrine, first articulated by the Texas Supreme
Court in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971), generally provides that if a
lessee's method of recovery of minerals would preclude or impair the surface owner's current
use of the surface and under the established practices of the industry an alternative method of
recovery of the minerals is available that would allow the current use of the surface, the lessee
will be required to adopt the alternative method of recovery.
456. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 144 (1993).
457. This issue could also logically involve the issue of bad faith raised by Westgate, Ltd. v.
State, discussed supra note 453.
458. 847 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, n.w.h.).
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authority instituted condemnation proceedings during which Saunders ar-
gued, under various theories, that the condemnation authority had no au-
thority to proceed with the condemnation. The trial court entered judgment
in favor of the condemning authority and Saunders appealed.4 59
On appeal, the Texarkana appellate court had little difficulty reversing the
trial court. Although recognizing a condemning authority's right to con-
demn a private party's land for the relocation of a public road, the court
concluded that Texas does not recognize a condemning authority's right to
condemn a private party's land for the purpose of relocating a private
road. 46° Not disagreeing with the court's analysis, the condemning author-
ity instead argued that the condemnation of Saunders' land constituted a
condemnation for public use in that the State would own the condemned
strip and a possibility existed that the condemned strip would be used by the
public. 46 1 Not to be argued with, the court insisted that the condemning
authority commenced the condemnation action only to satisfy Hackler's de-
mand for access to his property.462 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial
court judgment and set aside the condemnation. 463
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its previ-
ously published majority opinion in Westgate, Ltd. v. State464 and substi-
tuted a new majority opinion.46 5 The portion of the opinion relating to the
substantive claim of inverse condemnation remained unchanged, but the
court substantially altered the portion of its opinion dealing with the ques-
tions to be submitted to the jury regarding damages to the remainder tract.
The court generally held that the trial court has the discretion to submit
either the three jury questions enunciated in State v. Carpenter46 6 or the
three jury questions enunciated in Uselton v. State,467 based on the circum-
459. Id.
460. Id. at 429.
461. Id. at 428 (relying on Maher v. Lasater, 163 Tex. 356, 354 S.W.2d 923 (1962)); Estate
of Waggoner v. Gleghorn, 378 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1964).
462. 847 S.W.2d at 428.
463. Id. at 429.
464. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1042 (July 4, 1992).
465. 843 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1992).
466. 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194, 201-02 (1936). In Carpenter, the Court determined that
the issues to be submitted to the jury are as follows:
(1) the market value of the part taken, considered as severed land;
(2) the market value of the remaining tract of land, exclusive of the part taken,
immediately before the taking; and
(3) the market value of the remaining tract of land immediately after the taking.
Id.
467. 499 S.W.2d 92, 97-99 (Tex. 1973). In Uselton, the Court enunciated the issues to be
submitted to the jury as follows:
(1) the market value of the part taken, considered as severed land;
(2) the market value of the entire tract before the taking; and
(3) the market value of the remainder after the taking, giving consideration to
the uses to which the condemned part is to be subjected.
Id.
Under the Uselton approach, the total measure of damages is usually the difference between
the determinations under clauses (2) and (3) above; however, if the difference is less than the




stances of each case and with the understanding that the Uselton approach is
preferable where the part taken is small or irregularly shaped. 468 The court,
however, because of the broad-form submission requirement under Rule 277
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 469 reduced the three jury questions
required by Carpenter to the following:
(1) the market value of the part taken, considered as severed land; and
(2) damages to the remainder, with an instruction that such damages
should be determined by considering the difference between the pre-
taking value of the remainder and the post-taking value.470
Similarly, the court reduced the Uselton jury questions to the following:
(1) the market value of the part taken, considered as severed land; and
(2) the damages to the landowner's property, with an instruction that
the damages should be determined by considering the difference be-
tween (a) the value of the entire tract before taking, and (b) the market
value of the remainder after the taking, giving consideration to the uses
to which the condemned part is to be subjected. 471
State v. Biggar 472 is an inverse condemnation case which demonstrates the
Austin appellate court's recent penchant to protect landowners and their
property interests from the State's overreaching hands.473 In Biggar the
landowners owned a tract of land upon which they intended to construct an
office facility. The landowners obtained a site development plan approved
by the City of Austin and thereby greatly enhanced the value of the land.
The site development plan required the landowners to satisfy certain condi-
tions by a specified date, failing which the site development plan would ter-
minate. The conditions included a requirement that the landowners obtain
the State's agreement to the relocation of a drainage channel located on the
site to another acceptable location. The landowners promptly commenced
negotiations with the State to agree upon an exchange of land to accommo-
date the relocation. After substantial negotiations, the State tentatively ap-
proved an exchange of land that would accommodate the relocation. At
about this same time, however, the State and the county commenced efforts
to widen the right-of-way which abutted the landowner's land. To accom-
plish the widening, the State and county sought to condemn land bordering
the right-of-way, including a portion of the landowner's land. The State bid
on the land, but the landowners refused the bid as they believed that the bid
did not nearly reflect the true value of the land with the site development
plan in place. The State reconsidered its offer and in this process the State's
appraiser determined the value of the landowners' land to indeed be much
greater and so advised the State's legal counsel. The appraiser also advised
468. 843 S.W.2d at 457.
469. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
470. 843 S.W.2d at 457.
471. Id.
472. 848 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted).
473. See also the Austin's court's opinions in State v. Schmidt, 805 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App--
Austin 1991), rev'd, 867 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1993); State v. Austex, Ltd., 862 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1991), rev'd, 867 S.W.2d 769 (1993); Morales v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 843
S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.).
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the State's legal counsel that if the landowner did not complete the land
exchange relating to the relocation of the State's drainage channel within the
near future, the site development plan would terminate. Lo and behold, the
State withdrew its initial technical approval of the land exchange and re-
fused to reconsider its position, the site development plan terminated due to
the landowners' inability to complete the land exchange to allow the reloca-
tion of the drainage channel and the value of the landowners' land plum-
meted. Understandably incensed, the landowners brought suit against the
State, alleging inverse condemnation as a result of the State's failure to pro-
ceed with the land exchange and further alleging that the State had ceased
processing of the land exchange to reduce the condemnation award that the
State and county would be required to pay the landowners in connection
with the widening of the right-of-way. The trial court found in favor of the
landowners and the State appealed.
On appeal, the State initially argued that the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity barred all of the landowners' claims. Commencing with a simple "we
disagree," the court directed the State to a Texas Supreme Court holding
that governmental immunity offers no shield from a claim of inverse
condemnation. 4 74
The State next argued that the landowners' claim of inverse condemnation
must fail because the State had no legal duty to agree to an exchange of land
to accommodate the relocation of the drainage channel. In the court's judg-
ment, City ofAustin v. Teague 475 and a case cited approvingly by the Teague
Court, San Antonio River Authority v. Garrett Brothers,476 controlled the is-
sue before the court. The Biggar court found particularly relevant a state-
ment in Garrett Brothers that "where the purpose of the governmental action
is the prevention of development of land that would increase the cost of a
planned future acquisition of such land by government .... [the government]
can no longer pretend to be acting as a neutral arbiter ... [or as] an impar-
tial weigher of the merits of competing interest among its citizens. '477 Just
as the condemning authority had sought to enrich itself in Teague and Gar-
rett Brothers, the State, according to the Biggar court, sought to enrich itself
at the expense of the landowners by refusing to agree to the land exchange
and thereby significantly reducing the value of the landowners' land. 478 The
474. 848 S.W.2d at 294-95 (citing Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.
1980)). Cf Dalon v. City of De Soto, 852 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (supporting the proposition that damage alleged in an inverse condemnation action
must not result from condemner's negligence).
475. 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978). In Teague, a developer sought to improve his raw land
and in that regard applied for the required permits. Although the developer complied with the
engineering and other technical requirements to obtain the permits, the city refused to issue
the permits due to public pressure to preserve the scenic view provided by the developer's raw
land. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the city acted without authority and arbitrar-
ily and capriciously in refusing to issue the permits because the city intended to prevent all
development on the city's property by not issuing the permit and to preserve a scenic easement
for the public benefit. Id. at 391.
476. 528 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio, 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
477. Id. at 274.
478. Biggar, 848 S.W.2d at 297.
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State attempted to distinguish Teague and Garrett Brothers on the basis that
each of those cases involved the condemning authority's refusal to issue per-
mits contemplated by an ordinance as opposed to a discretionary exchange
of land. The court, however, directed the State to a State statute and certain
state highway department regulations which authorized the State to partici-
pate in exchanges of real property and allow petitioners to propose property
sales and exchanges. 4 79 The State countered, arguing that exchanges were
authorized only in the case of surplus property and the existing drainage
channel located on the landowners' land clearly did not constitute surplus.
Unimpressed and clearly in no mood to find for the State, the court stated
that the applicable State regulations provided for an exchange even when the
easement area sought to be exchanged is not yet surplus. 4 80
The State finally asserted that the exchange provisions provided for by
statute and applicable regulations allowed the State full discretion in deter-
mining whether to accept a proposed exchange. The Biggar court reminded
the State of the lessons taught by Teague and Garrett Brothers, and evidence
in the record that indicated the State routinely granted other requested ex-
changes, and further evidence reflecting that no State witness could ever re-
call a requested exchange being turned down once the State granted the
technical approval as it had in this case. 48 ' In the court's judgment, follow-
ing the State's technical approval of a proposed exchange, the State is re-
quired to complete the exchange. 4
8 2
Although the Austin appellate court, at least temporarily, soundly de-
feated the State in Biggar, the Austin court has suffered reversal of at least
six of its recent decisions entered against the State primarily because of the
Texas Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Schmidt.483
479. Id. (relying on TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6673a, § l(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994);
State Dep't of High. & Publ. Transp., Right of Way Manual §§ 421.07-08 (bk. 1, ed. 6 n.d.)).
480. Id. (citing Right of Way Manual § 421.08).
481. Id. at 297.
482. Id. The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ of error with respect to (1) whether
the State had the discretionary ability to refuse the exchange proposed by the landowners and
(2) whether the Biggar court correctly held that an exchange of real property is no different
than the issuance of a permit by a governmental authority, for purposes of applying the hold-
ings and principles enunciated in Teague and Garrett Brothers. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1088, 1089
(Mar. 39, 1994). The State has a reasonable argument regarding its discretion to withhold its
consent to a proposed exchange, even after technical approval, but, at least under the Biggar
facts, the State's actions should serve as the basis for a bad faith claim. The significant issue in
this regard, however, is whether the submissions to the jury included the issue of bad faith. See
Westgate, Ltd. v. State discussed in note 454 supra.
483. 867 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1993) consolidated with State v. Austex, Ltd. Both Schmidt and
Austex were decided by the Austin Court of Appeals. In addition, the holding in Schmidt is
cited as the primary reason for the reversal of the Austin Court of Appeals in State v. Allen, 37
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 313 (Jan. 5, 1994); State v. Donnie Ruth Moore Edwards, 868 S.W.2d 321
(Tex. 1993) per curiam; State v. Munday Enterprises, 868 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1993); State v.
Centennial Mortgage Corp., 867 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1993). Prior to Schmidt, the State, appar-
ently tiring of its sound beatings by the Austin court in connection with the modifications of
Highway 183, tried a new tactic in Morales v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 843 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.
App.-Austin, 1992 n.w.h.). Instead of arguing that, as a matter of law, the damages were
community in nature and therefore non-compensable and losing that argument prior to reach-
ing the jury, the State introduced testimony that the remainder property had been damaged by
loss of access, reduced visibility and construction disruption, but joined issue with the property
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In Schmidt, the State of Texas and City of Austin sought to convert state
highway 183, an open access highway, into a controlled access highway. In
connection with the conversion of highway 183 to a controlled access high-
way, the State and City intended to elevate the highway approximately
thirty-seven feet above a portion of the existing open access highway which
abutted property separately owned by Schmidt and Austex. The State insti-
tuted condemnation proceedings, seeking to acquire a portion of Schmidt's
and Austex's property to facilitate the construction of the controlled access
highway. However, both Schmidt and Austex rejected the amount of the
award offered by the State, each claiming that the State's offer did not con-
sider the damage that would result to the remainder of its tract due to less-
ened visibility to passing traffic and the inconvenience of construction
activities. Austex additionally claimed that the State's offer did not consider
the damage that would result to the remainder of its tract due to diversion of
traffic and increased circuity to access its property. The jury agreed with
Schmidt and Austex and awarded significant damages. The State appealed
to the Austin Court of Appeals, but found no solace there.
Confident in its position, the State appealed to the Texas Supreme Court,
claiming that the severance damages claimed by the landowners were not
recoverable (1) under existing case law, (2) because the damages resulted
from the State's construction and new use of the existing highway and the
taking of property from other landowners to widen the highway, as opposed
to just the taking of the strips of land by the State, and (3) as a result of
Section 21.042(d) of the Texas Property Code.48 4
As to the State's first defense, the Court concluded that the Court had
previously prohibited recovery for loss of value due to diversion of traffic and
circuity of travel in both actual and inverse condemnation cases. 485
Although the court acknowledged that it had not previously decided the
damage issue regarding impaired visibility and disruption of construction
activities, the court concluded there existed no good reason to treat those
damages differently than damages resulting from diversion of traffic and cir-
cuity of travel.486
owner on the amount of damage suffered. By arguing the same position as the property owner,
the State apparently hoped to obtain a jury instruction that the damages should be limited by
any damages that constituted community damages. This strategy thoroughly backfired on the
State, however, as the trial court refused to submit any such issue. On appeal to the Austin
court, the State suffered absolute defeat as result of the court's holding that the trial court did
not err by refusing to limit the evidence regarding damages presented by the State or entered
into the record by the property owner without objection from the State. Id. at 277. Moreover,
the court concluded that the record was devoid of any community damage testimony and any
limiting instruction regarding community damages would have only confused the jury. Id.
484. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.042(d) (Vernon 1984).
485. 867 S.W.2d at 776.
486. Id. In so concluding, the court expressly disapproved of State v. Buck, 489 S.W.2d
642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Milam County v. Akers, 181
S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.) to the extent inconsistent with
Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State, 334 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ ref d),
State v. Baker Bros. Nursery, 366 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1963) or State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc.,
751 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1988).
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The State fared just as well with respect to its second argument. Initially,
the court stated that the Court had theretofore recognized as applicable to
Texas condemnation cases the rule enunciated in Campbell v. US.487 that
"just compensation assured.., to an owner, a part of whose land is taken
for public use, does not include the diminution in value of the remainder
caused by the acquisition and use of adjoining lands of others for the same
undertaking. '48 8 The Schmidt Court further stated, however, that the
Campbell rule should not be applied if:
(1) the land taken from the condemnee landowner was indispensable to
the... project; (2) the land taken constituted a substantial (not inconse-
quential) part of the tract devoted to the project; and (3) the damages
resulting to the land not taken from the use of the land taken were
inseparable from those to the same land flowing from the condemnor
government's use of its adjoining land in the ... project.489
Applying these rules to the facts, the Schmidt Court concluded that the dim-
inution, if any, in the value of the remainder tracts caused by diversion of
traffic, circuity of travel, impaired vision and construction activity arose out
of the State's modifications to the existing highway and not out of the use of
the strip taken from each tract.490 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the alleged damages were not recoverable from the State.491
The State based its third and final argument on the provisions of section
21.042(d) of the Texas Property Code,4 9 2 which generally provides that the
commissioners, in arriving at a condemnation award, shall consider the in-
jury or benefit that is peculiar to the property owner and that relates to
property owner's use, ownership or enjoyment of particular property, but
shall not consider any injury or benefit experienced by the property owner in
common with the general community. After muddling through a few an-
cient cases and admitting that the principle of general community damages
is easier to articulate than define, the court concluded that "[w]hether an
injury is community cannot be decided simply by setting the size of the rele-
vant area. 'Community' in this context means not only where, but more
importantly, what kind."'49 3 In other words, the nature of the injury and not
the location of the injury is the more critical factor in determining whether
an injury is community.494 Notwithstanding that these principles fail to ade-
quately and clearly state the concept of community damages, the court had
little difficulty concluding that the damages were community primarily on
the theory that although one or more of the claimed damages could affect
Austex and Schmidt differently than all other property owners from whom
land was taken, the distinction, in the court's judgment, was one of degree
487. 266 U.S. 368 (1924).
488. Id. at 372.
489. 867 S.W.2d at 778 (quoting United States v. 15.65 Acres of Land, 689 F.2d 1329, 1332
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983)).
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.042(d) (Vernon 1984).




and not of kind.495
XIV. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During 1993, the 73rd Legislature of the State of Texas passed numerous
bills dealing with real estate related topics. 496 Attached as Appendix I is a
summary of most bills passed by the legislature that could logically affect a
real estate practitioner.497 Several bills, however, deserve some special atten-
tion. One such bill, House Bill (HB) 2537, will most significantly affect de-
velopers of land.498 This law provides that any person undertaking the
development of over one acre of land must conduct soil testing to determine
if any part of the tract overlies a closed municipal solid waste landfill. 499 As
used in the statute, the term development includes new construction and
alterations of existing improvements. 500 Regardless of whether the testing
reveals the presence of a landfill, the owner or lessee who is developing the
land must submit the test results to the Executive Director of the Texas
Natural Resources Conservation Commission (TNRCC) at least 30 days
prior to the commencement of the development. 50 1 If the soil testing indi-
cates the presence of a landfill, the owner or lessee developing the land must
then obtain a development permit from the TNRCC, and the application for
the permit must be made. no less than 45 days before the development be-
gins.502 As of the date of the writing of this article, the TNRCC has not yet
published any regulations regarding the procedures and criteria for soil test-
ing. The authors of this article understand, however, through conversations
with other lawyers, that the TNRCC, at this time, has taken the position
that soil testing does not need to be performed for any development over one
acre until regulations are published by the TNRCC, unless there is a known
landfill at the development. However, if a landfill is discovered during the
development of a tract of land greater than one acre in size, then the
TNRCC has taken the position that all development must cease and the
landfill must be reported to the Executive Director of the TNRCC, who will
then decide what steps need to be taken to comply with the statute before
development may recommence.
Another bill, HB 1081, places a duty on a seller of single family residential
real property to disclose the condition of the residence, including certain
items specified in the statute. 50 3 Fortunately, the statute provides a pre-
495. Id.
496. Among these is the statute regarding the effectiveness of a contractual choice of law
provision in written agreements, which is discussed in supra notes 269-81.
497. See also DAVIES ET AL., 1993 LEGISLATIVE UPDATE (REAL ESTATE LAW), VOL. 31
REAL ESTATE PROBATE & TRUST LAW REPORTER No. 4, 46 (July 1993).
498. HB 2537 is codified as TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.531-361.540
(Vernon Supp. 1994).
499. Id. § 361.538.
500. Id. § 361.531(1).
501. Id.
502. Id. §§ 361.532, 361.533. A violation of the statute is subject to civil penalties not to
exceed $10,000 for each violation of the statute. Id. § 361.540.
503. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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scribed form of notice so that sellers do not have to guess or speculate at
length regarding what particular disclosures are required. 50 4 The statute
further provides that the notice is to the best of the seller's knowledge and
that the disclosure is not a warranty by the seller or its agent.50 5 Signifi-
cantly, the notice is not required in connection with a sale of a new resi-
dence, an acquisition of a residence acquired at a foreclosure sale, or a sale
by a mortgagee who obtained title pursuant to a foreclosure sale.506 In the
event the required notice is not given to the purchaser before the contract is
executed by the purchaser, then the purchaser may terminate the contract
within seven days after receiving the notice.50 7
One final amendment to the Texas Property Code worthy of some discus-
sion is an amendment to section 51.002 regarding the timing of the various
notices required in connection with a non-judicial foreclosure sale of real
property. The legislature first clarified that section 51.002(d) applies only to
residential debtors; thus, only residential debtors need to be given the
twenty-day demand and opportunity to cure required by section 51.002(d)
before the twenty-one day notice of foreclosure sale is given. 508 This amend-
ment clears up some arguments made by debtor's counsel in the past that the
second sentence of section 51.002(d) requires twenty days' notice and oppor-
tunity to cure regardless of whether the real property is the debtor's resi-
dence. 509 The legislature then added a new subsection which clarifies the
computation of the required twenty-one day notice of foreclosure sale. Spe-
cifically, when computing the twenty-one day notice period for the notice of
foreclosure sale, the entire calendar day on which the notice of sale is given
is included, regardless of the time of day at which the notice of sale is given,
and the entire calendar day of the foreclosure sale is excluded. 510  This
amendment effectively eliminated repeated arguments that section 51.002(b)
required twenty-one full twenty-four hour time periods. 51'
504. Id. § 5.008(b).
505. Id. § 5.008(b), (d).
506. Id. § 5.008(e).
507. Id. § 5.008(0.
508. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
509. Prior to the amendment, although the first sentence of § 51.002(d) talked in terms of
the notice required in connection with a foreclosure of a debtor's residence, the second sen-
tence did not contain any such qualification, but merely stated that "The debtor must be given
at least twenty days to cure the default before the entire debt is due and notice of sale is given".
Id. However, this argument clearly conflicted with the entire context of § 51.002(d).
510. Id. § 51.002(g).
511. For example, prior to this amendment, if a notice of sale was delivered and posted at
1:00 p.m. on the third Tuesday prior to the foreclosure sale in question, and the foreclosure
sale was held at 10:00 a.m. on the foreclosure Tuesday, then debtors who were desperately
seeking ways to avoid foreclosure (or sue for wrongful foreclosure) would claim that the lender
had not complied with the statute (which required notice of the sale twenty-one days prior to
the sale), as the debtor did not have the benefit of a full twenty-one days (each day being
twenty-four hours) prior to the foreclosure sale. Because of this amendment, lenders will no
longer need to be concerned about what time of day the notice is posted and mailed to the




In a case which will impact the drafting of documents in all types of trans-
actions, including real estate transactions, the Texas Supreme Court ex-
tended the "express negligence" doctrine from indemnity agreements to
releases of liability and further held that indemnities and releases to which
the express negligence doctrine applies must be conspicuous. 512 In Dresser
the Texas Supreme Court held that "fair notice requirements" apply equally
to releases as well as to indemnity agreements when the effect of the release
or indemnity is to relieve a party in advance for its own negligence. 513 In the
court's opinion, fair notice requirements include both the express negligence
doctrine and a conspicuousness requirement.5 14 The court then adopted the
standard for conspicuousness set forth in section 1.201(10) of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code for indemnity and release provisions which
relieve a party in advance for its own negligence.5 15
The Dresser decision makes several drafting considerations obvious.516
First, even in instances where an indemnity clause contained in an agree-
ment complies with the express negligence doctrine, the indemnity clause
may not comply with the conspicuous requirements imposed by the Dresser
court. Consequently, any documents containing any such indemnifications
should be carefully reviewed, and the applicable language indemnifying a
party for its own negligence should be highlighted in some way so as to
satisfy the conspicuousness requirement. In light of the court's examples
given in the opinion, the applicable language should be either capitalized or
highlighted in contrasting type, such as a bold typeface. Second, the real
estate practitioner should carefully review a document for provisions releas-
ing his or her client in advance from its own negligence. Any such releases
must be drafted to comply with the express negligence doctrine and the con-
spicuousness requirements which are applicable to indemnity clauses. In
other words, the language must clearly express the intent of the parties that
512. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993).
513. Id. at 507-08.
514. Id at 508. The express negligence doctrine was enunciated by the Texas Supreme
Court in Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Tex. 1980), where the
court held that a party seeking to be indemnified from its own negligence in advance must
clearly express that intent in specific terms within the four corners of the agreement. Id.
515. Id. at 511 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(10) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1994)). Section 1.201 states that a clause is conspicuous when "it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it." TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 1.201(10) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987). The court then stated that language in
capital headings, language of a contrasting type and language in an extremely short document
were examples which satisfied the conspicuousness requirement. 853 S.W.2d at 510.
516. For instance, a lease typically contains various indemnification and release provisions
where the tenant and landlord release and/or indemnify each other with respect to acts result-
ing on property within the respective parties' control. A waiver of subrogation provision in a
lease should also be carefully examined to ascertain that the waiver complies with the fair
notice requirements. Another example is a seller of real estate who enters into a contract
which allows the purchaser to enter onto the seller's land to perform certain testing in connec-
tion with the purchaser's due diligence of the property (e.g., soil and environmental tests). In
this case, the seller will want to be sure that the indemnity provisions comply with the express
negligence doctrine and conspicuousness requirements.
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a party be released in advance for its own negligence, and the release must be
highlighted through the use of capitalized letters, different typeface, or some
other similar method which would ensure that a reasonable person against
whom the release is to operate should have noticed the release provision.
Clearly, indemnity, release, and waiver provisions which were once ignored
because they were buried in the boiler plate provisions of a contract will be




TEXAS REAL ESTATE STATUTES-1993
*All statutes effective September 1, 1993 unless otherwise noted*
HB 2537 DEVELOPMENT OF LAND - TESTING FOR
LANDFILL
Adds Subchapter R, Chapter 361, Health and Safety Code; amends
Section 363.064, Health and Safety Code.
A. Any person undertaking the development of over one acre of land
must conduct soil testing to determine if any part of the tract
overlies a closed municipal solid waste landfill.
B. Engineer who conducts the testing is required to notify Texas
Natural Resources Conservation Commission (TNRCC) if he
determines the tract overlies a closed municipal solid waste
landfill.
C. Regardless of whether testing reveals the presence of a landfill,
owner or lessee of the land for which a test is done must submit
the test results to the Executive Director of the TNRCC 30 days
before development begins.
D. If land overlies a landfill, owner or lessee of the land must obtain a
permit from the TNRCC before developing the land.
E. Civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation of the Act.
HB 1218 CLARIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL LANDLORD'S
LOCKOUT REMEDY FOR NONPAYMENT OF RENT
Amends Section 93.002(f), Property Code.
In connection with posting a written notice on a commercial tenant's
front door, after a lockout, stating the name of the individual or com-
pany from whom or which a new key may be obtained, the new key
need only be provided if the tenant pays the delinquent rent.
HB 1113 TEXAS BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE OMNIBUS
BILL
Modifies Texas enactment of Uniform Commercial Code by repealing
Chapter 6 (concerning bulk transfers), adding Chapter 2A (concerning
leases of goods) and adding Chapter 4A (concerning funds transfers).
Also modifies Chapter 24, Business and Commerce Code (concerning
fraudulent transfers), and adds new sections to Chapter 35, Business
and Commerce Code (concerning contractual choice of law provisions





" Applies to a lease of goods even if the goods become
"fixtures." Fixture filing protects lessor against competing
claims by lienholders or others with an interest in the real
estate. Generally, lessor may get priority if the fixture filing
is recorded within 10 days after the goods became fixtures
and if lessee has an interest of record in, or possession of, the
real estate.
* Construction mortgage may take priority over lessor's
interest if the construction mortgage was recorded before the
goods became fixtures and before completion of construction.
" Without a fixture filing, lessor still has a superior interest if
the fixtures are (1) readily removable factory or office
machines, (2) readily removable equipment that is not
primarily used or leased for use in the operation of real
estate, or (3) readily removable replacements of domestic
appliances that are subject to a consumer lease.
* Lessor with a superior interest who removes fixtures must
compensate an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who
is not the lessee for the cost of repair (but not for any
diminution in value) of real estate caused by the absence of
the goods removed or any necessity of replacing them.
* Upon default under a lease that covers both real property
and goods, a non-defaulting party can proceed under
Chapter 2A as to the goods only, or under real property laws
as to both real property and the goods, in which case Chapter
2A will not apply.
B. Fraudulent Transfer Act.
Changes to the fraudulent transfer rules allow a transferee
who has made certain types of improvements in good faith to
have a lien on the assets transferred, at least under state law.
The lien, which is for the value of the improvements, is prior
to the rights of the voiding creditor.
C. New Choice of Law Sections.
* Parties to transactions involving $1,000,000 or more are
generally permitted to agree in writing upon the law of a
particular jurisdiction to govern their transaction so long as
the transaction bears a "reasonable relation" to that
jurisdiction. Choice of law is to be honored even if the
chosen law is contrary to a fundamental or public policy of
Texas.
* Statute specifies means for meeting the "reasonable relation"
test.
* Parties can also agree in writing that the law of a jurisdiction
governs the interpretation of an agreement regardless of




* New rules do not apply to a determination of the law that
governs whether a transaction transfers or creates an interest
in real property (for security purposes or otherwise) or other
matters relating to the creation of a real property interest, to
foreclosures of real property liens, or to the manner and
effect of recording or failing to record a document
concerning an interest in real property. Also, new rules do
not apply when another statute provides that the transaction
will be governed by laws of a particular jurisdiction.
* Exceptions to the foregoing rules exist with respect to
contracts principally for construction or repair of
improvements to real property in Texas.
HB 2005 USURY CURE - COMMERCIAL LOANS (effective
8/30/93)
Adds Article 5069-1.06(4) and (5), Texas Civil Statutes.
A. Commercial lender may cure usury violations as follows: within
60 days after the date lender actually discovers the usury violation,
lender must correct the violation by performing any required duty
or act or by refunding any usurious amount. Lender must also
give written notice to obligor of the violation before obligor has
given written notice of, or has filed an action alleging, the
violation.
B. Commercial lender given until March 1, 1994 to cure existing
usury violations if lender gives written notice to obligor of the
violation before obligor has given written notice of, or has filed an
action alleging, the violation.
HB 1368 SECURITY DEVICES FOR RESIDENTIAL RENTAL
PROPERTY
Amends Sections 92.001, 92.005, Property Code; Subchapter D,
Chapter 92, Property Code.
A. New requirements for security devices in residential rental
property.
Expanded definitions of security devices (e.g., "door viewer"
and "keyless bolting device") and expanded coverage of
doors and windows (e.g., upgraded security on exterior
doors; extra security on sliding glass doors; security for
French doors). Upgrades generally applicable to new
construction after 9/1/93 and to all units after 1/1/95.
" Rekeying of security devices required on each tenant
turnover.
" Certain security devices can be requested by tenant at
tenant's expense.
* Explanation of landlord's duty to repair or replace security
devices. Seven day response time to tenant request;




B. Remedies available to tenants for landlord's failure to install or
rekey security devices. Besides a lawsuit, tenant may install or
rekey and deduct reasonable costs thereof from rent. Tenant may
also serve written request for compliance by landlord; landlord's
failure may result in unilateral termination of lease without court
proceedings.
C. Remedies available to tenants for landlord's failure to comply
with tenant's request regarding security devices. Landlord has
defense if tenant has not fully paid costs requested by landlord
under statute.
D. Management company or managing agent included with owner in
definition of "landlord."
" Management company or managing agent who is not the
owner of the dwelling has defense if company or agent does
not have funds of the dwelling owner in its possession with
which to comply; makes a written request of the dwelling
owner to fund and allow security device action; and provides
tenant with notice stating that the company or agent has
taken the preceding actions but the owner has not provided
the company or agent with the necessary funds and
explaining the remedies to the tenant.
" Tenant's remedies on notice from management company -
unilateral lease termination or exercise of other remedies
under the statute.
SB 170 SWIMMING POOL ENCLOSURES (Section 1 effective
9/1/93; Section 2 effective 1/1/94)
Adds Subchapter C, Chapter 214, Local Government Code; Chapter
757, Subtitle A, Title 9, Health and Safety Code.
A. Section 1 - Municipality may establish, by ordinance, minimum
standards for swimming pool fences and enclosures.
" Municipality that adopts an ordinance may remedy a
substandard enclosure or fence. Municipality can assess its
expenses on, and municipality has a lien against, the property
upon which the swimming pool or the enclosure or fence is
situated unless property is a homestead. Lien is primary to
other liens except tax liens and previously recorded mortgage
liens.
* Ordinance may provide for penalty not to exceed $1000 per
day.
B. Section 2 - Numerous specific requirements imposed on pool
enclosures and doors and windows opening into a pool yard.
Applies to (1) a pool owned, controlled or maintained by an
owner of a multi-unit rental complex or by a property owner's
association and (2) doors and windows of rental dwellings
opening into the pool yard of a multi-tenant rental complex or
condominium, cooperative or townhome project.
0 "Pool" includes spa or hot tub over 18 inches deep.
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* Affirmative duties to exercise ordinary and reasonable care
(1) to inspect (not less than every 31 days) and maintain pool
yard enclosures, gates and self closing and self latching
devices and (2) to maintain the window latches, sliding door
latches, sliding door pin locks and sliding door security bars
after request or notice from the tenant that the devices are
malfunctioning or in need of repair.
* Texas Board of Health may impose stricter rules.
C. Section 2 - Tenant of a multi-unit rental complex, a member
of a property owner's association, a governmental entity or any
other person may maintain an action against the owner or
property owner's association for failing to comply with the
requirements of the statute. Remedies include:
* Punitive damages if the owner or owner's association acted
intentionally, maliciously or with gross negligence.
* Judgment for a civil penalty of not more than $5000 if the
owner or owner's association fails to comply with the statute
within a reasonable time after written notice by a tenant.
D. Statute exempts from some of its requirements pool yard
enclosures constructed before 1/1/94 which comply with
applicable municipal ordinances existing on 1/1/94.
HB 1149 PROPERTY INTEREST TRANSFERRED BY RECEIVER
OR CONSERVATOR OF A FAILED DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTION (effective 8/30/93)
Adds Section 12.017, Property Code.
A. If a financial institution is placed in receivership or
conservatorship by state or federal agency, a person at any time
may record an affidavit or memorandum of a sale, transfer,
purchase or acquisition agreement between the receiver or
conservator of the failed depository institution and another
depository institution.
B. If the sale, transfer, purchase or acquisition agreement transfers or
sells an interest in land or in a mortgage or other lien vested
according to the property records in the failed depository
institution, a recorded affidavit or memorandum under this section
is constructive notice of the transfer or sale.
C. Failure of the affidavit or memorandum to be executed by the
record owner or failure of the affidavit, memorandum or
agreement to contain the language of conveyance does not
create a defect in title to the land or the lien.
HB 273 TEXAS REVISED PARTNERSHIP ACT (effective 1/1/94)
Enacts new partnership act to eventually replace Texas Uniform
Partnership Act.
A. Generally, follows structure of 1992 version of Uniform
Partnership Act.
B. Some substantive differences between Texas Act and 1992
Uniform Partnership Act, including:
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* Withdrawal of a partner does not require winding up the
partnership; instead, the interest of the withdrawing partner
must be redeemed at fair value unless a majority in interest of
the remaining partners elect to wind up.
* Creditors of the partnership must exhaust partnership assets
before collecting from individual partners who have joint and
several liability for partnership debts.
* Partners' duties are defined as "loyalty and care."
C. New Act applies to all partnerships after December 31, 1998, to
partnerships formed on or after the effective date of the Act and
to pre-existing partnerships that elect to adopt the Act.
HB 1239 REVISIONS TO TEXAS LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY ACT, TEXAS BUSINESS CORPORATION
ACT AND ASSUMED BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL
NAME ACT
Amends named acts.
A. General purposes of amendments include:
* Increase flexibility of Business Corporation Act.
* Refine provisions governing formation and operation of
limited liability companies.
* Reduce inadvertent inclusion of provisions that would keep
limited liability companies from being taxed like
partnerships.
B. Specific amendments include:
" Elimination of requirement for annual meetings of
shareholders of mutual funds.
• Clarification that corporate entity is to be disregarded in
contract cases only in the event of actual fraud.
* Refinement of merger provisions.
" Professional limited liability companies permitted for
architects, attorneys, doctors, accountants and certain other
professionals.
HB 156 UNIFORM CONDOMINIUM ACT (effective 1/1/94)
Adds Chapter 82, Title 7, Property Code.
A. Enacts the Uniform Condominium Act, with certain
modifications. Generally, governs every condominium for which a
declaration is recorded on or after January 1, 1994.
B. Certain provisions of the Act will apply to all condominiums in
Texas. Examples: minimum insurance requirements; 90-day
redemption period after a foreclosure at which a condominium
association purchases a unit. Otherwise, condominiums existing
before January 1, 1994 continue to be subject to the current
condominium statute unless an election is made by the
condominium association to be governed by the new Act.
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SB 314 BROKER'S ABILITY TO REPRESENT MORE THAN ONE
PARTY
Amends Section 15C, Article 6573a, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes.
A. Real estate broker may not act as agent for more than one party to
a transaction unless broker provides the parties with the applicable
agency form promulgated by the Real Estate Commission and
enters into written agreements in which all parties to the
transaction authorize broker to represent more than one party.
Written agreement must set forth the source of any expected
compensation to the broker.
B. Broker representing both sides has the following duties:
* Broker shall not disclose to the buyer or tenant that the seller
or landlord will accept a price less than the asking price
unless otherwise instructed in writing.
" Broker shall not disclose to the seller or landlord that the
buyer or tenant will pay a greater price than that offered
unless otherwise instructed in writing.
* Broker shall not disclose any confidential information unless
otherwise instructed in writing or required to under
applicable law.
• Broker shall treat all parties to the transaction honestly and
impartially.
C. Written agreement authorizing broker to represent more than one
party sufficient to establish the signing party's consent if
agreement sets forth in conspicuous bold or underlined print the
broker's obligations in B above.
HB 1081 SELLER'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE CONDITION OF HOME
TO PURCHASER (effective 1/1/94)
Adds Section 5.008, Subchapter A, Property Code.
A. Seller of residential real property comprising not more than one
dwelling unit must give to purchaser a prescribed form of notice
disclosing the condition of specified items, including:
* Various appliances, fixtures and amenities.
" Structure of the house and various systems within the house.
* Checklist as to various problems (such as termites, toxic
waste, asbestos, radon gas, flood plain, unplatted easements,
etc.).
" Homeowners' assessments.
* Violations of deed restrictions.
B. Notice is to best of Seller's knowledge, not a warranty of Seller or
its agent.
C. Disclosures do not apply to various stated transfers, including
new houses and transfers from a lender who obtained the
residence through foreclosure.
D. Notice to be delivered by seller to purchaser on or before the
effective date of the sales contract. If a contract is entered into
without seller providing the notice, purchaser may terminate the
contract for any reason within 7 days after receiving the notice.
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HB 1395 RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION LIABILITY (effective
8/30/93)
Amends Sections 27.001(2) and (3), Property Code.
A. Limits placed on contractor liability on residential construction
as follows:
" Definition of "structural failure" as actual physical damage
to load bearing portion of residence caused by failure of load-
bearing portion.
* Clarification that "goods" do not include a residence and
"personal injury" does not include mental anguish.
* Additional circumstance for which the contractor will not be
liable for damages - the contractor's reliance on written
information relating to the property that was obtained from
official government records, if the contractor did not know
and could not reasonably have known of the falsity or
inaccuracy of the information.
B. Limits damages recoverable under the statute for a construction
defect.
C. Adds a "reasonable" requirement with respect to the offer and
the attempted repairs made in connection with a settlement, the
failure to do either of which removes the limitations on damages
and defenses provided for in the statute.
D. Adds a provision requiring that a claimant must prove
causation.
HB 113 INSURANCE PAYMENT HELD BY LENDER
Adds Article 21.48B, Subchapter E, Chapter 21, Insurance Code.
A. In situations where a claim under an insurance policy for
damage to a one-to-four family residential real property is paid
to the insured and a lender holding a security interest in the
property and the lender holds all or part of the insurance claim
payment pending completion of all or part of the repairs:
* Lender must notify the insured within 10 days after the
insurance proceeds are received of the requirements that
must be met before the lender releases the insurance
proceeds.
* Within 10 days after the insured requests payment of the
insurance proceeds, lender must either pay the proceeds if
lender's requirements are met or notify the insured, in
specific detail, of the reasons the request is rejected and what
remaining requirements must be satisfied before the
insurance proceeds will be released.
" If lender fails to comply with the notice or payment
procedures, lender must pay to the insured interest on the
insurance proceeds held at the rate of 10% per annum.
B. No interest is due on insurance proceeds applied to the secured
debt in accordance with the governing loan documents.




SB 1243 ADDITIONAL FUNDING OF PETROLEUM STORAGE
TANK REMEDIATION FUND
Amends Section 403.092, Government Code; amends Section 26.3573,
Water Code; adds Section 26.35735, Water Code.
A. Permits transfer of up to $120 million from general revenue fund
to petroleum storage tank remediation fund on 9/1/93 (or as soon
as practical thereafter) to be used in 1994 and 1995 to pay
reimbursement claims and administrative expenses of the fund.
General revenue fund will be repaid with fees collected under
Water Code 26.3574.
B. Water Code amended to:
* Increase amount which may be spent on fund's
administrative expenses from 3% of fund's gross receipts to
5%, with the additional 2% being allocated to expense of
conducting claims audits, reimbursing eligible owners and
operators, and disposing of contaminated soils.
* Permit Water Commission to establish priorities for
payments and to suspend payments.
* Prohibit payment of interest on any claim.
* Require Water Commission to annually audit payment
claims (random sampling is permitted).
HB 1429 PROMPT PAYMENT TO CONTRACTORS AND
SUBCONTRACTORS
Adds Chapter 28, Property Code.
A. Owner must pay contractor within 45 days after receipt of written
request for payment from contractor or within 5 days after owner
receives loan proceeds with which to make such payment.
B. In written contract to construct single family residence, owner and
contractor may extend 45 day period to 60 days.
C. Amounts paid after due date bear interest at 18% per annum.
D. Contractor who receives payment from owner must pay its
subcontractors (subject to good faith dispute provisions under the
statute) no later than 7 days after the contractor receives payment.
E. Subcontractor who receives payment from contractor must pay
each of its subcontractors (such to good faith dispute provisions
under the statute) no later than 7 days after subcontractor receives
contractor's payment.
SB 540 ELIMINATION OF ARCHITECTURAL BARRIERS
Amends Article 9102, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes.
A. Permits Commissioner of Licensing and Regulation to modify or




B. Requirements for submission of plans and specifications for
construction or renovation applicable only where the estimated
construction costs are $50,000 or more. Inspection requirement
for such construction or renovation not later than the first
anniversary date of completion of such construction or renovation.
SB 176 DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT
Repeals Section 36A, Probate Code; adds Chapter XII, Probate Code.
A. Establishes new requirements for a durable power of attorney. To
be durable, a power of attorney must be acknowledged and state
that it is not affected by subsequent disability or incapacity of the
principal or that it becomes effective on the disability or incapacity
of the principal.
B. Under repealed Section 36A, power of attorney had to be signed
by two witnesses and publicly recorded to be durable.
C. Recordation requirement still applies for real property transactions
requiring execution and delivery of a recorded instrument.
D. Statutory form of durable power of attorney provided.
HB 2644 REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS
Amends Article 6573a.2, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes.
A. Expands powers and duties of Texas Appraiser Licensing and
Certification Board and describes procedures for initiation, review
and investigation of complaints against appraisers.
B. Includes a reciprocity provision.
C. Permits opinions by real estate brokers or salesmen licensed under
the Real Estate License Act as to the recommended listing price
for real estate, if such opinion is not referred to as an appraisal.
D. Expands definition of statutory "offenses" to a knowing or
intentional furnishing of false information in connection with an
affidavit filed under the statute.
HB 452 FORFEITURE NOTICE REGARDING CONTRACT FOR
DEED
Amends Section 5.062, Property Code.
A. Imposes additional notice requirements on a seller attempting to
enforce a forfeiture of interest and the acceleration of the
indebtedness under a contract for deed. The notice to the
purchaser must now include an itemization of the exact delinquent
amount, a statement of any additional charges claimed and the
period to which the delinquency and additional charges relate.
B. Affidavit of a person knowledgeable of the fact that notice was
given enables a bona fide subsequent purchaser for value to take
title free and clear of the contract.
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HB 1565 CASH PAYMENT FOR RENTAL OF RESIDENTIAL
PROPERTY
Adds Section 92.010, Property Code.
A. Landlord must accept a tenant's cash rental payment unless the
lease requires otherwise, and landlord must provide a receipt and
maintain a record book.
B. Tenant may file suit to enjoin a landlord from violation of this
section, and if he prevails may recover court costs and attorney's
fees, as well as the greater of one month's rent or $500 for each
violation.
HB 1144 TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY AFFIDAVITS -
RELEASE OF LIENS ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
(effective 8/30/93)
Adds Section 12.017, Property Code.
A. Applies only to mortgage on property consisting exclusively of one
to four family residence including a residential unit in a
condominium regime.
B. Title company authorized to execute and file affidavit of payment
to a mortgagee.
" Affidavit may not be filed until 60 days have elapsed since the
date payment was received by the mortgagee.
• Affidavit may not be filed until title company has given the
mortgagee at least 15 days notice in writing of its intention to
execute and record the affidavit and the mortgagee has failed
to respond to that notification.
* Evidence of mortgagee's receipt of payment must be attached
to affidavit.
C. Affidavit executed and recorded in accordance with the statute
releases the mortgage.
HB 1143 RECOVERY OF REAL PROPERTY CONVEYED BY AN
INSTRUMENT WITH TECHNICAL DEFECTS
Amends Section 16.033(a), Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
A. A person with a right of action for the recovery of real property
conveyed by an instrument with one of the stated defects must
bring suit not later than 4 (instead of the former 10) years after the
date the instrument was recorded.
B. Stated defects comprised primarily of specified failures in
signatures, acknowledgments and evidence of authority.
SB 355 RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF REAL PROPERTY SOLD
AT A TAX SALE (effective 1/1/94, subject to voter approval)
Amends Section 34.21, Tax Code.
A. Continues the 2-year redemption period after a tax sale only for an
owner of a residence homestead or agricultural property.
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B. The owner of any other type of real property sold at a tax sale may
redeem the property within 6 months after the date on which the
purchaser's deed is filed.
HB 1300 CLARIFYING CHANGES TO PROPERTY CODE
Amends various Sections, Property Code.
A. Confirmation that Property Code, Section 51.002(d), only applies
to residential debtors; thus, only residential debtors need be given
20 days' opportunity to cure default before the 21-day notice of
foreclosure sale is given.
B. Entire calendar day on which the 20-day notice to cure is given is
included in computing the 20-day cure period. Entire calendar
day on which the notice of foreclosure sale is given is excluded
from the 20-day cure period.
C. Entire calendar day on which the 21-day notice of foreclosure sale
is given is included in computing the 21-day notice of foreclosure
sale period. Entire calendar day of the foreclosure sale is excluded
from the 21-day period.
HB 1876 CANCELLATION OF JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
LIENS AFTER BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
Adds Sections 52.041, 52.042, 52.043, Property Code.
A. Judgment is discharged and any abstract of judgment or judgment
lien is released without further action in any court if (1) the lien is
against real property owned by the debtor before a petition was
filed under federal bankruptcy law and (2) the debt or obligation
evidenced by the judgment is discharged in the bankruptcy.
B. Judgment liens for debts or obligations not discharged in
bankruptcy or against property not exempted in bankruptcy and
abandoned during bankruptcy are not affected.
HB 496 PLATTING REQUIREMENTS
Amends Section 212.004(a) and (c), Local Government Code.
A. Requires owner of land to prepare and file subdivision plat if lots
are either combined or divided or to lay out streets, alleys, etc.
Prior statute required filing of subdivision plat where lots were
divided to lay out streets, alleys, etc. Excepted from amended
provisions are divisions of land into 5 acres or more, provided each
division has access and no public improvements are being
dedicated.
B. Finally, regarding variances requested by replat, 3/4ths of the
members of the planning commission (or other governing body)
that are present at the meeting must approve the requested
variance. Prior statute provided for 3/4ths of the members of the
planning commission (or other governing body).
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